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JUSTICIABILITY:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL PROBLEM SOLVING'*
THOMAS BARTON*
Much has been written about adjudication, almost all of it describing a
thing in isolation, a detached procedure for determining legal rights and duties.
This article attempts to discover something about adjudication by looking at
the concept of justiciability. "Justiciability" is here defined as the many rela-
tionships between adjudicative procedures, and the problems such procedures
are asked to resolve. So understood, justiciability offers an original perspective
from which the workings, capacities, and limitations of adjudication can be
better explored.
The article begins by creating a theoretical framework for understanding
the structure of problems in general, procedures in general, and the major links
between problems and procedures. The assumptions are made and developed,
(1) that quite apart from their differing content, problems differ from one
another in ways that can be described by eight structural variables; (2) that
procedures for solving problems evolve over time in ways best suited to solving
such problems; (3) that procedure's can be described according to eight struc-
tural variables that are closely associated with the eight problem variables.
Every problem possesses structural characteristics allowing the problem to be
best resolved by a procedure employing predictable features. Conversely,
every social procedure for solving problems is made up of features that cope
best with problems possessing a certain predictable structure.
Once such a general framework is developed, any given procedure can be
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described and evaluated according to its relationships to the problems it is
asked to solve. The remainder of the article is so devoted to describing and
evaluating adjudicative procedures. Adjudication is first characterized by the
eight procedure variables. Next, the ideal structure of a problem to be solved
by adjudicative procedures is described. Where adjudication is asked to solve
problems that possess structures that deviate from such ideal, the problem may
be described as bearing a "dissonant" relationship with adjudication. Judges
respond to such dissonance by refusing to hear the problem, or by somehow
modifying the problem so as to conform its structure to the ideal structure, or
by adapting the adjudicative procedures so as to conform with the structural
demands of the problem. The validation of this theory of justiciability lies in its
power to explain, and perhaps even predict, the spe4fic sorts of problem modifi-
cations, or procedural adaptations, that occur when a wide diversity of prob-
lems displaying a variety of structural dissonances with the features of tradi-
tional adjudication are nonetheless accepted for resolution within the legal
system.
I. A THEORY FOR AN ELUSIVE CONCEPT
A general description and explanation of justiciability has never been
published, perhaps because of the "notorious difficulty" of defining the con-
cept.' Stating an acceptable definition is difficult because justiciability seems as
much a judicial tool as a legal doctrine. As Justice Frankfurter wrote,
Justiciability is of course not a legal concept with fixed content or
susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of
many subtle pressures, including the appropriateness of the issues for
decision . . . and the actual hardship to the litigants of denying them
the relief sought.'
Frankfurter is correct and his statements have implications for the
methodology that must be used to understand justiciablity. Justiciability can-
not usefully be examined solely within the confines of the legal system. The
concept must be embedded within a larger theory of problem solving. This
limitation in method arises from two peculiar properties possessed by
justiciability. First, as the term traditionally is used, justiciability is definable
only by reference to itself; and second, justiciability is unusually protean, that
is, it manifests itself in many different forms.
Justiciability is, in effect, a closed system of judges regarding themselves. 3
' Marshall, Justiciability, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: A COLLABORATIVE
WORK 265, 269 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1960).
3
 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (1978). Professor Lawrence Tribe
has written:
Justiciability doctrine is peculiarly self-regarding. In deciding whether a case or con-
troversy exists, .. . courts decide whether they would be acting appropriately if they
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 507
That is, "justiciability" as described by judges consists of statements by judges
about the propriety of judges making statements about anything, presumably
including the propriety of making statements. It is impossible to prove, using
only judges' statements about the propriety of judges making statements,
which statements are in fact made appropriately. No one statement can be
determinative since any such statement may itself have been made inap-
propriately. Hence, justiciability can be fully understood only by adopting a
perspective beyond, rather than within, the closed system. Such a perspective
is attained first by employing non-legal language, avoiding such terminology as
"rights," "duties," "obligations," and "causes of action." 4 Second, the
broader perspective is achieved by avoiding reference to what judges have
resolved the question which the litigants press upon them. [A description of
justiciability], therefore, is in an important sense the description of an institutional
psychology: an account of how the . . . courts ... view their own role .... The con-
cept of justiciability is thus not exhausted by the set of specific limitations which the
Court derives from it.
Id. Tribe's final sentence, the conclusion that justiciability cannot be proven by examining what
limitations judges have said to exist, follows logically from his description of justiciability as " self-
regarding."
4
 The need to transcend legal language in discussing justiciability underlies Professor
Marshall's conclusion that existing notions of justiciability are largely tautological. Marshall,
supra note 1, at 278. He is unquestionably correct in this conclusion. The textbook answer to the
meaning of "justiciability" is: a controversy respecting some "legal interest," or some "legal
right," or even some "legal problem." Such answers, says Marshall, ultimately come to nothing
because virtually any dispute can be couched in legal language. Id. Identification of a "legal in-
terest" or "legal right" or "legal problem" is therefore merely a conclusion. Affixing the label
"legal" to a problem is not a reliable criterion for what is actually justiciable. Marshall writes:
No dispute or issue is inherently justiciable or suited to judicial solution. The sup-
position that it might be involves the assumption that a dispute can be clearly con-
trasted with its method of settlement and described independently. But once an
issue or contest of interests is defined it is impossible to avoid mentioning or imply-
ing at least some indication of what constitutes winning or losing (e.g. that the con-
test is not to the death or one for physical combat) and therefore indicating some
limitations on procedures. Yet once the description of the issue is filled out the con-
trast between the issue itself and its mode of settlement crumbles.
Id. Marshall's tautological circle, therefore, is drawn as follows: An issue is justiciable if it con-
cerns legal interests; but any issue concerns legal interests if a judge describes the issue in such
terms; hence an issue is justiciable if a court hears the issue, i.e. those issues are justiciable that
are adjudicated. Professor Summers suggests the escape from this tautology:
Undoubtedly an issue can be formulated in terms which suggest the appropriateness
of a specific mode of settlement. But this same issue may also be formulated in terms
suggesting other modes of settlement .... [Marshall's] analysis does not impair the
defensibility of a thesis that some disputes are 'inherently' suited to court solution.
Such analysis shows only that ... it is possible to indulge in question-begging by
describing an issue in, for example, 'judicial' terms, and then proclaiming that the
issue is, 'by its nature' suited to judicial solution.
Summers, Justiciability, 26 MoD. L. REV. 530, 532 (1963).
The concept of justiciability is, for Summers, no more inherently tautological than
other concepts. As both Summers and Marshall no doubt realize, Marshall's tautology is avoided
if one assesses justiciability with no reference to legal language. It is for that reason that
methodologically this paper proceeds by a theory that makes no reference to legal notions or legal
categories.
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stated or held regarding justiciability. Such an approach better develops
justiciability as a tool to assess what sorts of problems are, and are not, suitable
for adjudication.'
In addition to being self-regarding, justiciability is unusually protean. A
satisfactory theory of justiciability should therefore somehow account for a
wide array of judicial behavior and legal doctrine. Specifically, the theory
should suggest why, and in what sort of cases, judges: (1) refuse outright to
hear a particular issue; (2) "functionally refuse" to hear a case, perhaps by in-
voking one of the "prudential doctrines" of lack of standing, mootness,
"ripeness," or advisory opinion; (3) hear a case, but employ a rule or standard
that allows the court to avoid making any meaningful inquiry; (4) hear a case,
but appear to modify the issue to suit their purposes; and (5) hear a case, but in
doing so seem to step out of their traditional role of adjudicators. Such a diver-
sity of phenomena can be systematically explained only at a fairly high level of
abstraction. If the above practices can be seen as forming an overall pattern,
then the relationships between adjudicative procedures and the problems it is
asked to solve will have been described. The analysis holds many implications
for whether and how judges in the future deal with certain sorts of problems.
The theory also could be useful in the design of alternative dispute resolution
techniques. 6
A. Eight Variables that Describe Problems
Virtually no studies of social phenomena have attempted to differentiate
problems according to characteristics other than the specific content of the
The distinction between justiciability as a statement of fact and justiciability as a
statement of assessment, was first made by Marshall. Marshall, supra note 1, at 267, 268. Any
descriptive approach based on finding such criteria as "cause of action," or "jurisdiction" or
"legal controversy," by which cases are actually adjudicated or not adjudicated, ultimately will
be rooted in categories of thought defined by the legal system. So to avoid legal language means
not only to seek a new vocabulary, but also to draw evidence or information underlying the
theory from extra judicial sources.
6
 Another advantage to the extra-judicial approach to justiciability used in this article
is that a purely descriptive theory of justiciability can have little practical application. Current
practice concerning which cases are heard by judges and which cases are refused may be
undesirable or inefficient, and only a more detached theory can suggest directions for change.
Not all resulting prescriptions, however, would necessarily be levelled at judges. The sets "issues
actually adjudicated" and "issues suitable for adjudication" may diverge for several reasons, on-
ly a minor one being that the judge has mistaken the boundaries of justiciability. A more impor-
tant cause of error is one identified by Marshall: that issues unsuitable for adjudication are
foisted on the courts by the legislature. Marshall, supra note 1, 268. As a practical matter,
legislatively imposed jurisdiction over specific issues can hardly be avoided.
Most commonly, however, the sets "issues actually adjudicated" and "issues suitable
for adjudication" diverge because an issue, although recognized as unsuitable by the judge, is
nonetheless heard because to refuse to hear the issue would in effect relegate the dispute to an
alternative settlement procedure that is violent, or disruptive, or inaccurate, or grossly unfair.
About such divergences not much can be said. Certainly the legal system would operate more ef-
ficiently if judges refused to transgress the boundaries of justiciability. Most would, however, ap-
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problems themselves.' In the prevailing sociological and psychological perspec-
tives, all problems arguably are structurally identical .. 8 From the perspective of
an institution called upon to resolve a problem, however, problems are not all
alike. A variety of structural characteristics, quite apart from content, can be
shown to exist.
It is crucial to a theory of justiciability that such structural variables be
identified. Only by so differentiating problems can one evaluate which sorts of
problems are, and are not, suitable for resolution by adjudication. By piecing
together distinctions drawn by various legal scholars, this article proposes a set
plaud the willingness of the judges to decide what are almost invariably difficult cases. Any
resulting inefficiency is simply a reflection of imperfect skill or imagination in the social construc-
tion of decisional procedures.
•	 The single exception uncovered is Fuller & Myers, Some Aspects of a Theory of Social
Problems, in 6 AM. Soc. REV. 24 (1941). The authors offer a threefold classification of social
problems on the principle of different levels of relationship to social values:
At the first level we have what we may call the physical problem. The physical prob-
lem represents a condition which practically all people regard as a threat to their
welfare, but value judgments cannot be said to cause the condition itself. This is.
perhaps best demonstrated by such catastrophic problems as earthquakes, hur-
ricanes, floods, droughts, locust plagues, and so forth. That these are 'serious' prob-
lems from the standpoint of the people which they affect, we can have no doubt.
However, we may raise the question whether or not they are 'social' problems, since
they do not usually occur because of conflicts in the value-scheme of the culture . .
At the second level, we have the ameliorative problem. Problems of this type represent
conditions which people generally agree are undesirable i.n any instance, but they
are unable to agree on programs for the amelioration of the condition . . . . Crime
and delinquency fall in this category ... . In contrast to the physical problem at the
first level, the ameliorative problem is truly 'social' in the sense that it is a man-
made condition. By this we mean that value judgments [such as mores of con-
spicuous consumption, and a belief in retributive punishment] not only help to
create the condition, but to prevent its solution .. .. At the third level we have what
we will call the moral problem. The moral problem represents a condition on which
there is no unanimity of opinion throughout the society that the condition ... is a
problem and thus many people do not feel that anything should be done about it.
With the moral problem, we have a basic and primary confusion in social values
which goes much deeper than the questions of solution which trouble us in the
ameliorative problem.
Id. at 27-80.
This is a good start but is confined to one variable, namely social values. This variable
is incorporated as one of the eight structural variables set out below, but there are others yet fur-
ther divorced from specific content that are equally important.
A. NEWELL & Fl. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING (1972), describe problems in
two general categories: the set-predicate representation and the search representation. These two
representations of problems suffice for them, although they do not claim the categories are ex-
clusive:
We need not make special provision for separate representation for each particular
problem. Instead, we can define representations that cover large classes of problems
... the set representation and the search representation. We have no guarantee that all
problems can be represented in one of these two forms.
Id. at 73.
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of eight variables by which problems can be described. 9 The variables are
grouped into those speaking primarily to the difficulty of the problem, to its set-
ting, and finally to any social concerns associated with the problem. Only the
two "social concerns" variables are directly related to the specific content of
the problem. Each of the eight structural variables is not a binary "have-have
not" property, but rather is an attribute continually changing in degree be-
tween two polar opposites. Along such continua exist infinite "mixes" of
relative influence of the two opposing qualities. The eight structural variables
are represented at Appendix A. The remainder of this section is an explanation
and justification of each variable.
1. The "Difficulty" of the Problem
a. Problem Variable Al: Whether the Problem is Composed of "Simple" or "Interactive"
Variables
A given problem is easier to the extent it is composed of "simple"
variables, more difficult to the extent its variables are "interactive." These
terms do not describe the content of a problem, but rather describe the relation-
ship between or among the variables that comprise a problem. A "simple"
problem is, for example, describing an apple. The variables making up the
problem include the degrees of "redness," "crispness," "juiciness," and
"ripeness." Such variables are simple because no variable influences any other
variable. The degree of "redness" has no bearing on the degree of "crispness"
or "juiciness." Each property could theoretically be maximized until one
reaches the Platonic "apple." An "interactive" problem, in contrast, is one
where trade offs exist among the variables that comprise the problem. For ex-
ample, if the task were to decide how many apples to produce in a given
season, the salient variables of "costs of production," "demand," "revenue,"
"market share," and "profits" could never all be maximized. As costs go up,
for example, profits are likely to go down. Each of the variables interacts in
some way with all the others, and a proper solution to the problem is an op-
timization that considers all the intricate connections. No variable can validly
be considered in complete isolation from the others." All problems exist
somewhere on a continuum between consisting entirely of simple variables and
9 Other variables could be listed, but in the interest of simplicity these eight are chosen
as the most revealing.
10 One commentator has termed problems whose variables interact "polycentric"
problems. M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 170-200
(1951). The late Lon Fuller adopted this phrase in several of his writings. See Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978); Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule
of Law, 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. Polycen-
tricity, says Fuller, is distinct from complexity. A problem may contain numerous and difficult
variables, and yet the relationship among such variables may be simple. Second, polycentricity is
not a matter merely of a multiplicity of affected parties; a polycentric problem can arise between
two parties. Id. at 4.
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consisting entirely of interactive variables. No matter where on the continuum
a problem is found, however, it can be solved by the application of some com-
bination of rational principles and intuition."
b. Problem Variable A2: Whether the Decisional Criteria of the Problem are Well-
Established or, Rather, are Unknown or Disputed
Any problem is easier to the extent that the criteria for its solution are
well-established. In one rather crude sense, this point is self-evident: solutions
come easier where governed by precise, well-known rules. The point is also
true, however, in a more subtle sense. Even where no rules specify a particular
outcome, solutions come easier where two things are well-established: (1) what
considerations are relevant; and (2) what weight each relevant consideration is
generally given in determining the overall solution. An example might be
found in creative cooking: no rules dictate particular recipes, but the good chef
knows the relevant considerations of taste and appearance, and knows what
weights or proportions of each ingredient are likely to achieve a pleasing result.
Moreover, the chef is aware of what amount of any single ingredient is likely to
result in a disastrous final product.
Where the relevant criteria for solving a problem are unclear, or the ap-
propriate weight to be accorded each criterion is unclear, a problem necessarily
becomes complex. 12 This is similar to the manner in which a problem becomes
" Among polycentric tasks, their difficulty and therefore their appropriate method of
solution vary. For certain tasks, such as understanding the forces between girders of a steel
bridge, the connections between variables are so well understood that all interactions can be
mathematically described. For other tasks (especially "economic tasks" (Polanyi, supra note 10,
at 173-75)) the relationships between variables are susceptible only to a series of well-informed
approximations. For yet other problems, the interactions are "altogether incomputable." Such
highly interactive problems cannot be solved "deliberatively," that is, through the imposition of
an externally-formulated order. Rather, such extremely interactive problems can only be re-
solved "spontaneously," that is, by allowing any internal forces acting among the variables to
play themselves out. Id. at 154-57, 176. See also infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. Polycen-
tric problems are not necessarily without rational solution. Rational principles can clearly guide
the solving of the first sort of polycentric task mentioned above, namely the building of a steel
bridge. To a perhaps less formal degree, rationality can guide the sort of solution that must pro-
ceed by well-informed hunches and approximations. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, supra
note 10, at 4.
12 Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon
Fuller, 92 HARv. L. REV. 410 (1978). To illustrate this point, Eisenberg discusses the problem of
selecting a college golf team. Choosing such a team, Eisenberg is careful to point out, is not a
polycentric problem because "golf is played on an individual basis and selection of the team
therefore entails little or no interaction between choices." Id. at 425. Nevertheless the problem is
difficult. This is so for two reasons. First, because the relevant criteria are somewhat doubtful.
Should one consider such factors as experience, desire, intelligence, and compatibility? Second,
the problem is difficult because:
What is more important, even if all the relevant criteria could be listed, no criterion
would be authoritative in the sense that it would trump other criteria, or even in the
sense that it carried an objective weight in relation to others,... If in these cases a
single criterion could be made dispositive, it would be possible to determine rights
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more complex as the number of interactive variables increases. The extent to
which the criteria are well established differs, however, from this first variable
in that the criteria can change greatly over time as a funtion of both the deci-
sional history of the particular problem and the manner in which the problem is
to be settled. Any instance of "first impression" in adjudication, for example,
will be at the difficult end of this variable because the decisional criteria will be
relatively unknown. As precedents build, the problem will gradually move to
the variable's easier end. Such movement cannot occur with respect to the first
variable; the simplicity or interaction of the variables making up the problem
remain constant regardless of decisional setting."
c. Problem Variable A3: Whether Decisional Information or Evidence is Based on Past, or
Future. Events
It seems both important and self-evident that it is easier to solve a problem
where the decisional criteria look to past events rather than future events. No
doubt every sort of datum upon which a decision is based is subject to some
uncertainty. Yet as flawed and interpretative as historical investigation may
be, it surely is more often accurate than conclusions based on predictions."
Future-based, and therefore more difficult, problems are of two sorts: First,
those that require an unalterable present action, the accuracy of which cannot
be judged until the occurrence of one or more future events. Second, there are
"planning" problems that set a goal more or less extended into the future, and
then attempt constantly to manipulate the environment in order that at the
specified time the goal will have been met. Both sorts of problems are generally
more difficult than problems which can be solved by bringing to bear historical
information.
2. The "Setting" of the Problem
a. Problem Variable B1: Whether the Relationship of the Parties is "Simplex" or
"Multiplex"
The terms "simplex" and "multiplex" have been used to describe rela-
tionships between parties." A "simplex" relationship between two parties is
by the application of that criterion 	 . The same might also be true if all criteria
could be objectively weighed and choices were not interdependent.
Id.
" The simplicity or interactiveness of a problem remains constant over time, but solv-
ing an interactive problem no doubt becomes easier as the decision-makers gain more experience
coping with the problem.
" Predictive techniques are probably furthest advanced in the area of technological
forecasting. A wide variety of methods have been used to predict what innovations will be made
in industry and science in the next 50 years. No one method is wholly satisfactory, and the record
of prediction on such matters as population and natural resource use and availability is not good.
Ste R. C. DORF, TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY AND MAN 289-307 (1974).
15 M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
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best exemplified by strangers joining in a discrete transaction. The sole nexus
between such persons is the content of the transaction. Where a problem arises
in a simplex relationship, inquiry is easily confined to what was said or done
pursuant to the transaction. At the opposite pole are "multiplex" relation-
ships, those that either involve a few ties that endure over time, or those that
involve complex ties in which the persons are linked in a variety of ways. Such
multiple-tie relationships may or may not endure over time, although most are
quite long-standing. Multiplex relationships are typified by the relationships
that exist within the nuclear family. Problems that arise in a multiplex relation-
ship differ from those that arise in a simplex relationship in at least three
respects: First, "problems" are not abnormal or unexpected occurrences in a
multiplex relationship. Indeed, the role expectations that evolve in such rela-
tionships may grow from an anticipation of problems." Second, when a prob-
lem in a multiplex relationship comes to the attention of third parties, inquiry
is not easily confined to the incidents of the immediate dispute. A valid or
helpful decision normally requires a fuller knowledge of the relationship and its
history. Third, whereas simplex parties can fairly'easily adopt adversarial roles
to solve a problem, it may be counterproductive to problem solution, or harm-
ful to the relationship, to require multiplex disputants to become adversaries
before a third party.
The relationship of the parties does not necessarily affect the difficulty of
their problem or its solution. In fact, the richer bonds between multiplex par-
ties may make finding a solution much easier than in a simplex relationship
where the parties are tied by a single transaction. Yet, given the likely inade-
quacy of adversarial proceedings, the existence of a multiplex setting does
perhaps call for the employment of different institutional techniques for prob-
lem solving, and therefore the variable is important.
b. Problem Variable B2: Whether the Dispute is "Private" or "Public"
The distinction between "private" and "public" disputes is important,
but becoming increasingly difficult to articulate and apply. One rather formal
approach" to the distinction suggests that a "private" dispute is "defined by
the absence of any initial participation by public authorities."" A private
problem may become so intense that state intervention, e.g. by the courts, is
requested. Still, such a dispute remains private. Under this approach,
RHODESIA 19, 20 (1955). The substance of Gluckrnan's distinction has been used by others, most
notably in the important article of MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. . 691
(1974).
" MacNeil, supra note 15. See also Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J.
JURIS. 1, 5, 7 (1969).
" Friedman, The Functions of Trial Courts in the Modern World, paper presented to the
Conference on the Sociology of the Judicial Process, Bielefeld, Germany, 1973, quoted in
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 6 (S. Goldman
& A. Sarat, ed. 1978).
" Id.
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"public" disputes are those in which the State is a disputant. Public disputes
therefore can be of two types: first, those initiated by the State where it is at-
tempting to enforce laws; and second, those wherein the State is defending a
challenge made to its overall authority or the propriety of one of its actions.°
Difficulty with this approach arises, however, in the specific context of
Anglo-American adjudication. Many cases now being adjudicated are an
amalgam of private and public interests; typically, such hybrid cases involve
the application of government regulation to particular circumstances, or the at-
tempt by one private party to constrain the activities of another based upon
constitutional considerations or statutory policies."
Yet maintaining some form of distinction between public and private
disputes is important. The existence and nature of State involvement may con-
strain the validity or effectiveness of certain institutional techniques for solving
the dispute. For example, very strict standards of evidence, proof, and con-
sistency may be considered necessary when resolving State-initiated prosecu-
tions. Or, since State-defendant disputes often involve decisions about the
proper role of the citizen vis-a-vis the State, it may be advisable to incorporate
decisional techniques that use wide publicity and public participation, fluid
standards of relevance, and non-final judgments. Alternatively, both such sorts
of techniques for solving public disputes may be unacceptable or simply too
burdensome for use in solving purely private disputes.
c. Problem Variable B3: Whether Private Resolution of the Problem is Feasible or
Infeasible
Whether the parties could or could not feasibly resolve their problem
amongst themselves is important, not so much to decide how an institution
might best approach the problem as to decide whether such an institution should
even attempt a solution. Most commonly the parties to a dispute have sufficient
access to one another that they could, at least theoretically, resolve their differ-
ences privately. Occasionally, however, obstacles block such private resolu-
tion. Consider, for example, the case of a factory that is emitting large amounts
of ash and soot, most of which falls on the properties of 1,000 surrounding
homeowners. A private resolution of this pollution problem is very difficult. If
according to law the factory is entitled to emit the smoke regardless of effects on
neighboring landowners, the pollution will cease only if the 1,000 surrounding
landowners negotiate an agreement with the factory owners whereby the fac-
tory stops polluting in exchange for the payment of compensation. The first
obstacle to this private resolution is organizational: how can the 1,000
homeowners coordinate their activities? The second obstacle is economic: how
are the homeowners to share the costs of compensating the factory? This prob-
" Id. at 6, 7.
20 Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
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lem is intensified by the "free rider effect:" invariably some of the 1,000
homeowners will refuse to contribute any money, claiming it is simply not im-
portant to them to have a yard free of soot and ash. Their real strategy is to
avoid contributing to the collective purchase of the factory's right to pollute.
Obviously, if too many homeowners adopt this strategy, the costs to the re-
maining homeowners will be too high, and the purchase of the entitlement will
be frustrated." Practically speaking, private resolution is infeasible in this
case. To be solved, the dispute must be resolved by an outside person with suf-
ficient power to compel payments by all of the homeowners."
Where private resolution is infeasible, decisional institutions may feel a
special urgency to hear the dispute. Conversely, where such private resolution
is feasible, the institution will erect barriers to entry to prevent strain on in-
stitutional resources.
3. The "Social Concerns" Associated with the Problem
a. Problem Variable Cl: Whether Social Consensus or Dissensus" Exists Regarding the
Proper Outcome of the Problem
For few problems can one identify the existence of public consensus or
dissensus regarding the proper outcome. Problems that are quite narrow, or
technical, or novel are generally not within the public domain as they are not
widely understood and generally little debate therefore takes place. For prob-
lems that are within such public domain, consensus or dissensus can vary both
by proportion of shared opinion, and by the intensity of commitment to such
opinions. A high consensus as to the appropriate outcome could affect deci-
sional institutions in at least three ways. First, the individuals making up the
institution may be predisposed toward the consensus outcome. Second, a deci-
" Similar obstacles would prevent a private resolution where the factory wants to
pollute (because pollution controls would be very expensive or impossible), but the law gives the
homeowners (through nuisance law, for example) the right to be free of such ash and soot. The
private resolution of this case would entail the factory buying up the individual rights of the 1,000
homeowners. Even if the practical obstacle of approaching 1,000 persons is overcome, the factory
would face the economic phenomenon of the "hold-out." As soon as any single homeowner
realizes that the factory is buying up the rights of his neighbors, and realizes further that the fac-
tory cannot emit the smoke unless it buys up all of the 1,000 "rights," the single homeowner may
well "hold-out" for an impossibly high price for his or her single right. Again, if too many
homeowners behave in this way, the private resolution will be frustrated.
22 For a useful introduction to the concept of externalities and "free rider" and "hold-
out" considerations, see W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
8-15 (1979). Private resolution infeasibility also may occur because one disputing party cannot
identify or deal with the persons with whom such a private resolution must be negotiated. Ex-
amples of this include disputes against unborn heirs, or against incompetents, or cases wherein a
party wishes to have recognized certain rights in rem.
23 "Dissensus" is here defined as disagreement within a group. The dissensus can be
measured by the relative proportions of those who hold various opinions on a topic, and/or by the
intensity with which such opinions are held. No attempt is made to differentiate such dimensions
when general reference is made to the term.
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sion contrary to the social consensus might adversely affect the prestige or
perceived legitimacy of the institution. Third, if the remedy for a particular
problem requires social cooperation, a decision contrary to consensus risks
noncompliance, thereby rendering the institution and its decision ineffectual.
Where sharp dissensus exists as to the proper outcome of a problem,
similar effects may obtain. Regardless of outcome, prestige-threatening
charges of partiality may be made and remedial implementation may be dif-
ficult. Furthermore, the decisional institution is likely to feel pressure against
giving a single, final judgment to such a dissensus problem. Rather, the prob-
lem is likely to be considered in fragmented form, or to recur in slightly dif-
ferent form with subtle nuances affecting the solutions.
In sum, social consensus or dissensus can affect an institutional decision to
hear, or refusal to hear, a given problem. Social consensus or dissensus may
also affect the shape of the techniques used to solve the problem, or affect the
level of specificity with which institutional decisions are articulated.
b. Problem Variable C2: Whether Private Resolution of the Problem is Socially Desirable
or Undesirable
Perhaps contrary to intuition, private resolution of disputes is not always
desirable. One must inquire by what means such a private resolution would pro-
ceed. Sometimes a private resolution is effected by self-help, which can take
forms that are highly unfair or disruptive. 24 Sometimes private resolution is by
physical violence, rights being determined by relative might. Even where
private resolution is more consensual, it may be unacceptable, as where the
parties are grossly disparate in sophistication or bargaining power. Under any
of these circumstances, the undesirable prospects of private resolution may
pressure a decisional institution to impose its own solutions.
Private resolution is especially undesirable where a problem involves a
"tragic choice." 25 Choices are tragic where they involve the social allocation of
"goods" that entail great suffering or death. When attention is riveted on such
distributions they arouse emotions of compassion, outrage, and terror. 26
Where a problem involves a tragic choice, the form and justification for a given
institutional solution may be affected as well as the decision to hear, or not
hear, the problem. Understandably, societies attempt to justify the allocation
of suffering and death by referring to "humanistic values which prize life and
well-being."" In fact, such allocations are made by the exigencies of cost, and
the caprice of nature. Yet to admit this risks social upheaval. Tragedy befalls
the humanist justification, which inexorably succumbs to fate and practicality.
24 See infra note 524 and accompanying text.
25 G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
26 Id. at 18. For a discussion of the legal treatment of certain of these "goods," see the
chapter The Value of Life in P. STEIN &J. SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 164-83
(1974).
27 G. CALABRESI & P. BOBEITT, supra note 25, at 18.
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One example of a tragic choice is the allocation of the use of a kidney
dialysis machine." Suppose two persons require access to the kidney machine
in order to survive, but the machine has the capacity to treat only one person.
Suppose private resolution of this problem is perfectly feasible: the patients are
both in the waiting room and the hospital agrees to allow one party to buy out
the other. A private resolution is manifestly undesirable because: First, society
is uncomfortable to learn what life, in this context, is worth in monetary terms.
Second, society is uncomfortable in confronting the effects of the existing
distribution of wealth: the poorer person presumably will lose this bidding; the
question is at what point must he stop?"
Problems involving tragic choices therefore inevitably are referred to in-
stitutions for decision, rather than left to private resolution. Such problems,
however, place extraordinary demands on the resilience and creativity of such
institutions. The allocation must be made, yet it must be made in such a man-
ner that will "preserve the moral foundations of social collaboration. If this is
successfully done, the tragic choice is transformed into an allocation which does
not appear to implicate moral contradictions. Morally debasing outcomes are
averted. "S 0 Hence in the special case of a problem involving a tragic choice,
not only is there special pressure on institutions to decide the issues because
private resolution is undesirable, but also, great care must be taken in the form
and articulated justification of the decision.
4. Summary
This article proposes that the above eight variables represent the most im-
portant structural features possessed by all problems. Each such variable af-
fects whether, or how, an institution will approach a given problem. In the next
section, decisional institutions are similarly analyzed. The tools will then exist
for evaluating how problems and procedures do, and do not fit together.
B. Eight Variables that Describe Procedures
Various jurisprudential and sociological works have attempted to classify
decisional procedures. 3 ' The classifications made by jurisprudential writers
28
 Id.
" G. Calabresi, Another View of Torts, lecture delivered at Cambridge University, 1980.
3° G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 25, at 18.
" Synopses of such efforts are given in separate works by two legal anthropologists. See
Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW AND SOC. REV. 217 (1973);
Nader, Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOC'Y 86-91 (L.
Nader, ed. 1969). See also L. NADER & H. TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS — LAW IN TEN
SOCIETIES 1-4-0 (1978). Both accounts of the history of procedural taxonomy reveal a gradual
evolution in precision, and also highlight the variety of concepts that have been employed as
bases for classifications. Sir Henry Maine and Emile Durkheim were the earliest contributors,
each grouping decisional procedures according to a single variable. Maine's famous "status ver-
sus contract" (H.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1950) (first published 1861)) distinction was made
in the context of family law. Since his time, the distinction has been widely used in other con-
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have been more descriptive than aculturally analytical. The shared opinion
among such legal writers recognizes that "adjudication is only one among
many methods of conflict resolution in free societies. For varying purposes we
[also) resort to voting, bargaining, mediation, lotteries, and even restricted
private warfare." 32
This article proposes an original classification of decisional procedures,
again based on eight variables (see Appendix B). Once again, each variable is
conceived as a continuum running between polar opposites. Beyond this for-
mal similarity, however, each of the eight procedure variables is substantively related to
its correspondingly numbered problem variable. Each procedure variable is in a sense an in-
stitutional response to its problem variable counterpart. Conversely, each problem variable is
in a sense a cognitive and linguistic response to its procedure variable counterpart. In other
words, between similarly numbered problem and procedures variables there
exists a form of continuity:" a given aspect of a problem will influence the
texts. Together with Durkheim's "repressive versus restitutive" concept, E. DURKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Simpson trans. 1947) (first published 1893), the two dyads still
illustrate two alternative yet fundamental approaches. Maine distinguishes systems of family law
according to the sorts of problems considered by such systems, and the relationships between the
procedures and the parties. Durkheim, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the shape
of the decision, and its larger effects in society. Since their time, many variations on each ap-
proach have been devised. Social scientists like B.S, Cohn, Cohn, Some Notes on Law and Change in
North India, 8 ECON. DEVEL. CUL. CHANGE 79 (1959), and Villein Aubert, Aubert, Competition
and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 25 (1963), have
proliferated the classificatory variables in order to account for the variety of decisional institutions
that exist both cross-culturally and even within a single society. Cohn describes four variables
that distinguish the English legal system from the typical Indian legal system: (1) equality in the
eyes of the law; (2) status and contract; (3) importance of the decision; and (4) settlement of the
case and only the case. "Norms" and "interests" are the basis of Aubert's work. Beginning with
a comparative analysis of these concepts, he constructs two ideal types of decisional systems: an
adjudicative model based on "norms," and a bargaining model based on "interests." Aubert's
work is a major contribution. Nader suggests that her own data support Aubert. Nader, supra
note 31, at 87.
Finally, a novel and comprehensive typology of the collective techniques by which socie-
ty discharges all its functions is offered by Robert Summers. Summers, The Technique Element in
Law, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1971). His five basic techniques are: the grievance-remedial, the
penal, the administrative-regulative, the public-benefit conferral, and the private-arranging.
These differ in primary thrust (one is reparative, one prohibitive, one regulative, one
distributive, and one facilitative); and in immediate returns (compensation, crime prevention,
regulatory compliance, substantive public benefit, and individual self-realization); and in their
use of legal resources and extent of reliance on coercion.
" Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation on Separa-
tion of Powers, 18 J. PUB. L. 339, 339 (1969).
93 Fuller has made a similar point in the narrower context of different forms of law and
the problems traditionally solved by each such form:
[L]aw and its social environment stand in a relation of reciprocal influence; any
given form of law will not only act upon, but be influenced and shaped by, the
established forms of interaction that constitute its social mileau.
Fuller, supra note 16, at 27. Fuller's next sentence shows, gratifyingly, the relevance of this arti-
cle:
This means that for a given social context one form of law may be more appropriate
than another, and that the attempt to force a form of law upon a social environment
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evolution of a given procedure for its resolution." Patterns of approaching
problems similarly influence the ways in which new problems are articuIated. 33
The remainder of this section first explains and attempts to justify each of
the eight proposed procedures variables. The relationship between each such
procedures variable and its corresponding problem variable is then briefly ex-
plored. The discussion of such relationship is necessarily evaluative, and a
given sort of procedure will be deemed well-suited, or not well-suited, to a
given sort of problem. To add some precision to such evaluations, the article
will at various times consider three distinct dimensions of the suitability of a
given procedure for a given problem: the "accuracy," the "efficiency," and
the "acceptability" of the procedure. 36
1. The Decisional Process
a. Procedures Variable Al: Whether the Decision is Made Deliberatively, or Spontane-
ously
uncongenial to it may miscarry with damaging results.
Id. The continuity between problem and procedure is treated more generally by Lawrence Tribe
in his Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 617 (1973). Tribe contends that social decisions reciprocally influence the
decision-makers. How we as human beings define ourselves, says Tribe, depends largely on the
decisions we have made. Reciprocally, future decisions are strongly influenced by what we are.
34
 That society evolves institutions efficiently designed for their respective tasks is an
assumption shared by many current legal writers. See, e.g., Rubin, Why is the Common Law Effi-
cient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); 2 F. A. Hayek, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 21
(1976).
35
 This is the point that caused Marshall's fears of tautology. See supra note 4 and ac-
companying text. The tendency to articulate problems in categories created by procedures is also
noted by Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, supra note 31, at 367-69.
36
 Although the first two criteria are similar to those (i.e. "certainty" and "efficiency")
used by Max Weber to evaluate aspects of bureaucracy (see Abel, supra note 31, at 269), all three
terms are borrowed from Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-type Hearings for Resolving Complex
Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 137-50 (1972), who used the criteria
specifically to evaluate the performance of procedural systems. Although use of the terms is com-
pletely nontechnical and they are to be given their ordinary language meanings, it is nonetheless
interesting to note that each of the three dimensions are related. For example, "efficiency" can-
not be described without a close reference to the degree of "accuracy" desired, and without also
at least a nod to "acceptability." Boyer's definition of "acceptable" is instructive:
An important, yet relatively amorphous, aspect of any decisionmaking process is
that it must be acceptable—that is, perceived as legitimate—both to those who are
directly affected by decisions and to the general public as well. In part, acceptability
may correspond to the other criteria since, on the whole, people want the govern-
ment to make decisions efficiently and accurately. Beyond this, however, considera-
tions of acceptability raise complex questions ... regarding the exercise of govern-
mental power.
Id. at 146-47 [citations omitted]. The "acceptability" dimension may be read as including also
Tribe's notion of the "expressiveness" of procedures. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-93 (1971). For a more comprehensive
vocabulary with which to evaluate procedures, see Professor Summers' Evaluating and Improving
Legal Processes — A Plea for 'Process Values', 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
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The terms "deliberative" and "spontaneous" describe contrasting
methods by which order can be achieved." Order can be created deliberative-
ly, or intentionally, by limiting freedom and assigning people or things to a
specific position in a prearranged plan." Alternatively, order can be created
spontaneously by internal forces and mutual interactions of such people or
things." Examples of deliberative orderings come easily to mind: a well-kept
garden, perhaps, or a company on parade." Understanding the notion of
spontaneous orderings, however, requires a bit of imagination. The order is
achieved non-purposively, by each unit of a system ordering itself by following
internal, rather than external, forces. A natural world example of spontaneous
order is the way that "the water in a jug settles down, filling the hollow of the
vessel perfectly and in even density, up to the level of a horizontal plane which
forms its free surface: a perfect arrangement such as no human artifice could
reproduce .... „41
Along with spontaneous orderings in the natural world, social spon-
taneous orders also come to exist.” A good example is the market economy,
where problems of immense complexity and competing values are spon-
taneously sorted out by the mutual adjustments of millions of individual
preference schedules." If the pure market is functioning, optimal solutions are
said to be achievable without planning or deliberation. As other examples, it
has been suggested that certain intellectual orders like the common law, or the
tenets of science, are spontaneous rather than deliberative.**
Just as the continuous nature of the problem variables was stressed," so
also is it important to avoid conceiving of "deliberative" and "spontaneous"
as binary alternatives. Perhaps in the natural world a perfectly spontaneous
procedure can be described. Not so, however, in the social world. Even the
most centralized, despotic decisions are subject to some compromise and
mutual adjustment." Moreover, as in the pure market example, within a
single system each particular decision or adjustment may be consciously
deliberative, even while the system as a whole displays spontaneity.
Closely related to this procedure variable is the problem variable of
whether the variables of the specific problem are simple, or interactive. This
particular relationship of procedure to problem is straightforward: problems
31 Polanyi, supra note 31, at 154-56.
' Id. at 155.
" Id. at 156. Note that "spontaneously" does not here mean "immediately," but
rather "non-deliberately." A spontaneous system may operate very quickly, or, as shall be
discussed in the example of the common law, operate very slowly.
" Id. at 154, 155.
4 ' Id. at 155.
42 Id. at 115.
+2 Id. at 160-61.
" Id. at 162-65.
43 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
" Fuller, Imgation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1964).
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composed of very large numbers of interactive variables are much better suited
to decisions that proceed spontaneously . . This is so along all three dimensions
of suitability, i.e. accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability. Problems with small
numbers of variables, or those composed of simple variables, are better suited
to deliberative procedures. For example, deliberative human intervention in
the task of arranging molecules in a crystalline structure would require years of
effort, be subject to countless errors, and indeed would probably succeed only
in preventing the molecules from achieving that natural, spontaneous order
that forms in a matter of seconds. 47 On the other hand, problems with fewer
variables (e.g. planting a garden, building a lawnmower) are not normally
well-suited to spontaneous procedures; "[w]here smaller numbers are con-
cerned, [a planned order] is likely to show a greatly superior performance: all
machinery and mechnical techniques of man demonstrates this superiority
when the numbers are small enough." 48 The relationship between the com-
plexity of the variables comprising the problem and the spontaneity or deliber-
ateness of decision-making is quite clear. Similar relationships can and will be
developed for the other problem and procedure variables.
b. Procedures Variable A2: Whether the Process is Universalist or Particularist
The notion of "universalist" versus "particularist" procedures is popular
with social and legal theorists. The meaning of the terms, however, is subject to
disagreement. Some find universality wherever decision-makers are guided by
general rules or are compelled to justify their decisions doctrinally, and, con-
versely, find particularity wherever decision-makers judge each case to be sui
generis. 49 Others identify universality where decisional information or criteria
are based on the actions or desires of large groups (e.g. on "social utility") and
particularity where decisions are based more narrowly on attributes of in-
dividual disputants (e.g. on concepts of "rights")." Yet others distinguish
universality and particularity by examining the view taken by the decisional in-
stitutions of the disputants. 5 ' Each of these three strands of meaning, i.e., the
47 Polanyi, supra note 31, at 155-56.
43 Id. at 156.
49 Sarat and Grossman, for example, consider universalist procedures to involve both
general rules and social needs, being:
more concerned with general rules or standards for future application than with the
equities between two or more parties currently in dispute. Additionally, [univer-
salist procedures] deal with the needs of broad and unnamed classes or groups
rather than individuals, with "issues and symbols" rather than specific pro-
nouncements, and with general, often imprecise, claims of deprivation or need.
Sarat & Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication, 69
AMER. POI.. Set. REV. 1200, 1200 (1975).
'° For the explication of how "rights" as a decisional standard differs from that of
"social utility," see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
si Roberto Unger, for example, discusses "universalism versus particularism" as it
relates to the status of the disputants:
Liberal society tends toward universalism; it is inclined to draw people together
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breadth or narrowness of rules, the nature of the justifications of the rules, and
the institution's views of the disputants, can be useful, and all three strands are
incorporated in the following paragraphs relating this procedure variable to its
corresponding problem variable.
The universalist-particularist procedure variable is related in a variety of
ways to the problem variable of whether decisional criteria are well-established
or disputed. There emerges, however, a certain pattern in the interaction of the
problem variable and procedure variable: Where a problem possesses well-
established decisional criteria, the best procedure to judge the problem is one
that is (a) universalist with respect to the use of general rules or doctrine; (b)
particularist with respect to decisional evidence or information; and (c) flexible
(either universalist or particularist) with respect to the treatment of disputants.
Conversely, where the decisional criteria of a problem are unknown or
disputed, the best procedure to judge such a problem is one that is (a) par-
ticularist with respect to general rules or doctrine, i.e. makes limited appeal to
either rules or doctrine; (b) universalist with respect to decisional evidence or
information, drawing broadly on general trends or probabilities rather than
narrowly on particular events; and (c) again is flexible with respect to the treat-
ment of disputants.
This pattern can be illustrated by contrasting the ways in which one prop-
erly judges two very different sorts of contests: first, a footrace; and second, an
artistic competition. The decisional criterion of a footrace is simple, and very
well-established. The winner is the first person to cross the finish line without
interfering with others. Therefore, the most appropriate way to judge a
footrace is (a) to rely heavily on the established criterion as a universal, general
rule; (b) to apply such general rule by looking at the particular facts of this
given footrace, and using such facts as the decisional information or evidence;
and (c) to treat every participant in the race equally, except perhaps retaining
the flexibility to make certain relevant categorizations, for example between
male and female, or between young and old.
In contrast, the decisional criteria are relatively more disputed or unknown
where the task is to judge the winner of an artistic competition, particularly a
competition where radically different styles are represented. Under such cir-
cumstances the most appropriate judging procedure is one that (a) does not
make appeal to general rules or doctrine, because any such appeal would be
essentially arbitrary; (b) acts universally with respect to decisional information
or evidence, perhaps by polling large numbers of people from a cross-section of
the community on their preferences amongst the entries, or perhaps by allow-
under the rule of formal equality. Tribal society is particularistic; the subordination
of the individual to the group and the rigidity of group differences suppress the
acknowledgment of a common humanity in which native and foreigner alike par-
ticipate.
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 147-48
(1976),
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ing smaller numbers of judges to draw upon whatever external information or
expertise they may possess; and (c) is flexible with respect to how much ex-
posure is afforded to each painting, or how much information is disseminated
about each painting. Arguably, the judges should be allowed to make
themselves as familiar as they choose with any or all of the artistic works.
The above conclusions about how procedures ought to vary as a function
of varying certitude of decisional criteria are based on considerations of ac-
curacy, efficiency, and acceptability. Where decisional criteria are well estab-
lished, for example, it would be either inaccurate or unfair to ignore the gen-
eral rules or doctrines that are created by the existence of well-established deci-
sional criteria. Similarly, to raise as possible decisional information or evidence
any matters not particularly related to the case at hand would be inefficient. For
example, it would be inefficient in judging a foot-race to raise the issue that the
"fastest" runner can never really be judged on the strength of only one race,
and that hence the performances of each runner over the last five races ought to
be averaged in order to declare the proper "winner." Such an inquiry would
be irrelevant, and thereby wasteful, because the decisional criterion of judging
a footrace has already been established. The alternative decisional criterion of
the winner being declared on the basis of average performance was presumably
raised in the past as a possible standard to use, but rejected.
Conversely, in the more difficult case of making judgments where deci-
sional criteria are unknown or disputed, it would be inaccurate, arbitrary, and
unfair to choose one criterion as definitive. The appropriate ways of judging
such problems (e.g. making the decision represent the views of large numbers
of those affected, or having a few judges who attempt to become intimately
knowledgeable about the specific problem) are certainly less efficient than mak-
ing an arbitrary judgment, but are arguably more accurate and almost certain-
ly more acceptable.
The precise locating of procedures along this dimension is neither easy,
nor terribly important. The significance of the examples is to demonstrate that
decisional procedures do indeed differ along the continua described.
c. Procedures Variable A3: Whether the Process is Active or Reactive
Whether a given procedure is "active" or "reactive" is also important to
some legal and political theorists. 52 An "active" decision system is one that can
initiate by itself the investigation and treatment of problems. A "reactive" pro-
cedure is one that depends on outside parties to identify the problem. Reactive
procedures are generally limited to considering the sorts of problems that
private parties perceive and pursue." Certain problems, however, are difficult
for untrained persons to detect. Where a long hiatus exists between a harm-
52 See, e.g., S. Goldman & A. Sarat, supra note 17; Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); Howard, supra note 32.
59 Sarat & Grossman, supra note 49, at 1200; see also Black, supra note 52, at 137.
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causing occurrence and the manifestation of injury, reactive procedures are
certainly inefficient, and the passage of time may impair accuracy of decision."
Attempts by the common law to deal with health problems caused by en-
vironmental pollution illustrate this point." Often a plaintiff is exposed to the
harmful agent years before the injury surfaces. Even where Statute of Limita-
tions problems are overcome, evidentiary problems, particularly related to
causation, can frustrate recovery. Furthermore, even if recovery is obtained, it
still is possible that other injuries that occurred during the hiatus might have
been prevented by an earlier edict of some more active decisional system.
The overall effectiveness of reactive procedures is limited by the necessary
dependence on private initiative in pursuing claims. For example, victims of
incest or rape may not report the incident, and victims of child battering, being
under the parents' control, are often incapable of complaint. However, an ac-
tive system may well develop such rigid and restrictive policies of problem
identification that it ultimately considers a lesser diversity of problems.
Moreover, reactive systems may be generally more acceptable because such
procedures enhance opportunities for decisional participation by persons with
restricted access to the power structures of active systems. Minority groups or
others with less than average participation and influence in active systems (as
in legislatures, for example) will normally fare better in reactive systems like
the courts."
Active or reactive procedures are linked to the problem variable of
whether decisional information is based on past, or future events." Problems
requiring analysis of future events are better suited to active procedures; prob-
lems based upon historical events are better suited to reactive procedures. This
conclusion follows from two premises: first, the dependence of reactive systems
on the perceptions of untrained outsiders that a problem exists; and second,
that future-based problems tend either to be of a "policy" nature, or else to be
relatively subtle problems affecting large numbers of people. Untrained out-
siders have difficulty perceiving the underlying social patterns which give rise
to future-based problems. Hence reactive systems, which depend on such un-
trained persons for identification and articulation of problems, are not likely to
cope well with future-based problems. It is possible that a future-based prob-
lem would simply never be raised within a reactive system, or that it would be
presented piecemeal or incoherently, or that the initiatives might come too late
to be effective." Effective, efficient dealing with future-based problems is
34
 Goldman & Sarat, supra note 17, at 8; Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Informa-
tion in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 404 (1974).
33 Green, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Technology Assessment, in M. CETRON & B. BAC-
TOCHA, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT 630-31 (1973); Gelpe &
Tarlock, supra note 54.
56 Howard, supra note 32, at 346.
57 See supra note 14 accompanying text.
38_ Goldman & Sarat, supra note 52, at 8; Black, supra note 52, at 137.
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enhanced in an active decisional system with its more systematic, inclusive ap-
proach, its better access to predictive information, and its greater ability to
manipulate the environment according to some preconceived plan. Converse-
ly, accepting the Aristotelian notion of representation that those who feel the
pinch best know how it hurts" leads to the general conclusion that it is more ac-
curate and acceptable for past-based problems to be presented initially, and
perhaps articulated, by those persons who have been specifically injured, even
if they are not trained within the decision system. Such piecemeal problem-
solving may be less efficient than the approach taken in an active system, 6° but
considerations of enhanced accuracy and acceptablility nonetheless may
prevail over concerns about inefficiency.
2.• The Relationship Between Procedures and Parties
a. Procedures Variable B1: Whether the Process is Controlled by the Disputants or by
Strangers
In contrast to the above concern about problem identification, this
variable speaks to whether the disputants, or rather strangers to the dispute,
control such matters as issue formation, the presentation of proofs and
arguments, and implementation of remedy. 61 At the extreme end of disputant
control would be a decisional system like direct negotiation between the par-
ties. At the extreme end of stranger control would, for example, be an inter-
insurance company arbitration of a controversy between policyholders. At the
middle range of this variable are proceedings totally controlled by decision
system personnel who are nonetheless fully acquainted with the disputants, or
systems like Anglo-American adjudication which have certain procedural
aspects that are clearly stranger-controlled, and yet other aspects which are
clearly disputant-controlled. 62
The insertion of a stranger into a dispute markedly alters the character
and emotional effects of attempts at resolution. 63 The influence of a stranger in
decisional procedures goes first to the articulation of issues. To justify con-
fidence in his or her impartiality, a stranger commonly will appeal to norms
rather than to the particular interests of the disputants in characterizing the
• " Howard, supra note 32, at 344. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
7.02, at 115 (1958). Aristotle's assertion is not always true. For example, where the injury is not
tangible, but rather, legally defined (as in a case of persons being deprived of some welfare
benefit to which they did not know they were entitled), the best initiator is clearly someone other
than the person injured. David Fleming, personal communication, 1981.
°') Certainly in the short term, fragmented reactive decision-making is duplicative and
therefore more costly. Where accuracy is greatly enhanced by such procedures, however, reac-
tive procedures may in the long term be more, rather than less, efficient.
61 Howard, supra note 32, at 343.
• 62 See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
" Eiienberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rukmaking, 89
MARV. L. REV. 637, 655 (1976).
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issues." This is because the value of a stranger is in achieving balance and ob-
jectivity. To stress such objectivity further, the stranger is apt to use norms in a
highly stylized fashion that appears to reduce the amount of discretion being
employed. Norms are conceived as competing in an absolute, binary manner,
rather than as clusters of guiding principles that can coexist in a variety of
mixes. 69 The available options to the stranger are therefore only two, rather
than many fine gradations that would require closer, and probably more per-
sonal, decisions. Norms further are conceived as "act-oriented" rather than
"person-oriented"; that is, norms are seen as objectively defined by events
with no consideration given to the persons whose actions are being assessed,"
or with a similar neglect shown toward the social context in which the events
occur. Each of these conceptions of the norms adopted help to insure that once
the stranger chooses which norm to follow, all concerned parties will accept the
outcome.
Beyond the normative characterization of issues, stranger control of pro-
ceedings affects both the form and content of proofs and arguments. The
changes may seriously impair the accuracy and efficiency of dispute resolution.
For example, in disputant-controlled proceedings the parties informally may
agree on many of the material facts because their personal knowledge of the
facts coincides.° Alternatively, the parties may make a settlement which takes
into account an unresolved dispute over material facts." Such informality and
mutual accommodation is cumbersome where issues must be proven to a
stranger. 69 Moreover, concerns for impartiality cause stranger-controlled pro-
ceedings to favor strict, exclusionary rules of evidence, and high standards of
64
 Id.; see also Aubert, supra note 31, at 33, 34; Eckhoff, The Mediator, the Judge, and the
Administrator in Conflict Resolution, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 148 (1966), (reprinted in AMERICAN
COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 31, (S. Goldman & A.
Sarat, eds. 1978)).
65 Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 655; see also Aubert, supra note 64, at 39, 40.
66
 Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 656; see also Aubert, supra note 64, at 35; Fuller supra note
16, at 34.
67 Eisenberg states: .
In dispute-negotiation most factual issues can be determined by explicit or tacit
agreement, since the participants in the process will have personal knowledge of
most of the material facts. Where the disputants do not have personal knowledge,
they can often agree on the truth of a proposition on the basis of their mutual accep-
tance of a relator's credibility. If agreement on a factual proposition cannot be
reached, a further cluster of techniques is available. The disputants can assume the
truth of a proposition provisionally, and proceed to develop and examine its implica-
tions; they can by-pass the proposition provisionally, to determine whether a settle-
ment can be reached if its truth is left open; or they can make a settlement whose
terms accomodate, in an appropriate way, conflicting versions of the proposition or
doubt as to its validity. (footnote omitted).
Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 657.
" Id.
69 Id. at 657-58; see also Aubert, supra note 31, at 35.
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proof." Impartiality may be achieved at the cost of an accurate and efficient
resolution of the problem.
Whether the disputants or a stranger controls the proceedings also affects
the choice of remedy. Greater flexibility in the choice of remedy is possible
where disputants remain in control. In norm-based stranger-controlled pro-
ceedings the choice of remedy usually is limited to a narrow range bearing a
logical relationship to the rights and duties declared." Alone, however, the
disputants could agree on a face-saving, non-normative remedy like mutual
apologies. This truncation of remedial alternatives in stranger-controlled pro-
ceedings occurs because the unfamiliarity of the stranger with all aspects of the
disputants' lives makes difficult any innovative remedial decree not specifically
suggested by the evidence presented."
The variable of who controls the proceedings is associated with the prob-
lem variable of simplex versus multiplex parties. Problems arising in multiplex
contexts often are better suited to disputant-controlled procedures. Conversely,
simplex problems are generally compatible with stranger-controlled pro-
ceedings. The first conclusion is grounded in concerns for accuracy and accept-
ability while the second is grounded in concerns for efficiency and acceptabili-
ty.
Strangers in control of decisional procedures tend to avoid making an
assessment of personal traits of the disputants by the device of narrowing
disputes to questions of provable events rather than considering personal or
relational qualities of the parties. This occurs for the reasons of practicality and
impartiality outlined above. Where the problem to be decided arises in a
multiplex setting, the stranger thus tends to stereotype the relationships of the
disputants." To do otherwise would require the stranger to make determina-
tions about the character of the various disputants. Although convenient for the
stranger, the process is reductivist and often disregards facts or norms that the
disputants regard as important. 74 Beyond concerns for accuracy, the reliance
by strangers on absolute, impersonal norms in deciding multiplex problems
well may damage unacceptably the underlying relationships between the par-
ties. For example, in the adjudication of marital problems the tendency of
stranger-judges to reduce marriage to a set of impersonal act-oriented norms
may undermine the mutual trust and confidence essential for long-term
maintenance of the marriage." Moreover, the efficiency and accuracy of using
'° Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 658.
71 Id.
72 Id.; see also Freeman, Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-making and Prospective Over-
ruling, 26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 166, 175-78 (1973).
" Aubert, supra note 31, at 35.
" Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 657.
75 Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305-31 (1971). .
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any norm-based procedure in the marital context is questionable; the shifting
contingencies of marriage, such as illness, pregnancy, and loss of employment,
would require any such "norms" to be riddled with exceptions." For all of the
above reasons, stranger-controlled procedures are ill-suited for multipleX prob-
lems.
Similar considerations lead to the opposite conclusion that simplex prob-
lems normally are better suited to stranger-controlled procedures than to dis-
putant-controlled procedures. Parties joined by only a single transaction often
lack the incentives, skills, or spirit of cooperation required to resolve their own
disputes. Moreover, such parties not only may prefer that their relationship be
confined and standardized by a stranger, but such objectivity also may reflect
accurately their intentions and behavior."
One exception to the foregoing conclusions occurs where a disparity in
power or knowledge exists between the disputants. In such a circumstance,
even in a multiplex setting a stranger-controlled proceeding is almost in-
variably more acceptable and given to greater accuracy than a disputant-
controlled proceeding." Disputant control therefore often may be unsuitable in
settings like parent-child and employer-employee.
b. Procedures Variable B2: Whether Participation in the Proceedings is Strict and Assured,
or Diffuse and Loose"
Under this variable "strict" participation means that participation is con-
fined to the immediate disputants and the decision-maker. 8° "Assured" par-
ticipation means that the opportunity to participate is guaranteed by right, or is
at least strongly institutionalized. 81 "Diffuse" participation occurs where the
community is heavily involved in decision-making, either directly, or indirectly
as in a legislature. 82 "Loose" participation is unassured, unregulated, or
disorganized. 83
The significance of this variable is best discussed by linking it immediately
to the problem variable of whether a dispute is "private" or "public." For
purposes of this discussion a private dispute is one in which the State is not an
initial participant, and a public dispute is one in which the State is an actual
78 Id.; see also Fuller, supra note 16, at 28.
" See generally Eckhoff, supra note 64, at 150-51. This desire for complete objectivity and
stranger judgment may, however, be rare, as suggested by Stewart Macaulay's classic study of
business disputes. See Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
• SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
'a Boyer, supra note 36, at 120-21.
78 Professors Fuller and Eisenberg are the foremost developers of the "participation"
variable in decisional procedures. Eisenberg, supra note 12; Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Ad-
judication, supra note 10.
88
 Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 431.
al Id.
SA Id.
u Id.
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party." Given that distinction, public disputes are more suitable to diffuse,
loose proceedings and private disputes are more suitable to strict, assured pro-
ceedings. Public disputes often are concerned with drawing the contours of the
relationship between citizen and State. Such disputes are largely generic: in
principle, the relationship between citizen and state is identical for most, if not
all, citizens. On grounds of efficiency and accuracy, and perhaps also accept-
ability, therefore, such problems defining relations between citizens and the
State are better considered by allowing diffuse participation by the citizenry,
by hearing all the possible arguments, and by using informal means of
weighing all arguments. 85
Private disputes, which are better suited to strict and assured procedures,
tend to be more personal and idiosyncratic than public disputes. In such prob-
lems "accuracy" becomes more a matter of the parties' own perceptions.
Hence, accuracy is better served by a strict participation procedure confined to
the parties." Moreover, in determining idiosyncratic problems restricted par-
ticipation may enhance efficiency: a wider participation simply is not necessary
to convey the relevant information, or to assure representativeness of the deci-
sion. Finally, privacy becomes important to personal disputes, and of course
strict participation is more private, and therefore more acceptable.
Third party decision-makers have greater autonomy in strict participation
proceedings. Consequently, the danger of partiality becomes more salient.
One means of safeguarding impartiality is to "assure" participation' by each
party within a rigid format. Perhaps the most elaborate example of such
54 The distinction here used is Friedman's. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying
text. In any society where the State makes widespread interventions in economic and social ac-
tivity, Friedman's distinction is overly simplistic. This is especially so where two-way interaction
between the State and its citizens is formally embodied in a Constitution. Later, this article will
consider this public dispute/private dispute problem variable in the spa-fie context of Anglo-
American society. See infra notes 456-87 and accompanying text. There the article proposes alter-
native, and hopefully more appropriate, criteria for distinguishing between public and private
disputes.
m Howard, supra note 32, at 347-59. The obvious difficulty with this conclusion is ex-
plaining the criminal law trial. In form, such trials are public disputes, since the State is a party.
Criminal trials are not intuitively "generic," i.e, affecting the rights and duties of the populace
in general, and they certainly are not diffuse. The explanation for this apparent anomaly is that
at the level of individual prosecutions, a criminal trial is really more private than public. There
virtually always exists an identifiable private victim who theoretically could prosecute the crime.
Practically speaking, the victim must cooperate in order for certain offenses to be pressed. The
State is the formal complainant in criminal law proceedings because the issues involved are so
important to society that the State wishes to retain control over the prosecution. Although
criminal trials serve, over time, to establish relationships between the citizenry and the State,
each individual trial also serves to resolve, in a manner satisfactory to all, a "dispute" between
discrete individuals. Consequently any type of diffuse decision-making process, however,
theoretically ideal, would likely be intrusive and inefficient. Predictably, however, general declara-
tions of what is and is not criminal activity normally are articulated in the diffuse public arena of
the legislature.
86
 Id.
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assuredness is the general set of procedural protections in the legal system,
which assures parties the right to be represented by an advocate, to cross-
examine witnesses, to hear justifications for third-party decisions, and to ap-
peal such decisions." All such participant rights restrict caprice by the judge.
Generally, "assuring" participation in a decision system has another very
important consequence: the decision system is forced to be consistent over time in
its rulings." The participants must "share stable expectancies about how [the
decision-maker] will act. " 69
 Assured participation, therefore, requires the
decision-maker to be systematic and consistent in resolving problems." This in
turn no doubt contributes to the tendency of third-party decision-makers to ap-
peal to norms. In order for assured participation to be meaningful, there must
be sufficient tribunal consistency to permit predictability."
c. Procedures Variable B3: Whether the Decision System is Strongly Responsive, or
Weakly Responsive, to the Parties' Proofs and Arguments
Under this variable, a decision system is "strongly responsive" to the par-
ties' proofs and arguments if the decision "proceeds from" and is "congruent
with" such proofs and arguments. 92 In contrast, a procedure is "weakly
responsive" to the extent "the decisionmaker may base his decision solely on
evidence he has himself collected, on his own experience, on his institutional
preferences, and on rules neither adduced nor addressed by the parties.""
Although strict participation might be thought necessarily to require strong
responsiveness, and loose participation to entail weak responsiveness,
"responsiveness" is in fact an independent variable." For example, a "con-
sultative process" may assure strict participation, yet only weakly respond to
the posited arguments; the decision-maker is required only to consider the
disputant views in good faith, make the decision for a proper reason, and then
87 Id. at 349, 359.
88 Fuller, Adjudication and . the Rule of Law, supra note . 10, at 5.
89
 Freeman, supra note 72, at 179.
" As Fuller states:
[the decision-maker is] confronted by a problem of system. The rules applied to the
decision of individual controversies cannot simply be isolated exercises of ...
wisdom. They must be brought into, and maintained in, some systematic interrela-
tionship; they must display some coherent internal structure.
FULLER, supra note 52, at 94.
91 This tie between assured participation and consistency is further proved by con-
trasting systems with loose participation. Such systems can, like the Parliament, "take 'leaps in
the dark.' There is no logical necessity for any [decision} to be related to any other." Freeman,
supra note 72, at 179. Or as stated by Judge Friendly, "Unlike legislatures, which may properly
frame pragmatic rules having no relation to strict logic, courts should render a principled deci-
sion that will apply to a great sweep of cases." Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 23 (1978).
92
 Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 412-13.
" M. at 414.
94 Id. at 413.
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explain the decision." In effect, although the affected parties are before the
decision-maker, and are allowed to present their views in a formal manner, the
decision-maker can conceivably make his determination on some other basis.
In general, a strict and assured procedure may be weakly responsive if the
decision-maker is more concerned with "policy" or social utility than with
restoring harmony between the litigants." Conversly, a procedure using dif-
fuse and loose participation can be strongly responsive. Indeed, it has been
argued that the diffuse procedure of legislation is legitimate only where it is
strongly responsive." If it is not so responsive, the argument states, the reason
for permitting the diffusion is lost."
Procedural responsiveness is associated with whether the problem con-
sidered can or cannot feasibly be resolved privately. Problems that cannot be
solved privately are more appropriate to weakly responsive procedures; prob-
lems that can be solved privately are sometimes more suitable to strongly
responsive procedures and at other times are more suitable to weakly respon-
sive procedures. The former conclusion is made for reasons of accuracy and ac-
ceptability. The infeasibility of private resolution often will arise because such
resolution requires a group of unrelated persons to act in concert, or because
one party to the dispute is incompetent or unavailable. 99 Where either condi-
tion exists so as to frustrate private resolution, the condition also will impair
greatly the ability of one side of the dispute (i.e. the group, the incompetent, or
the absent) to participate in any other procedure for resolution. Logically, a
procedure that under such conditions is strongly responsive to the proofs and
arguments of the parties will disadvantage the party with impaired ability to
participate.'" The decision-maker acts more acceptably and accurately by be-
ing weakly responsive, i.e. by taking the initiative to discover arguments in
favor of the impaired party. Alternatively, the decision-maker could remain
strongly responsive but appoint a representative to argue on behalf of such im-
paired party. 10 '
95 Id. at 414. Such a consultative process is mandated, for example, under 5 553 of the
United States Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. S 553 (1976). Eisenberg describes this
procedure as follows:
Where section 553 applies, an agency proposing a new rule must give affected par-
ties an opportunity to present proof (in the form of 'written data') and reasoned
arguments and is obliged both to attend to those proofs and arguments and to ex-
plain its action. However, the rules it issues need not proceed from or be congruent
with the participants' proofs and arguments ... provided they have a factual basis
and fall within the limits of rationality.
Id. at 415.
96 Goldman & Sarat, supra note 52, at 5.
97 Howard, supra note 32, at 346-48.
98 Id.
99 See supra note 21-22.
This point is similar to that made supra at note 78 and accompanying text (where one
side of the dispute is predictably much more powerful than the other, disputant-controlled pro-
ceedings are likely to be both unacceptable and inaccurate).
101 See infra notes 498-500 and accompanying text.
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For problems that might feasibly be resolved privately, the more ap-
propriate procedure is sometimes strongly responsive, sometimes weakly
responsive. These conclusions follow from considering the reasons why such
private resolution might fail. To say that private resolution is feasible means
that face-to-face compromise is possible, or that an established market exists to
determine the value of the objects in dispute. Where impasse nonetheless oc-
curs, it normally is for one of two reasons. Either the parties have split on nor-
mative grounds 102 and desire the sort of decision that declares one person
"right" and the other "wrong," 1 °3
 or compromise fails because one party
simply refuses to negotiate. The first situation leads to the recommendation of
a strongly responsive procedure, the second to the recommendation of a weakly
responsive procedure.
Where the parties have split on normative grounds, the parties have had
available procedures (like compromise) that encourage each party to minimize
his or her maximum loss. Such procedures have been unavailing, so the parties
turn to a third party. Most likely the parties are arguing "on principle" and
desire a procedure that is strongly responsive, vindicating the arguments of
one, and rejecting the arguments of the other. The outcome certainly is impor-
tant in such cases, but no more so than the process of choosing one or the other
of the parties' arguments. A victory on weakly responsive grounds in such
cases would be rather Pyrrhic.
In the second case, a compromise fails because one party sees no advan-
tage in negotiating a change in the status quo. Such unwillingness by one party
to engage in any form of bargaining "is usually the case after a loss, whether
the loss is due to an accident, to fraud or negligence, to inability, or to a
crime.' "°4
 Aggression is a distinct danger in such circumstances, and normally
some form of third-party intervention is foisted on the parties.'° 5
 Such institu-
tionalized intervention grows out of society's need for protection, the primary
example being the criminal law prosecution. Given the reasons for the in-
tervention it is not likely the procedure would commit itself to strong party
responsiveness, and indeed such is the case in criminal law: the decision need
not be grounded on the arguments of either the accused or the victim. Rather,
the court is free to accept the arguments of the State, as articulated by the pros-
ecutor.
3. The Nature of the Decision
a. Procedures Variable Cl: Whether the Decision is Binary, or Graduated and
Accommodative
A "binary" decisional process is one where:
1132 See Ecichoff, supra note 64, at 150.
to' Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 654-55.
104 Aubert, supra note 31, at 33.
1G3 Id.
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In reaching, and even more clearly in rationalizing outcomes, any
given proposition of fact is normally found to be either true or false,
. . . norms are generally treated as if only the more compelling .. .
[or] dominant norm were applicable, and each disputant is generally
determined to be either "right" or "wrong. 5, 106
In contrast, a "graduated" or "accommodative" decision occurs where
. . . pin reaching and rationalizing outcomes, any given norm or any given
factual proposition can be taken into account according to the degree of its
authoritativeness and applicability (in the case of a norm) or probability (in the
case of a factual proposition). '"" This "binary" versus "graduated, accom-
modative" distinction applies, therefore, to both facts and norms. The
gravamen of the distinction is that any norm, for example, can either be viewed
as a hard-edged thing, competing on a mutually exclusive basis with other
norms, or as a softer-edged concept that can coexist in balance and compromise
with other norms.
This binary-graduated procedural distinction is associated with whether
social consensus or dissensus exists on the proper outcome of a problem. Where
consensus exists, a decision generally will be of binary character; where dissen-
sus exists, the character of the decision will be more graduated and accom-
modative. Dissensus issues are likely to yield accommodative decisions for
reasons of acceptability; an absolutist approach to problems about which
serious people disagree is likely to be considered by proponents on both sides as
presumptuous or unconcerned. If a system is to maintain legitimacy, the
decision-maker must seek a graduated or accommodative solution.'° 8 Even
where social consensus exists, it is rarely advantageous for the third-party
decision-maker to side fully with one party or another; rather, prestige normal-
ly is enhanced by the third-party accommodating the contending positions. By
adopting an accommodative resolution, rather than siding fully with one party,
the decision-maker preserves his status as an objective outsider.'"
108 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 654.
107 Id.
108
 This may not always be so. A well established institution may attempt to build a
social consensus, rather than follow the dissensus. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
1p9 As Aubert writes:
One may raise the question as to whether the third party, by virtue of his position,
will tend towards the opinion that there must be "some wrong on both sides.7 He
can ally himself with one of the parties, and can therefore enforce a completely asym-
metrical view of the responsibility for the conflict, but there may be reasons ... why
he should try to avoid this. If he sides fully with one of the contestants, he has
brought his status as an outsider into some jeopardy. He has sacrificed his unique
moral standpoint in the little group.... It seems that in terms of power and authori-
ty he will generally stand to gain by assuming a position Fomewhere between the
claims of the two parties, possibly maximizing his own moral superiority the nearer
the solution lies toward the golden mean.. .. The two others have presented
themselves as extremists, exaggerating the importance of this or that point, or hav-
ing somewhat misrepresented the facts.
Aubert, supra note 31, at 39.
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Furthermore, a binary decision, simply because of its absoluteness, most
likely is less accurate than a graduated decision.'" Essentially, the binary
mode of decision-making is appropriate only when either a strong social con-
sensus demands recognition,'" or when the problem is of such importance that
society demands that it be treated as though a consensus existed."' For exam-
ple, binary decisions are appropriate in criminal cases since society probably
would reject a system which apportioned blame between the criminal and the
victim."' A final example of this connection between social consensus-building
and binary decisions is the occasional practice (as, for examples, in the school
desegregation cases of the 1950's and more recently, in the Watergate tapes
case) of the United States Supreme Court of refraining from separate opinions
in matters in which public interest is high and the Court desires to build con-
sensus for its decision. 14
b. Procedures Variable C2: Whether the Decision is Corrective or Facilitative
This final procedure variable is closely related to the first one, namely
whether the procedure is spontaneous or deliberative."' Whereas the first
distinction speaks more to the method of deciding, however, this "corrective
versus facilitative" variable speaks to the function of the decision, the manner
in which problems are perceived by all participants in the decision system, and
the emotional impact on the disputants of submitting their controversy for deci-
sion.
A "corrective" procedure assumes the existence of rules or standards
governing rights and duties. The aim of a corrective decision is not so much to
solve a controversy, or restore relationships, or allocate resources, but rather to
control behavior." 6
 In seeking to insure greater conformity to the rules, a cor-
rective decision incidentally is educational on the meaning of such rules. A
"facilitative" procedure makes no such assumptions about rules. A facilitative
procedure aims to coordinate or smooth human interaction, rather than dictate
particular actions. This coordination is accomplished by decisions that act like
traffic laws to stabilize "interactional expectancies" so that the parties can
"guide their conduct toward one another by these expectancies.'""
110
 In the vast majority of disputes there is actually some right and wrong on both sides.
Id.; cf. P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra note 26, at 89-95 (discussion of areas of human experience
that are, largely for reasons of accuracy and acceptability, beyond the scope of law).
"I See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
12 Aubert, supra note 31, at 39.
Li' Id. This need in criminal law to come to a binary decision also may help explain an
anomaly considered above, namely why, even though they are "public" disputes, criminal pros-
ecutions are characterized by strict, assured proceedings. See supra note 85.
114 See, e.g. , Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
"5 See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
16 Fuller, supra note 16, at 20.
1 " Id. at 9.
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 535
The facilitative-corrective variable also influences how a decision-maker
generally views problems. Facilitative procedures assume that problems and
conflicts are natural incidents of any relationship. The procedure therefore
seeks to minimize or prevent problems by clarifying interactional principles,
and by facilitating the early perception of trouble. 118
 Corrective procedures, as
the name suggests, are rdctificatory or compensatory rather than preventative.
This difference in attitude toward what "problems" represent affects in turn
the emotional impact to the disputants of submitting a problem to a decisional
procedure. Facilitative procedures tend to minimize such emotional impacts by
"expressing, in a symbolic way, the expectation that trouble is a normal part of
these relationships and situations." 119
 Corrective procedures often exaggerate
such emotional effects. For example, corrective procedures result in "judg-
ments" (as opposed to "decisions"), that are couched in terms of responsibility
for guilt or wrongdoing. 12° Such "judgments" can "generate a state of tension
and . . . drive the disputants irreconcilably apart, whatever the outcome."'"
The facilitative-corrective procedures variable is associated with the prob-
lem variable of whether private resolution is socially desirable or undesirable. .
The relationship between these variables is inconclusive: often, for example,
both types of procedure can decide a problem so as to prevent any further at-
tempts at private resolution.
Such inconclusiveness stems from the two prerequisites for any private
resolution to a problem. First, there must exist a framework of shared expecta-
tions between the disputants regarding how negotiations proceed. Second,
there must be information about who owns what, or which party has what
rights or duties. Negotiation is easy only where the parties know both the ef-
fects of making an agreement, and the existing distribution of the commodity
in question. Private resolution, therefore, can be facilitated (or prevented) in
two distinct ways: first by making the framework for negotiation more (or less)
stable and predictable; and second, by giving the parties more (or less) infor-
mation about their respective starting positions. For example, a corrective deci-
sion is a relatively clear announcement of respective entitlements and duties in
a given situation. This information in turn facilitates future private resolutions.
Similarly, a facilitative decision that improves the framework for negotiation
will aid such future private resolutions. Conversely, private resolution of dis-
putes can be prevented by sabotaging access to the negotiation framework, as
by an outright prohibition against private dealings with the commodity, 122 or
"u Goldman & Sarat, supra note 52, at 18.
"9 Id.
120 Aubert, supra note 31, at 36; Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 659.
121 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 659-60; see also Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration
—A Preliminary Analysis, 17 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 698, 698 n.1 (1952).
122
 See the discussion in Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) regarding the three basic ways
(property rule, liability rule, and inalienability rule) by which society allows and disallows ex-
change of any given commodity.
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by granting an entitlement to a person or entity incapable of bargaining (e.g.
giving rights to trees). Alternatively, private resolution could be frustrated by
obfuscating, or by refusing to grant, any alleged rights. Such sabotage or ob-
fuscation conceivably could be accomplished by either a "facilitative" or a
"corrective" decision system.
C. Conclusions
Admittedly there are limitations to the conclusions drawn (see summary at
Appendix C) about the relationships between the problem variables and pro-
cedure variables. First, the associations are not logical correlates, following
necessarily from one another. Rather, the connections are conceptually and
prescriptively tied by evaluations of procedural accuracy, efficiency, and ac-
ceptability. Second, the tendencies are not statistically demonstrable. The
associations are pieced together from the observations and experience of a
variety of legal theorists and social scientists dealing with decisional procedures
of a variety of cultures. Third, no doubt dozens of other associations could be
described. Each procedure variable probably has some sort of predictable rela-
tionship with several other problem variables. For reasons of manageability,
however, each procedure variable has been paired with its single most logically
related problem variable. Moreover, this article suggests that these eight pair-
ings are the most important. The article turns now to a brief discussion of how
the theory can be applied, followed by the attempt to use the theory to under-
stand the notion of "justiciability."
II. STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ADJUDICATION
The first step in analyzing justiciability in the Anglo-American legal
system is to describe adjudication by the procedure variables previously devel-
oped in this article.'" Then the sorts of problems most appropriate for Anglo-
American adjudication can be assessed according to their procedure variable
correlates. The article will focus on "traditional adjudication," a form which
evolved as "a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private
rights."'" Traditional adjudication has been described as consisting of the
following five characteristics:' 22
12 ' See supra notes 37-122 and accompanying text.
124
 Chayes, supra note 20, at 1282.
175
 The characteristics are Chayes', Id. at 1282, 1283, "Traditional adjudication" is
contrasted by Chayes with the newer "public law litigation" where "the object of [adjudication]
is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." Id. at 1284. Sharp procedural dif-
ferences distinguish the two forms, and much of Chayes' analysis is devoted to explaining such
differences as a function of the differing objectives of the two procedures. Chayes' distinction is
extremely useful, and his model of "public law" adjudication shall be explored below. As a star-
ting point, however, the "adjudication" here described is 'his "traditional adjudication," a
model with which lawyers are more familiar, and a model which accords with more common no-
tions about how litigation proceeds.
In specifying the features of "traditional adjudication," Chayes recognizes he is drawing
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1. The lawsuit is bipolar. Litigation is organized as a contest between
two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically op-
posed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all basis.
2. Litigation is retrospective. The controversy is about an identified set
of completed events: whether they occurred, and if so, with what con-
sequences for the legal relations of the parties.
3. Right and remedy are interdependent. The scope of the relief is derived
more or less logically from the substantive violation under the general
theory that the plaintiff will get compensation measured by the harm
caused by the defendant's breach of duty — in contract by giving
plaintiff the money he would have had absent the breach; in tort by
paying the value of the damage caused.
4. The lawsuit is a self-contained episode. The impact of the judgment
is confined to the parties. If plaintiff prevails there is a simple com-
pensatory transfer, usually of money, but occasionally the return of a
thing or the performance of a definite act. If defendant prevails, a loss
lies where it has fallen. In either case, entry of judgment ends the
court's involvement.
5. The process is party-initiated and party-controlled. The case is
organized and the issues defined by exchanges between the parties.
Responsibility for fact development is theirs. The trial judge is a
neutral arbiter of their interactions who decides questions of law only
if they are put in issue by an appropriate move of a party. 126
A. Procedure Variables and Anglo-American Adjudication: The Decisional Process
1. Procedure Variable Al: Whether Adjudication is Spontaneous, or
Deliberative
Litigation traditionally was conceived of as "a private contest between
private parties with only minimal judicial intrusion. „127 " [T]he courts could
be seen as an adjunct to private ordering,' 128
 whose primary role was to
resolve disputes which arose as private individuals autonomously tried to
achieve social and economic order. 129 Viewed in such a light, the common law
a stereotype of the common law procedures (rather than equitable procedures) prevalent over the
last 250 years. Id. at 1283 n.11. The historical validity of the model can be narrowly disputed, but
such a debate, states Chayes, would miss the point; "whether the traditional conception ever
conformed fully to what judges were doing in fact, it has been central to our understanding and
our analysis of the legal system.” Id. at 1283.
128 Id. at 1282, 1283 [citations omitted].
' 27 Id. at 1288.
128
 Id. at 1285.
129 Id. at 1285, citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Pound,
Do We Need a Philosophy of Law, 5 Coium. L. REV. 339, 344-49 (1905). Chayes explains:
Besides its inherent plausibility in the nineteenth century American setting, the
traditional model of adjudication answered a number of important political and in-
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is an example of spontaneous intellectual order. 13° Any particular legal deci-
sion, however, may display great deliberateness as the judge attempts to con-
form the outcome of the instant case with doctrine and precedent. Such
deliberateness at the individual level does not impair the spontaneity of the
system as a whole. Indeed, it is this very action by dozens of judges of adjusting
their decisions in accordance with doctrine and precedent that causes the
overall spontaneity of the common law. The common law thus operates as "a
sequence of adjustments between succeeding judges, guided by a parallel in-
teraction between the judges and the general public."'" This sequence results
in the ordered growth of the common law, in which the same fundamental rules
are re-applied and re-interpreted, and thus expanded into "a system of in-
creasing scope and consistency .... Accordingly, the operations of a judicial
system of case law is an instance of spontaneous order in society."'" Since in-
dividual legal decisions are deliberative while the system as a whole can display
spontaneity, traditional common law adjudication can be described as
somewhat more spontaneous than deliberative.
2. Procedures Variable A2: Whether Adjudication is Universalist or Par-
ticularist
A procedure may be either universalist or particularist in three distinct
tellectual needs. The conception of litigation as a private contest between private
parties with only minimal judicial intrusion confirmed the general view of govern-
ment powers as stringently limited. The emphasis on the appellate function, con-
ceived as an exercise in deduction from a few embracing principles themselves in-
duced from the data of the cases, supplied the demand of the new legal academics
for an intellectual discipline comparable to that of their faculty colleagues in the
sciences... .
Id. at 1288.
' 30 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
131 POLANYI, supra note 10, at 162. He states:
Consider a judge sitting in court and deciding a difficult case. While pondering
his decision, he refers consciously to dozens of precedents and unconsciously to
many more. Before him numberless other judges have sat and decided according to
statute, precedent, equity, and convenience, as he himself will have to decide now;
his mind, while he analyzes the various aspects of the case, is in constant contact
with theirs. And beyond the purely legal references, he senses the entire contem-
porary trend of opinions, the social medium as a whole. Not until he has established
all these bearings of his case and responded to them in the light of his own profes-
sional conscience, will his decision acquire force of conviction and will he be ready to
declare it.
The moment this point is reached and the judgment announced, the tide starts
running backwards .... Every new decision in court gives guidance to all future
judges for their decisions of cases yet unthought of.
Id.
This sense of patterned consistency emerging slowly through successive approximations
and mutual adjustments is no doubt an important component of that other elusive concept, legal
rationality. See also Freund, Rationality inJudkial Decisions, in NOmOs VII: RATIONAL DECISIONS .
109 (C. ,J. Friedrich ed. 1964) (discussing Max Weber's complaint that Anglo-American law
compromises "rationality" in favor of the practical and the expedient).
132 POLANYI, supra note 10, at 162.
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ways: first, with respect to general rules or doctrine; second, with respect to
decisional information or evidence; and third, with respect to the treatment of
disputants.'" Adjudication is universalist in its appeal to general rules or doc-
trine; 134
 legal rules refer to "courses of action, not single actions, and to
multiplicities of men, not single individuals. "135
 Adjudication also, however,
deals with an identified set of events, which suggests it is particularist regarding
the evidence or information upon which a decision is made. 136 Finally, modern
legal systems are universalist in the social assumptions made about
disputants.'" "[M]odern law consists of rules that are uniform and unvarying
in their application. The incidence of these rules is territorial rather than "per-
sonal;" that is, the same rules are applicable to members of all religions, tribes,
classes, castes, localities and to both sexes.' 38
 This universal treatment is at-
tained at no small cost to accuracy: the law is able to preserve the idea of the
equality of all citizens before the law only by deliberately excluding much of
man's experience, such as the artistic and religious life, from its area of con-
cern . 139
3. Procedures Variable A3: Whether Adjudication is Reactive or Active
It is generally acknowledged that adjudication is a reactive procedure,
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
134 Chayes, supra note 20, at 1285.
136 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 623
(1958). Hart is supported in this latter conclusion by general consensus. Marc Galanter joins the
consensus, but points out that appeal to general rules is much more pronounced in the legal
systems of industrial societies than the legal systems of traditional societies:
[M]odern legal norms are universalistic. Particular instances of regulating are
devised to exemplify a valid statement of general applicability, rather than to ex-
press [as in the norms of traditional societies] that which is unique and intuited.
Galanter, The Modernization of Law in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 153, 155
(M. Weiner, ed. 1966). In this more specific section of the article, description is confined to a
model based on Anglo-American law. As Galanter points out, adjudication in a more traditional
society differs from this model in several respects. Id., passim. Galanter also cautions as follows
against the too-easy belief that the generalities about legal rules in modern society are completely
accurate:
Our model of modern law emphasizes its unity, uniformity, and universality. Our
model pictures a machinery for the relentless imposition of prevailing central rules
and procedures over all that is local and parochial and deviant. But no actual legal
system is really so unified, regular, and universalistic. [In every legal system there
are] sources of diversity, variety, irregularity, and particularism ....
Id. at 157.
"6 Chayes, supra note 20, at 1282. This is supported by a later passage discussing ap-
pellate level adjudication which, Chayes states, differs from trial level adjudication in that "only
there [i.e. at the appellate level] did the process reach beyond the immediate parties to achieve a
wider import through the elaboration of generally applicable legal rules." Id. at 1285.
'" See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
"a Galanter, supra note 135, at 154. The differences among persons that are recognized
by the law are not differences in intrinsic kind or quality, such as differences between the nobles
and serfs or between Brahmans and lower castes, but differences in function, condition, and
achievement in mundane pursuits, Id. at 154-55.
139 STEIN & SHAND, supra note 26, at 90.
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since it is party-initiated."° Such a reactive procedure as defined in this model
can be expected most often to treat problems based on past events. Traditional
lawsuits in fact are retrospective, concerning completed events."' American
courts are largely passive and resolve only those disputes that are brought
before them.'" Such dependence on party initiative above all else limits the
power of the courts.'" Thus, traditional adjudication in all significant respects
is very close to being a purely "reactive" procedure.
4. Procedures Variable BI: Whether Adjudication is Stranger-controlled, or
Disputant-controlled
In contrast to the previous variable, it is unclear whether adjudication is
basically stranger-controlled or disputant-controlled.'" In fact, adjudication
displays features of both disputant and stranger control. The parties (often act-
ing through their attorneys whose relationships to the actual disputants can
vary from intimate friend through virtual stranger) are responsible for raising
issues and arguments, offering proofs, and interrogating witnesses. The judge,
however, can constrain the parties' control on any such matter and the parties
cannot control the final deliberations of judge or jury. Once trial has begun, no.
range of options for resolution is offered to either party.
The reason for the combination of stranger and disputant control of tradi-
tional adjudication arguably lies in the problem variable associated with this
aspect of procedure, i.e. whether the problems typically handled by adjudica-
tion arise in the context of simplex, or multiplex relationships. Certainly tradi-
tional adjudication, being a sort of residual, last-resort decision-maker for all
kinds of problems, must be equipped to handle both simplex and multiplex
' 4° Chayes, supra note 20, at 1283.
' 4 ' Id. at 1282.
142 As Goldman and Sarat state plainly:
American courts do not actively seek out the disputes with which they deal. Instead
it may fairly be said that our courts are passive and reactive. They wait for disputes
to be brought to them.
Goldman & Sarat, supra note 52, at 5.
143
 Reactive procedures plus the incremental nature of litigation combine, says Howard,
to give the courts "[formally, ... the shortest reach; they are the easiest to check, the most
vulnerable to popular retaliation." Howard, supra note 32, at 355. But the qualification "formal-
ly" in the Howard quotation is obviously important. Practically, the interplay of the three
branches of government is subtle; at any given time any of the branches may be preeminent. Set
generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
' 44
 Chayes, in his fifth quoted point, states explicitly that traditional adjudication is
"party-controlled." See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Just as explicitly, however,
Eisenberg states it is stranger-controlled:
While dispute-negotiation is usually controlled by the disputants themselves, and is
therefore characterized by its intimacy, traditional adjudication is characterized by
the central role given to a stranger. The impact of the stranger's role makes itself felt
dramatically across every element of the two processes:• selection and application of
norms; determination of facts; choice of remedy; and, perhaps most dramatically,
the emotional effect of participation. (footnotes omitted).
Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 655.
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problems. That requirement in itself might account for the existence of
elements of both disputant-control and stranger-control. The ambivalence goes
deeper, however, to whether the allocations of legal rights and duties follow a
simplex, transactional model, or a multiplex, relational model. On this ques-
tion there exists a sharp disagreement. One view sees the design of the legal
system as based on assumptions of simplex relations: "[M]odern law is trans-
actional. Rights and obligations are apportioned as they result from transactions
(contractual, tortious, criminal, and so on) between parties rather than ag-
gregated in unchanging clusters that attach to persons because of determinants
outside the particular transactions.' 145 The opposite view holds that relation-
ships, rather than discrete transactions, form the basis of Anglo-American
law. 146 Support for this multiplex, relational model of traditional adjudication
is found in the substantive law of such areas as landlord-tenant, partnership,
domestic relations, and master-servant."' In each of these areas of law the
rights, duties and liabilities of the parties are established by the relation be-
tween the parties rather than by the will of the parties.'"
Perhaps the two opposing views can be reconciled by saying that the com-
mon law uses as its model individual transactions that occur largely within rela-
tionships whose boundaries are legally determined. The general metaphor for
how society is organized, therefore, is one of initiatives within constraints.
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is just such a metaphor that could characterize the
procedural mix of disputant control to stranger control in adjudication. 149 It
"5 Galanter, supra note 135, at 154 [emphasis added]. Although seeing rapid change in
this regard, Ian MacNeil would support Galanter's opinion. Western legal systems contain a bias
toward the transactional model rather than the relational model, he says, because of the reliance
of such systems on "explicit rules creating explicit and monetarized rights. These are transac-
tional techniques; the western legal system, especially the judiciary (real or quasi), uses them
very heavily.... " MacNeil, supra note 15, at 741.
146 Pound, writing in 1917, seems to come emphatically to this conclusion. He states:
In the Romanist system the chief role is played by the conception of a legal transac-
tion, an act intended to create legal results to which the law, carrying out the will of
the actor, gives the intended effect .... In our law, by contrast, the central idea is
rather relation. Thus, in case of agency the civilian thinks of an act, a manifestation
of the will .... The common law lawyer, on the other hand, thinks of the relation of
principal and agent and of powers, rights, duties, and liabilities, not as willed by the
parties, but as incident to and involved in the relation.
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 211-12 (1917).
' 47 Id. at 212-15.
118 Id. at 212.
149 This controversy as to whether a simplex or a multiplex model of society underlies
the creation of legal rules bears also on whether traditional adjudication is universalist or par-
ticularist with respect to its treatment of disputants. Pound explicitly rejects using Maine's
"status to contract" evolution to describe how Anglo-American law looks upon individuals. Id.
at 211. In most human endeavors, thinks Pound, the common law ascribes some sort of relational
or status baggage. This may well be true, but it does not necessarily amount to treating people
"particularly" as was done under feudal law. This distinction between archaic and modern
forms of status ascription is well made by Professor Graveson: In modern society, people are not
constantly burdened by the same ascribed characteristics regardless of the nature of their transac-
tions. People are free to move in and out of a variety of "status" categories. R. GRAVESON,
STATUS IN THE COMMON LAW (1953). See also Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23
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therefore is difficult to locate adjudication precisely along a continuum between
stranger-control and disputant-control. Elements of both are present in almost
every instance of adjudication and one is left to conclude that each is roughly of
equal significance.
5. Procedures Variable B2: Whether the Participation in Adjudication is Strict
and Assured, or Loose and Diffuse
Participation in traditional adjudication can be characterized as strict and
assured. Participation is strict in that in a traditional lawsuit it is up to the par-
ties to present proofs and arguments for a decision in their favor.' 5° Only in ap-
pellate adjudication does the process reach in any manner past the immediate
parties. 15 ' Moreover, participation in adjudication is assured since a lawsuit is
a contest between diametrically opposed parties in which each party is entitled
to participate. 15 ' Hence, traditional adjudication can easily be characterized as
strict and assured rather than loose and diffuse.
6. Procedures Variable B3: Whether Adjudication is Strongly Responsive, or
Weakly Responsive, to the Proofs and Arguments of the Parties
This variable is controversial. One view maintains that traditional ad-
judication is strongly responsive to the proofs and arguments of the parties.
Under this view, a court's decision "ought to proceed from and be congruent
with [the parties'] proofs and arguments.' " 53
 A contrasting view states that the
adjudicative decision is based on utilitarian rather than individualized con-
siderations.'" To the extent a decision is based on social considerations, it is
weakly responsive to the individualized considerations brought forth. True, the
winning party could base his or her argument on social considerations, and
such arguments might be reflected in the judgment. Such congruence would be
STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971). Indeed it is the law that often creates the entry and the easy means of
escape from such status categories.
1 " Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, supra note 10, at 364; see also Fuller, Ad-
judication and the Rule of Lau, supra note 10, at 1.
"' Chayes, supra note 20, at 1285. Again, Chayes is confining his remarks to "tradi-
tional adjudication" as opposed to "public law litigation." In the latter sort of litigation, even at
the trial level the dispute ranges far beyond the immediate parties.
" I Id. at 1282-83. The "assuredness" of participation receives further substantiation
from Robert Mnookin, who summarizes:
At the core of adjudication is the notion that government exercises authority
through a process in which the persons affected can participate. (footnote omitted).
Mnookin, Child-custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 226, 249 (1975).
'" Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 413. "[S]trong responsiveness	 is an independent
norm which both helps define adjudication and gives a special meaning to participation through
proofs and arguments. To this extent, strong responsiveness is a critical characteristic of the ad-
judicative process." Id.
154 See discussion of Aubert's "model of adjudication," supra at note 31 and accompa-
nying text.
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coincidental, however, and the judgment criteria would remain exogenous to
the individual considerations of that party.
In determining the extent to which the decisions of Anglo-American ad-
judication are based on utilitarian, social, or policy considerations rather than
individual considerations, the conclusions made about the "universalist versus
particularist" variable are relevant. Legal decisions are based on both univer-
salist and particularist considerations. Every case ultimately is more or less
grounded on universalist general rules or doctrine which are formulated along
utilitarian grounds. Yet every case gathers individualized decisional informa-
tion or evidence, thus tempering the result that might obtain on strictly
utilitarian grounds.'"
7. Procedures Variable C 1: Whether Adjudication Produces a Binary, or
rather, a Graduated or Accommodative Decision
That traditional adjudication employs the binary rather than graduated
decisional form is widely acknowledged but by no means uniformly
applauded,'" since a binary decision gives all to the successful party.'" Two
reasons are commonly advanced to explain the tendency toward binary deci-
sions. The first is that the all-or-nothing decision is the necessary result of the
peculiarly absolutist nature of legal rules and norms.'" The second suggestion
is less formal, stating that the values underlying legal rules are considered by
society as crucial to its identity or endurance.' 59
 With respect to the first
reason, one commentator has stated that the Anglo-American judiciary uses
absolute legal rules and norms because the judiciary "is uncomfortable in the
highest degree with persuasion, mediation, adjustment, compromise, etc. 11 160
Thus, it has been asserted that judges use legal norms in a highly stylized and
tightly controlled fashion; where norms conflict, a judge will discard one as in-
valid or inapplicable and select one as determinative of the outcome of the
case. 16 '
"6 For a general and very valuable discussion of the interplay of rules, utilitarianism,
and rights, see DWORKIN, supra note 50.
156 See, e.g., the criticism in Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964). Aubert, for example, complains: "The legal
solution, in common with the solution which accident, fate, or may give to a transaction,
tends to ignore the minimax principle and gives all to one party." Aubert, supra note 31, at 28.
"' See supra note 156.
"a See infra note 160-62 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra note 163-64 and accompanying text.
' 6° MacNeil, supra note 15, at 741-42. This position is elaborated by Eisenberg, who
ultimately ties the absolute nature of legal norms to the fact that the judge is normally a stranger
to the disputants. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text, MacNeil no doubt has, in mind
the process of litigation itself. At stages prior to litigation, the legal system contains many substan-
tive rules, such as the accord and satisfaction doctrine, that promote "adjustment, compromise,
etc." David Fleming, personal communication (March, 1981).
161 As Eisenberg states:
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A further limitation on the power of legal rules to explain the binary
nature of Anglo-American traditional adjudication arises from the very struc-
ture of the legal rules. While the binary form is generally used in the stating of
legal decisions and legal rules, the words "do not express precise ideas, but do
practically the reverse: they point to enormously complex difficulties ... and
they provide a beginning for argument and thought. ' " 62
 Thus, the "absolute"
nature of legal norms is fictitious. The binary nature of legal decisions cannot
be explained on the basis of a model of legal thought that is radically fictitious.
The second proposed explanation for the binary tendency of legal deci-
sions is that the values underlying legal rules are considered by society as
crucial to its identity or endurance. Legal decisions touching on values closely
held by society, so goes the argument, are binary in order that the values are
expressed unambiguously.'" This explanation seems convincing wherever
strongly held social values are present. Many decisions, however, deal with
matters that are quite mundane. The binary mode remains in place in such
cases even though, as one commentator noted, the moral position of the
decision-maker is enhanced by a non-binary decision close to the accom-
modative golden mean.'" The explanation for the relentlessly binary nature of
In adjudication (or, at least, that style of adjudication prevalent in complex Western
cultures) the universe and operation of norms is highly stylized and tightly con-
trolled. Where norms conflict, a court will characteristically treat one norm as not
only subordinate but totally invalid—so that a court which adopts the doctrine of
contributory negligence will deny the validity of comparative negligence. Where
norms collide, a court will characteristically select one as determinative of the out-
come of the case and reject the other as inapplicable .... Finally, courts tend to treat
person-oriented norms as either invalid or irrelevant—so that in the United States
the socially recognized principle that brothers owe each other special obligations will
typically give rise to neither a cause of action nor a defense. (footnotes . omitted).
Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 644.
162 J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 228 (1973). White concurs with the formal
aspects of the Eisenberg binary, act-oriented model. Yet, says White, "There is a sense in which
the very structure or syntax of the rule—the way it works—makes it a radically fictional expres-
sion." Id. This "fiction" of legal rules springs from four characteristics:
First, ... the rule reduces all that can be said about an event to a "legal issue," a
question framed in legal terms demanding an answer "yes" or "no"; second, it
works by a process of naming or labelling that has the false appearance of being a
simple and easy operation, a falsity that seriously misleads many users of legal
language; third, an apparent premise of the rule is that it shall always be applied
consistently, so that its terms—its labels—shall always mean exactly the same thing
(and ... this premise is unworkable if true, dishonest if not); fourth, the legal rule is
usually designed to have a sort of middle degree of generality, between the specific
command and the vague ideal, and this form involves constant compromise and in-
accuracy.
Id. at 228-29. See also STEIN & SHAND, supra note 26, at 93-95.
163 STEIN & SHAND, supra note 26, at 91, 92. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying
text. This "values" explanation is not inconsistent with the reasoning that the binary mode will
emerge in a third-party procedure only where the interests of society are deeply felt.
164 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Aubert's explanation for the general use of
the binary decision is unconvincing. He suggests the binary approach may work to increase ac-
curacy, since the spirit of compromise is actually a distortion of the facts: "[T)his tendency [toward
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 545
legal decisions perhaps lies in judicial inertia, or reluctance to include in legal
judgments overt discussion of the presence or absence of compelling social
needs. Alternatively, it may simply be an inability of judges to transcend that
rather Newtonian mentality to which all people seem susceptible — that
everything simply is, or is not.'"
Whatever the reason, there seems little doubt that the form of traditional
legal decisions is binary rather than graduated or accommodative. Substantive-
ly the matter is open to some question, since over time the language of law is
susceptible to manipulation, and decisions come to mean more than one
thing.' 66 At the time the decision is made, however, the inescapable fact is that
one disputant wins, and the other loses: a binary decision.
8. Procedures Variable C2: Whether Adjudication is Corrective, or Facilitative
Whether a given procedure is corrective or facilitative can be examined
from several different perspectives. The three suggested in this article are: the
function of the decision (is it to control or cure, rather than to enable or pre-
vent); the dominant view of problems (are they pathological rather than ex-
pected or inherent in a given situation); and the emotional impact of submit-
ting a decision (is it debilitating rather than merely regrettable or
therapeutic). 167 On all three attributes, adjudication is more corrective than
facilitative. Unquestionably, however, adjudication plays an important
facilitative role.
The function of adjudication most often is seen as controlling or rec-
tificatory rather than facilitative or preventative.'" Problems are dominantly
viewed as "breaches of duty" rather than as the process of mutual adjustment
normally attendant to relationships. Also, somber assumptions are made about
the state of a relationship that needs resort to adjudication. These assumptions
are reflected in some aspects of adjudicative procedure, and in the emotional
impact of participation. As one commentator stated, "each disputant is by
posture a supplicant and by role an inferior. He must tacitly admit that he can-
compromise] may also introduce a bias, since there is no intrinsic reason why one party should
not be predominantly right in his claims." Aubert, supra note 31, at 40. This may well be, but the
bias is certainly not cured by adopting a mode of decision that forces one party to be declared com-
pletely right, and the other completely wrong. The binary approach is a bias in the other direc-
tion. Were Aubert correct in his "accuracy" reasoning, we should expect to see at least some
graduated or accommodative decisions.
165
 For a discussion of how scientific thought has influenced legal thought, see L.
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) ch. 3, 93-137.
166 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
168 This view is illustrated by Chayes' third point which states that "the plaintiff will get
compensation measured by the harm caused by the defendant's breach of duty." See supra note
126 and accompanying text. Plainly evident in this statement is the "guilt" mode of cognition
suggested by Aubert as yet another defining feature of the corrective type of procedure. Aubert,
supra note 31, at 36. See also infra note 227.
546	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:505
not handle his own affairs.'"" Moreover, the disputant must do his utmost to
influence the adjudicator, while according the adjudicator great respect, if not
deference. 17°
Where the adjudication does not involve some notion of compensation for
wrong, the lawsuit normally is seen by both legal and social theorists as an "in-
strument of social control.""' Much of law, however, including the law of con-
tract, agency, marriage and divorce, property, and most rules of court pro-
cedure have little to do with social control. Rather, they "serve primarily to set
the terms of men's relations with one another; they facilitate human interaction
as traffic is facilitated by the laying out of roads and the installation of direction
signs."'" Although not without its facilitative aspects, adjudication tends on
balance to be essentially corrective.'"
B. Problems and Their Suitability for Anglo-American Adjudication
• This section derives a profile of the sort of problem best suited for resolu-
tion by Anglo-American adjudication as described according to the eight pro-
cedure variables. Using that profile as a guide, a number of the types of prob-
lems submitted for adjudication are described, and their respective
"justiciabilities" roughly charted. In the succeeding sections, several of the
charted problems are discussed in greater detail.
1. The "Ideally Justiciable" Problem
The "ideally justiciable" problem is simply that problem whose eight
structural variables are fully consistent with the structural attributes of ad-
judication established in the previous section.' 74 Once adjudication has been
structurally described, the ideally justiciable problem is easily derived by refer-
ring to the procedure-problem associations derived earlier. Inasmuch as the
procedural attributes of traditional adjudication can be described and links can
be made between the procedure and problem variables, it follows that a prob-
lem can be described as ideally suited to traditional adjudication. This process
is not entirely mechanical, however, and there follows an explanation of the
derivation of each of the ideal problem's eight attributes.
162 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 659.
17° Id.
'" Fuller, supra note 16, at 20. This perspective perhaps sterns in part from the tradi-
tional absolutist model of legal rules, the limitations of which have been discussed above, and in
part from the notion that the necessity for law arises entirely from man's defective moral
nature...." Id. Yet as Fuller states, much of law has nothing whatever to do with man's
"moral" or "immoral" nature. Id.
"2 Id.
1 " For a summary of the locations of adjudication on the continua of the eight procedure
variables, see Appendix D.
'" See supra note 173.
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Adjudication is somewhat unusual among decisional procedures in that it
is capable of solving both simple problems and interactive problems. For two
reasons, however, adjudication is probably better suited to solving simple
problems. First, because adjudication is reactive, the solution of an interactive
problem through the common law might require a considerable period of time,
often years. Second, because the optimization of variables required to resolve
an interactive problem is accomplished at the system level, i.e. by the aggregate
of cases that constitute the common law, the interactive problem can be ex-
pected to present great decisional difficulty at the individual case level. This is
particularly so early in the decisional history of a given legal problem. There-
fore, even though adjudication can cope with interactive problems, the ad-
judicatory process nonetheless is better suited to solving simple problems.
Because adjudication employs universalist rules, but looks to particularist
evidence, while treating disputants universally, the process is much better
suited to solving problems with decisional criteria that are undisputed or well-
established. In addition, because adjudication is a reactive procedure, it is bet-
ter designed for resolving problems based on past events than for resolving
problems requiring prediction of future events.
Adjudication as noted has elements of both stranger-control and
disputant-control.'" Adjudication therefore would seem to be equally adept at
solving problems arising in the context of simple, or multiplex, relationships.
Although the disputant control that is allowed in adjudication is no doubt a
useful adaptation for dealing with multiplex problems, on balance adjudication
is better suited to simplex party problems. This is the result of the influence of
another procedure variable, namely "corrective versus facilitative." Adjudica-
tion is largely corrective: as such, certain emotional effects accompany the
bringing of a lawsuit. Adjudication can be highly detrimental to aspects of a
multiplex relationship, such as the marital relationship, even though the rela-
tionship is not specifically part of a given lawsuit. 16 Adjudication passes judg-
ment according to a "guilt" and "compensatory" mentality incompatible with
the mutual trust and reciprocity needed to sustain long-term, intimate relation-
ships.'" Adjudication therefore is better suited to solving simplex party prob-
lems than multiplex party problems.
'" See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text,
'" This is substantiated by the finding of Goldman and Sarat:
[T]he way in which third-party remedy systems account for the emergence of
trouble in a relationship also influences the way people will deal with that trouble.
Those which try to settle troubles by determining whether omeone violated a social
norm and by assigning causal or moral responsibility will not be attractive to people
who have long-standing relationships. These people will generally see greater am-
bivalence in the evolution and continuation of their trouble than such a settlement
procedure recognizes.
Goldman & Sarat, supra note 52, at 19.
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Since adjudication uses strict, assured participation, it is better suited to
solving "private" disputes than to solving "public" disputes. 179 The wider in-
terests at stake in a "public" dispute cannot be ideally accommodated with
limited participation, but rather should be resolved in a more diffuse forum
such as a legislature.
Since adjudication is fairly strongly responsive to the proofs and
arguments of the parties, it is more suitable to resolving problems for which
private resolution is "feasible" than those for which private resolution is "in-
feasible." Despite the strong responsiveness of adjudication, however, "in=
feasible" problems often are adjudicated. Where problems cannot feasibly be
resolved privately, judges probably feel special pressure to hear the case: If the
disputants are foreclosed from the legal system, there may be no other deci-
sional institution to turn to, leaving the parties to a more or less arbitrary and
violent form of self-help.'" Moreover, the legal system often can adapt easily to
hearing an "infeasible" problem, as where the court simply appoints an at-
torney to represent the interests of the party, who by reason of incapacity or
absence would be prejudiced by a strongly responsive procedure.'"
Since adjudication uses the binary form of decision announcement, it is
not well-suited to hear problems about which considerable social dissensus ex-
ists. Such problems are normally much better suited to graduated or accom-
modative decisions. 1 B' Occasionally, however, a court will treat a dissensus
problem in a distinctly binary fashion, hoping thereby to forge some communi-
ty consensus on the issue, or to dispirit those holding the opposing view.'" In
addition, adjudication is more corrective than facilitative. Either form of pro-
cedure can cope in its own way both with problems for which private resolution
is desirable, and with problems for which private resolution is undeSirable.
Since corrective procedures are more bluntly considered "instruments of social
control," such procedures can perhaps deal with "undersirable" problems
more forthrightly than can facilitative procedures. Nonetheless, just as ad-
judication is better suited to solving simple problems than interactive problems,
even though it can cope with the latter, so also is adjudication better suited to
solving problems for which private resolution is desirable, even though it can
cope (though perhaps unevenly) with problems for which private resolution is
undesirable. Undesirable "tragic choice" problems pose unavoidable dif-
ficulties for adjudication because (1) such problems often come to a morally
ambiguous choice between two bad alternatives; and because (2) contrary to
178 See also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text, regarding the exception for
criminal trials. Also, the definition of "public" and "private" disputes here used is formal, and
is applied only with great difficulty to the modern sort of case that Chayes refers to as "public law
litigation." See infra notes 456-87 and accompanying text.
I79 See also supra notes 104-05, 524 and accompanying.text.
180 See supra notes 78 and 100 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
'al See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 549
the traditions of adjudication in which candid justifications accompany the an-
nouncement of decisions, the true reasons behind tragic choice decisions must
remain clouded.' 83 The ideal problem thus is reduced to one having the follow-
ing attributes:' 84
 Simple content variables; Well-established decisional criteria;
Past-oriented; Simplex relationship between parties; Private dispute; Private
resolution feasible; Social consensus on proper outcome; and Private resolution
desirable .
2. Patterns of Justiciability
Using the profile developed of the ideally justiciable problem one can con-
struct a chart that provides a very rough, and in several respects inconclusive,
guide to the justiciability of a variety of problems submitted to the Anglo-
American system of adjudication (see Figure 1). The eight characteristics of the
ideal problem become the columns on the chart. The rows are various prob-
lems that have been submitted for adjudication. For simplicity, there is no con-
sideration of degree along a continuum. The structure of each problem has
been assessed in a binary fashion so that every problem is considered, for ex-
ample, to have completely well-established, or completely unknown, decisional
criteria. This procedure is reductive, but the chart is intended simply to reveal
patterns. Where the attribute of the given problem agrees with the correspond-
ing attributes of the ideally justiciable problem, a " " appears in the appro-
priate box. Where there is a disagreement, a " " appears. If for any reason
no judgment could be made (such as that the characterization depends greatly
on particular circumstances, or that both poles of the variable tend to be pres-
ent in every instance of the problem), a "?" appears.
Two conclusions can be drawn immediately from Figure 1: (1) the gradual
deterioration of justiciability as one proceeds down the list of problems cor-
relates highly with the increasing novelty of the problem's legal implications;
and (2) many problems that depart significantly from the model of ideal
justiciability are commonly heard by Anglo-American judges. The correlation
between decreasing problem justiciability and increasing legal novelty is
evidence that the theory is substantially accurate. Traditional legal subject
matters like property, contract, tort, and criminal law score as almost perfectly
justiciable.' 83
 Conversely, such legally novel issues as the regulation of scien-
'" See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
1"
 A summary of the attributes of the "ideally justiciable" problem is depicted at Ap-
pendix E.
185
 The "?" mark in the "social consensus" box of the "Breach of Contract" action
reflects the gradual deterioration, particularly in consumer contexts, of the once widely shared
beliefs that people should be held to those promises made but . not fully understood, and those
promises made, but not made fully without duress. See generally, G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1974). The "?" in the "private dispute" box of "Criminal Law" reflects the pres-
ence in every criminal trial of elements of both public and private disputes. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
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Figure 1
Patterns of Justiciability
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Property boundary dispute	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
Personal injury tort
	
+	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
Criminal law	 +	 +	 +	 +	 ?	 +	 +	 -
Breach of contract	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 ?	 +
Nuisance	 ?	 +	 +	 +	 +	 ?	 +	 +
Divorce (contested)	 +	 +	 +	 -	 +	 +	 +	 +
Riparian rights	 -	 +	 ?	 ?	 +	 ?	 +	 4
Breach of promise
	
+	 -	 +	 -	 +	 +	 -	 +
Intra-denominational
Church disputes	 -	 ?	 -	 +	 +	 +
Civil commitment	 +	 -	 ?	 -	 ?	 -	 +	 -
Obscenity	 +	 -	 +	 +	 _	 -
Restrictive trade cases
	
-	 ?	 ?	 +	 ?	 -	 +	 +
Employment discrimination	 -	 +	 -	 ?	 -	 -	 -
Child custody	 -	 -	 -	 -	 +	 +	 -	 +
Abortion	 +	 -	 ?	 +	 -	 -	 -	 -
Technology assessment	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 +
Allowance of bail	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	 -	 -	 -
Suits to enjoin
factory closures	 -	 -	 -	 -	 ?	 +	 -	 +
Aesthetics regulation	 -	 -	 ?	 +	 ?	 -	 -	 ?
Pollution	 -	 -	 ?	 +	 ?	 -	 -	 ?
Child ungovernability	 +	 -	 -	 -	 -
Controls on science	 -	 -	 -	 +	 -	 -
Criminal sentencing	 -	 ?	 +	 -	 -
Who may bear children
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tific activity, or the enjoining of factory closures on grounds of "social respon-
sibility," score very badly. The only aberrations to this correlation are criminal
sentencing and the setting of bail. The criminal sentencing exception is dis-
cussed later in this article, and the allowance of bail exception is roughly
analogous. These exceptions do not, for reasons that will be made clear, under-
mine the fairly striking correlation between decreasing problem justiciability
and increasing legal novelty. The correlation means that either the theory as
constructed is reasonably valid, or else the assumptions alluded to above 186
concerning the evolution of procedures are invalid. To review, these assump-
tions are first that problems, in addition to being of varying content, can differ
from one another in ways that can be described structurally. Second, people
constantly seek procedures for solving problems that are maximally accurate,
efficient, and acceptable. Third, such maximization occurs when a specific pro-
cedure is devised that copes well with the specific structural attributes of a cer-
tain problem. Fourth, it can therefore be assumed that procedures evolve along
structural lines that bear associations with the structure of problems. If such
assumptions are correct, then there should be a strong correlation between the
attributes of a procedure, and the attributes of the sorts of problems most com-
rnonly"7 or traditionally resolved by such procedures. Such correlation does
emerge in the chart; hence the constructed theory can be grossly inaccurate
only if the underlying assumptions are incorrect. 186
188 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
187
 The rather depressing results of the research of Friedman and Percival are that the
traditional subjects of law (contract, tort, property) are increasing rarities in the actual work of
inferior courts. This counsels caution in use of the word "commonly." See Friedman & Percival,
A Tale of Two Courts. Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 267
(1976).
188
 Thomas Kuhn, of course, alerts us to another possibility: that the designer of the
chart was unconsciously influenced by his own predispositions. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962). This is not to be taken lightly; many of the attributes assigned
to the twenty-three problems are debatable. The reader is invited to make independent
assessments of the " +" and " — " and "?" features of the chart. Minor variations in the details
of the chart, however, would not affect the patterns from which the claims of validity are drawn.
This study proceeded first by attempting to develop a "structural vocabulary" for prob-
lems qua problems. No particular sort of problems, for example "legal problems," acted as
models. Next, the same process was followed for "procedures," again without any particular
reference to "legal procedures." Third, the major interactions and associations of the problem
and procedure variables were studied. The "evolutionary" relationship between a particular
problem variable and a particular procedure variable was noticed. The evolutionary model was
then adopted as a working hypothesis, leading to many of the associations postulated supra in Sec-
tion B which introduces and describes the procedure variables. Once such associations are found,
deriving the ideal problem structure for a given procedure is purely logical. The procedure has a
given structure which works best in solving problems with a structure dictated by the associa-
tions. Problems not possessing such a structure are more or less poorly suited to be resolved by
the procedure.
This theory is in no way restricted to the procedure of "adjudication." It can be used to
describe the structure, and recommend the ideal sort of problem to be decided by any of a
number of alternative decisional procedures, like negotiation, or the pure market, or the lottery.
Alternatively, one could begin with a given problem and recommend the ideal procedure for
solving it.
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The second conclusion clear from Figure 1 is that many problems bearing
attributes opposite from those of the ideally justiciable problem, are regularly
heard by Anglo-American judges. At first blush this fact seems to contradict
the evolutionary assumptions about problems and procedures. Each society,
however, has available to it only a limited number of settlement procedures.'"
Judges therefore often must hear these "dissonant" problems because adjudi-
cation is the best available technique. Such necessity does not change the in-
compatibilities between such problems and adjudication. The legal system,
and judges in particular, respond to the dissonance with Victorian ingen-
uity—sometimes changing the problem, sometimes changing themselves. Such
problem modifications or procedural adaptations often occur predictably along the exact
structural variable where the incompatibility with traditional adjudication is most severe.
The remainder of this article is devoted to testing this claim; if borne out, it af-
fords yet more striking validation of the constructed theory of justiciability.
III. TESTING THE THEORY
The structural theory of the interaction of problems and procedures
developed in this article has potential application far beyond the single example
of Anglo-American adjudication. Using the theory, an ideal sort of problem
can be derived for any given procedure for problem-solving; conversely, for
any given problem an ideal sort of problem-solving procedure can be de-
scribed.' 9° For many problems it may well be that no procedure has yet been
devised that resembles the structure ideally needed to solve the problem accu-
rately, efficiently, and acceptably.' 9 '
The theory was generated rationalistically rather than empirically.'"
Figure 1 crudely demonstrates that the theory has some empirical validity in
the context of Anglo-American adjudication. Using this same example, the sec-
ond half of this article tests virtually every one of the major associations
claimed to exist between a given problem variable and its counterpart pro-
cedure variable. For any given procedure variable of Anglo-American ad-
judication a corresponding problem attribute exists.' 93 When such attribute
does not appear, and in fact the opposite problem attribute is found in the
problems actually being adjudicated, dissonance exists. One should then ex-
pect to see a wide array of judicial behaviors that attempt to cope with or
resolve the dissonance between the procedures of adjudication and the problem
that adjudication is being employed to solve.
' 99 Fuller, supra note 46, at 1026.
' 9° See supra note 188.
191 See Fuller, supra note 46, passim.
19' See supra note 188.
'9' See Appendix E.
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Unsuitable problems often are submitted for adjudication. Sometimes,
although rarely, the judge refuses to entertain the dispute. 19 ' More frequently
the judge hears part or all of the case, yet adopts a substantive standard that ef-
fectively operates as a refusal to hear the case; most commonly perhaps by
deferring absolutely to the discretion of an administrative agency. 195 Frequent-
ly, however, the judge does proceed to a judgment on the merits. In such cases,
there will be pressure to modify the problem, or to adapt the procedures of ad-
judication, so as to resolve the dissonance between the structural attributes of
the submitted problem, and the structural attributes of adjudication. Problem
modifications will tend to occur that somehow convert the problem feature into
its opposite. If a problem is unsuitable for adjudication as a result of being in-
teractive rather than simple, for example, the predictable problem modification
is one that will somehow treat the problem as though it were simple, rather than
interactive. An alternative method of resolving this dissonance arising from an
interactive problem is for judges to change their procedures from their normal
form to a form that is much more spontaneous, and therefore much more able
to deal with interactive problems. The features and effects of modifications and
adaptations to resolve problem dissonances can be predicted by bearing in
mind the associations between problem variables, and similarly numbered pro-
cedure variables. This section is devoted to predicting and describing how the
legal system responds when confronted with problems that are less than
perfectly justiciable as a result of their being interactive rather than simple.
Succeeding sections are similarly structured for describing the effects of un-
suitability for adjudication created by each of the other seven problem
variables.
A. When Adjudication Faces Interactive Problems
Over time, the common law (as a system, i.e., as an aggregate of cases
rather than one individual case) 196 displays "spontaneity" and thereby gains
the ability to cope with interactive problems. The key to such system-level
spontaneity is stare decisis.' 97 Judges follow precedent, but not so closely as to
foreclose a certain amount of manipulation. This manipulation results in the
constant and frequent mutual adjustments that create spontaneity within a
decisional system. Over time, what perhaps began as judicial hunch or instinct
about the optimal balancing of the interactive variables of a given problem
becomes a reservoir of close approximations for differing circumstances, each
14 See, e.g. , United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues of Greater Boston,
Inc., 349 Mass. 595, 211.N.E.2d 332 (1965).
195 See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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such prevailing approximation being the result of dozens of literal "trials and
errors." What creates dissonance between traditional adjudication and in-
teractive problems is the slowness of the common law process. Ultimately it is
spontaneous; at each point in time, however, it appears deliberative.
Interactive problems are therefore more difficult to solve than are simple
problems. Particularly when the previous number of adjudications on a given
interactive problem is small, pressures exist on the individual judge to refuse to
hear the case, or to modify the problem, or to increase the spontaneity of the
legal system to cope with the problem. Examples of all three possible responses
can be found in examining (a) cases where judges are asked to specify the prop-
er siting of a highway; (b) cases where the judge is asked to declare something
visually beautiful or aesthetically unacceptable; and (c) the differing ap-
proaches taken by British and American judges toward cases involving the
regulation of business competition.
1. Highway Siting
Highway siting is just one example of a common type of very interactive
problem. The proper routing of a highway is an optimization of many com-
peting considerations about cost, terrain, soil conditions, preexisting uses, sur-
rounding population density, the availability of nearby alternative routes and,
as discussed in the following case, the sociological impact on the neighborhood
through which the highway is to be built. Where judges are asked to hear a case
that requires a decision about the proper corridor for a proposed highway, they
characteristically respond either by refusing outright to decide the problem, or by
functionally refusing to decide the problem through adopting a substantive stand-
ard that defers absolutely to the discretion of some administrative agency.'"
Such a deferral is not a mandated standard of review under any general princi-
ple of administrative law.'" Rather, judges choose to adopt very loose stand-
ards of review because it is difficult for them to cope with an interactive prob-
lem like highway siting.
In Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington , 2" for example, suit was
brought by an unincorporated association of citizens in North Nashville, Ten-
nessee, seeking to enjoin state highway officials from constructing a stretch of
highway through their community. The complaint alleged procedural errors in
the administrative decision that resulted in the particular routing, and also
alleged that "selection of the route in question was made arbitrarily or with the
purpose of discriminating against the Negro or low socio-economic segments of
Nashville's population. "201 The federal district court denied the injunction.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, after holding that the adminis-
198 See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
199 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
'" 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
201 Id. at 181.
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trative hearing was not invalid for lack of notice, then refused to consider whether
the result of the particular routing would be to deprive the plaintiffs of the due
process and equal protection of the law. 202
 The court stated that absent proof of
racial discrimination, the routing of highways was not a justiciable matter. 205
Thus, the court held, the district court had acted properly in refusing to
substitute its judgment for that of the highway officials in the routing of the
highway. 2" Neither this rather explicit limitation of judicial review nor the
slightly less absolute standards adopted by the three cases that follow below are
mandated under any general principle of administrative law. In fact, the prop-
er standard of review of the sort of administrative decisions here involved is
unclear and with respect to such decisions "probably no court treats all agen-
cies alike."'"
Many interactive problems are, consigned to administrative agencies
through the legislative vehicle of special sort of rules."" Such rules specify to
the administrative agency the relevant factors to consider in their decision, but
do not deem any one factor conclusive. 207
 The rules very often will frame an in-
teractive problem: one having many competing variables, and one for which
no guidance is given on the proper optimization. Such rules can be applied on-
ly through spontaneous procedures in which the administrator considers a wide
variety of decisional factors "[Nut ultimately . . . reaches decision by an in-
tuitive leap. " 208
 Where a court must subsequently review administrative deci-
sions made pursuant to this sort of rule, the court may choose from standards
that vary widely in their closeness of scrutiny. At one extreme is a close stand-
ard of review in which the court determines all of the relevant rules and then
applies those rules to the facts. 209
 At the other extreme is a standard of review
in which the "court may hold that it is without power to revise the application
of rules to the facts unless the application is in its opinion 'unreasonable' or 'al--
"2 Id. at 185.
"3 Id.
204 The minimizing of hardships and adverse economic effects is a problem addressing itself to
engineers, not judges." (emphasis added) Id.
2°5 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 557 (1965).
2" Id at 556.
207 Id,
200 Id.
[This] type of rule is perhaps the most characteristic instrument for making ad-
ministrative decisions. It singles out a consideration as relevant, but provides no
further rule for the application of the consideration. It therefore permits, indeed
compels the administrator to resort to a whole complex of additional concepts and
attitudes, official and personal, some of which he may explicitly formulate for the
decision at hand, some of which he may not express, sonic of which he may be
unaware of . The mind focuses attention for a period of time on a group of
authoritative decisional factors.... It is this process which 1 would call the exercise
of "discretion"... .
Id. at 555-56.
209 Id. at 556.
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bitrary.' " 210
 In other words, the reviewing court is free to adopt a very close
review or to defer to the discretion of the administrators. The Nashville 1-40
court, in refusing even to consider the agency determination, seems to go beyond
even this extreme minimal review. The contention here is that where the
underlying problem is highly interactive, the courts will feel strong pressures to
avoid attempting their own optimization of the variables. The Nashville 1-40
court felt just such pressures. That it could refuse to review the administrative
decision in the face of a challenge at the constitutional level"' evidences the
strength of such influences.
The Nashville 1-40 court, however, showed unusual candor in refusing to
review the administrative decision. More often the court will uncomplainingly
review the administrative decision on an interactive problem, yet adopt such
an invincibly discretionary standard of review as to amount to a functional
refusal by the judge to consider the challenge. Such was the case in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 212
 an action to enjoin the United States
Secretary of Transportation from releasing federal funds to the Highway
Department of .the State of Tennessee for construction of a segment of an ex-
pressway in the City of Memphis through Overton Park, a zoo and recrea-
tional area.'" The plaintiffs relied in part on a federal statute that prohibits the
Secretary of Transportation from approving any highway project that requires
use of land from a public park: "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent al-
ternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible
planning to minimize harm to such park . . . "214
 Such a statute would seem to
require the judiciary, in hearing a challenge to a project that does take park-
land, to assess any proposed alternative with a view of determining, whether
such alternative is "feasible and prudent." If so found by the judge, further in-
vestigation by the Secretary would seem mandated under the statute.
Presumably the plaintiffs were prepared to offer into evidence some alternative
plan.'" Nevertheless, the court first refused to require the Secretary to set out
explicitly his findings concerning his conclusion that there existed no feasible
and prudent alternative, and then the court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiffs. 216
 The court stated that the Secretary of Transportation
210 Id. at 557.
211
 Appellants contended "that, regardless of intent, the result of the construction of the
proposed highway would be so injurious to the residents ... as to deprive [them] ... of due proc-
ess and equal protection as a matter of law." 387 F.2d at 185.
212 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd and
remanded, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), on remand, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), supplemental hear-
ings, 357 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), rev'd sub. nom. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
217
	 F. Supp. at 1191.
2'4
	 U.S.C. S 138 (1966).
2" On remand, plaintiffs did propose an alternative route. 335 F. Supp. at 880-81.
418 309 F. Supp. at 1195.
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was to make determinations as to reasonable alternatives and the court was
only concerned with whether such determinations were made arbitrarily and
capriciously."'
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding
that the proper standard for judicial review in this case was not a de novo inquiry
into feasible and prudent alternatives, but the reviewing court must "engage in
a substantial inquiry ... [which is] thorough, probing, in-depth . . . " 213 On
remand, the District Court engaged in such an inquiry and concluded "that on
the record the Secretary could properly have determined either that there was
or that there was not a feasible and prudent alternative." 219 Neither judgment
would have been "clear error" or "arbitrary or capricious. " 220 The routing
determination was remanded to the Secretary of Transportation who respond-
ed in a written decision of January 18, 1973, that he could not approve the pro-
posed routing through the park because "I cannot find, as the Statute requires,
and as interpreted by the courts, that there are no prudent and feasible alter-
natives to the use of [the] parkland . . . . "221 This was no doubt a perfectly
honest response: disproving the existence of such alternatives is virtually im-
possible. It would not only require finding the optimum of all interacting
variables, but also would require proving that all other mixes among the
variables were vastly inferior, which seems unrealistic. Nonetheless the State of
Tenneessee petitioned the Federal District Court for an order requiring the
Secretary affirmatively to specify what is the feasible and prudent route. The
District Court granted the relief. 222 The Sixth Circuit then reversed, saying
"[i]f one route is disapproved, the burden is on the state to submit another pro-
posal to the Secretary and at that time the Secretary would be required either to
approve or disapprove the new proposal." 223 If any newly-proposed route used
parkland, however, presumably it would not be approved because the
Secretary would be unable to prove the lack of a feasible and prudent alter-
native. It required years of litigation to reach this conclusion.
In a similar case, 224 effective decision-making was so stymied by the
various court pronouncements that the United States Congress passed special
legislation exempting a proposed Texas highway from obtaining corridor ap-
2 7 Id.
2 ' 8 401 U.S. at 415.
"9 335 F. Supp. at 880 [emphasis added]. The District Court undertook a plenary hear-
ing that consumed 25 trial days, and admitted 240 exhibits into evidence. Stated Chief Judge
Brown: "We believe it can fairly be said that the inquiry was substantial, thorough, probing, in-
depth, searching and careful. We have also had the benefit of 287 pages of post-trial briefs." Id.
at 878.
720 Id. at 881.
221 357 F. Supp. at 849.
222 Id. at 852.
222
	 F.2d at 1216.
224 Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
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proval by the Secretary of Transportation. 225 The unhappy truth is that such
corridor decisions are irreducibly interactive, and the judiciary get involved
only with the short run risk of themselves being accused of caprice. Admin-
istrative discretion becomes the standard because there is nothing else to be
done.
2. Cases Involving Assessments of Aesthetics
Similar pressures against close judicial review exist where such review
would entail an assessment of aesthetic worth. That such assessments con-
stitute highly interactive problems is not to be denied. 225
The following two cases illustrate how judges react when asked to make
such aesthetic judgments. Both State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley 227 and Reid v. Ar-
chitectural Board of Review 228
 involved plaintiffs desiring to build unusual homes
in neighborhoods dominated by traditionally styled homes. 229 Both designs
were denied building permits.
In Sloyanoff, the issue was whether the legislature had unduly delegated
authority, without constraining standards, to an architectural review board. 2"
The Stoyanoff  case involved an ordinance calling upon the Ladue, Missouri Ar-
chitectural Board to approve such designs as conformed with surrounding
structures and with appropriate standards of beauty, and to disapprove designs
for "unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures. " 231 The Missouri court
upheld the constitutionality of this ordinance. 232 The court found justification
in part on language from a previous case that gave special latitude to legislative
delegations of authority "in situations and circumstances where necessity would
require the vesting of discretion in the officer charged with the enforcement of
an ordinance, as where it would be impossible to fix a definite rule or stand-
ard. . . . "233 Such "definite rules or standards" are clearly impracticable in
making aesthetic assessments. On the further question in the case of whether
the Ladue Board's actual decision comported with the language of the ordi-
Dep't., 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
225 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, P.L. 93-87 154(a), 87 Stat. 276.
226 [T]he number of potential designs is infinite; the choice as to any single factor,
say materials, has an impact on all other factors; and one cannot identify any
nonaesthetic features that will even begin to consistently justify the application of
any aesthetic concept.
Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1,
18-19 (1977).
227 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
228
 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
229 458 S.W.2d at 307; 119 Ohio App. at 70-71, 192 N.E.2d at 77.
298
 458 S.W.2d at 311.
231 458 S.W.2d at 306.
292 S.W.2d at 311.
2" Id. [emphasis supplied], citing State ex rd. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552, 557
(Mo. 1957).
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nance, the court stated that it would uphold zoning decisions, such as the
Board's ruling in Stoyanoff, "if the result is not oppressive, arbitrary, or unrea-
sonable." 234
The ordinance in the second case, Reid, was much more specific than that
in Sioyanoff, requiring the employment of "proper architectural principles" to
regulate "design, use of materials, finished grade lines and orientation of all
new buildings.' '233
 Mrs. Reid's architect-designed proposed home was conced-
ed by the Board to be a "very interesting home in a different environment,"
but was denied a permit because its design did not conform to the character of
the houses in the area. 236 Design compatibility, however, was not mentioned , in
the ordinance as a fit subject for regulation. Nevertheless, the court approved
the Board's determination, stating simply: "[T]he Board did not abuse its
discretion in this matter. "237
In Reid and Stoyanoff, the courts once again relied on "administrative
discretion" to avoid substantive review. In other cases involving aesthetic
judgments, however, courts refer to the effect on surrounding property values
of allowing the proposed home to be built. 238 Sometimes the appeal to property
values is made in order to sustain the architectural review legislation against
constitutional attack. 239 At other times the discussion of property values is a
resort to what might be termed the "common denominator" strategy. 42 0 This
is a tempting, but often misleading and reductivist, technique to overcome the
problem of optimization in making aesthetic judgments.
In making aesthetic judgments, the need for optimization arises because
"objective rules" of aesthetics can never be constructed. 24 ' The development
of such objective rules is impossible because beauty cannot be fully analyzed in
nonaesthetic terms like "square" or "circle:" ultimately, resort must be had to
294 Id. at 310.
235 119 Ohio App. at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 76, citing CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO,
CODIFIED ORDINANCES S 137.05.
236 119 Ohio App. at 71, 192 N.E.2d at 77.
2"
 119 Ohio App. at 72, 192 N.E.2d at 78.
238 See, e.g., State ex rd. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
239
 Even after Justice Douglas' opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), many
states refuse to consider aesthetics per se as sufficient reason for the state's use of the police power.
It is uncontroverted, however, that the use of the police power is justified under the rubric of
"general welfare" where the State acts to prevent deterioration of neighborhoods. It is said that
maintaining property values prevents such deterioration. Hence, aesthetics zoning is often
legitimized, in jurisdictions that otherwise would not accept it, by tying aesthetics to the
maintenance of property values .  See generally, Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Ob-
jectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973).
24° Cf. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law,
83 YALE L. J. 1315, 1322-23 (1974).
241
 Williams, supra note 226, at 16-18, citing Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts in ART AND
PHILOSOPHY 351 (W. Kennick ed. 1964).
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such terms as "unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless .	 "242 If the variables
all could be expressed according to a common denominator, however, their op-
timization easily could be accomplished simply by adding together all the
various positive and negative values. The weighing of one variable against
another would be inherent in the expression of each variable in terms of the
common denominator. Once the weighing is clear, optimization is merely a
mechanical process of adding the pluses and minuses. For example, the deter-
mination of how many apples to grow in a given season depends on the interac-
tions of such variables as "demand," "revenue," "market share," "costs of
production," and also factors such as land depletion and personal effort re-
quired.'" The optimization of these variables is extremely difficult unless one
is capable of expressing each variable as a plus or minus quantity of some com-
mon denominator, like money. If indeed every variable can be so expressed,
the optimization is simply a matter of drawing cost and revenue curves ex-
pressed as functions of the number of apples produced. At some point the
curves should meet, and that point is the optimum. A court that attempts to
validate an aesthetic judgment by referring to the effects on surrounding prop-
erty values is saying that the many personal assessments of the money value of
each relevant aesthetic variable can be aggregated to declare the proposed
house grotesque, or unsightly, or innocuous, or even beautiful. It is not rele-
vant here whether this technique of validation, which is common to virtually all
forms of cost-benefit analysis, is valid or invalid.'" Suffice it to say that there
are definitional and valuation difficulties with the approach, but that the pros-
pects of optimization it affords will nonetheless make it an attractive technique
whenever decision-makers are faced with an interactive problem.
3. British and American Restrictive Trade Practices Laws
One further problem modification as well as certain procedural adapta-
tions can be illustrated by comparing British and American approaches to the
interactive problem of regulating business competition. Once again, the in-
teractive character of most antitrust problems is clear. Some of the many rele-
vant factors are: "the long-run supply and demand picture,' `the incentive of
242 Williams, supra note 226, at 18 n.52, citing Sibley, supra note 241, at 351.
243 Set supra note 10 and accompanying text.
2" In the particular case of aesthetics, set Williams' criticism of Turnbull, Aesthetics
Regulation, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 230 (1971), which proposes wider use of the property value
criterion as providing an "objective" determinant of aesthetic value. Williams, supra note 226, at
19-20. The more general debate about the use of cost-benefit analysis as a technique for solving
other interactive problems (such as development versus preservation of the environment) has
produced numerous books and articles. See, e.g. , P. SELF, ECONOCRATS AND THE POLICY PROC-
ESS: THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1975); Rodgers, Benefits,
Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decision-making, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
191 (1980); Rosen, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Judicial Review and the National Environmental Policy Act, 19
JURIMETRICS J. 28 (1978); Tribe, supra note 33.
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sellers or potential sellers to enter new markets and io improve their products
or services,' `adjustments by other companies to the actual and expected shifts
in markets affected,' and 'the opportunities for innovation in products ... [or]
in methods of sale.' " 245 In addition to this multiplicity of relevant factors, the
adversary process is often insufficient or inaccurate in revealing the degree to
which these complex factors are present in a case.'" The main problem with
antitrust litigation, therefore, "is that such [multifaceted inquiries] create con-
fusion, magnify uncertainty, multiply the possibilities of error, and otherwise
make less certain and less accurate the judicial determination of disputed
issues. "247 The judicial reaction to such conditions in the general context of
restrictive trade practices differs in America and Great Britain. Each response,
2" Bok, Section Seven of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 226, 256 (1960), citing ATT'v GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 123-25 (1955). Bok
continues:
Further matters of possible interest are "special technologies or know how,"
"growth history," "changes in the opportunity for sellers to make independent
decisions as to products, prices, advertising, sales methods, channels of sales, classes
of customers, and business activities in which they will engage," and other matters
too numerous to mention. The really striking aspect of the discussion is the lack of
any suggestion as to the manner in which these factors may be applied in any given
case. Thus, despite the hospitality which the discussion displayed toward the niceties
of economic theory, the entire exposition was condemned by one of the most
distinguished economists in matters of antitrust [E. S. Mason] as "a total failure to
take advantage of an opportunity to suggest policy and clarify the law with respect to
mergers . .
Bok, supra note 245, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTI-
TRUST REP. 125-27 (1955) and Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46-2
AM. ECON. REV., Papers and Proceedings 490, 492 (1956)).
246 Id. at 291, 295. Even more striking about Bok's criticism is his analysis of the im-
plications of the existence of such competing factors for the actual adjudication of merger disputes:
It is also possible that the adversary system is simply not well suited to measure the
kind of factors under discussion here. Adversary litigation is probably at its best
where the questions . in issue are of a predominately "either-or" variety, and the
problem is largely one of deciding which side is correct. In the complex statistical
and theoretical jungle of a merger proceeding, few disputes actually fit this descrip-
tion . . . The judge may not even have two positions to choose between, for one side
will frequently expose the defects in the other's assertion without feeling any tactical
need or responsibility to offer an alternative solution. ... Quite clearly, then, the
adjudicator cannot aspire under these circumstances to any real confidence as to the
degree to which various relevant factors are actually present in the case at hand.
This sense of uncertainty as to the facts of the case must inevitably enlarge the
doubts which we have already described concerning the relative importance of the
various factors that are supposed to bear upon the final result	 [T]here are
reasons for suspecting that a consideration of all relevant factors may actually
detract from the accuracy of decisions made under section 7. This danger consists in
part of the possibility that errors in logic and inference will increase when larger
amounts of complex data must be considered in a conceptual framework that is but
partially understood.
Bok, supra note 245, at 291-95 (footnotes omitted).
2'7
	 at 295, quoting 13 F.R.D. 62, 64 (1951) Report of the Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States on Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases.
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however, is logical under the theory of justiciability here posited. That is, each
response deals with the interactive nature of antitrust problems by modifying
either the problem or the adjudicative procedure. There follows first an over-
view of the relevant British and American statutes, and then a detailed ex-
amination of the problem modification employed by American judges, and the
procedural adaptations of the British court.
Neither the British nor the American legislation on antitrust matters give
much assistance to the judges. Although the statutes vary greatly in form, both
amount to mere instructions to the judiciary to engage in the optimization of
competition without providing substantive guidance as to the relative weights
of the factors. The British legislation is called the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act.'" The Act set up the Restrictive Trade Practices Court, whose sole func-
tion is the adjudication of alleged restrictive agreements. Yet restrictive trade
practices are not in themselves condemned under the statute. The Court in
every case must consider not only the effects of the alleged wrongful agreement
on competition, but also must balance such harm against seven possible
benefits, specified in the Act, 249
 of the anticompetitive practice. The Act gives
no guidance as to the relative weights of any of these factors. 2"
In contrast, the American antitrust legislation is quite simple, specifying
no such variables and requiring no such balancing of anticompetitive harms
against possible wider economic or social benefits. 25 ' Although superficially
"a 4 & 5 Eliz, 2, c. 68, now amended and consolidated as the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act, 1976.
249 As summarized in J. OLIVER, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 65
(1979), such benefits are:
1. that the agreement is necessary for the protection of the public from physical in-
jury;
2. that a specific or substantial benefit results to the public;
3. that the agreement is necessary as a countermeasure to another's restrictions;
4. that the agreement is necessary to protect the parties against large buyers and
sellers;
5. that the removal of the agreement would be likely to have a serious and persistent
effect on unemployment;
6. that the abolition of the agreement would result in the reduction of the export
business.
25° R. B. STEVENS & B. S. YAMEY, THE RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES COURT: A STUDY
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 76 (1965). Indeed, a "tailpiece" of 5 10(1)
makes the task even more difficult because the Court is instructed to consider separately the in-
terests of (a) the public; (b) purchasers, consumers, and users of the goods produced or sold by
parties to the agreement; and (c) competitors or potential competitors of the parties to the agree-
ment. Id.
2" The most basic laws are found in 55 (1) and (2) of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 55
1-7 (1976), which prohibit both single-firm attempts at monopolization and interfirm agreements
in restraint of trade; and in section (7) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 12-27 (1976) which for-
bids any corporation from acquiring all or part of another corporation "where ... the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly;" 15
U.S.C. at 18 (1976), and in 5 (5) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 41-51
(1976), which prohibits "unfair methods of competition," 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1976).
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dissimilar, both the British and the American legislation keep intact the in-
teractive nature of the problem. Neither statute gives relative weights to the
factors to be considered. Both statutes essentially instruct the courts to engage
in the balancing process respecting factors of competition, without supplying
any guidance on how such balance should be struck.
The American courts often respond by employing the problem modifica-
tion of creating rules which afford conclusive weight to one particular variable; 252 this
"reductivist" strategy, of course, eliminates any need to engage in optimiza-
tion. By specific statutory direction the British Restrictive Trade Practices
Court cannot so truncate the inquiry. 253 Since that Court also cannot pass off
its decision to an administrative agency (as in the highway siting and aesthetics
cases), it is left with resolving the partial dissonance between traditional ad-
judication and interactive problems by adapting its decisional procedures
rather than by modifying the problem.
As suggested, American judges have often adopted a reductivist strategy
in coping with interactive antitrust problems. The strategy involves selecting
one factor from among the many present, and deeming such factor conclusive
of the inquiry. Examples of the reductivist strategy include the creation of the
"illegal per se" rules which apply to agreements to fix prices or divide markets,
to concerted refusals to deal, and to tie-in arrangements. 254 The "illegal per
se" rules deem certain business activities as illegal per se "independently of
any examination of their effects in the particular case or of the circumstances
which led to them."'" The "per se" rules have the obvious intended advan-
tages of being relatively clear and of simplifying judicial proceedings. A court
must verify only that one of the "illegal per se" activities had occured and need
not weigh any other factors. 256 Again, no contention is made that the reduc-
272 See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
2"
 For a general description of the "illegal per se" rules and the conditions thought
necessary and sufficient for their use, see C. KAYSEN & D. F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
142-60 (1959).
255
 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 254, at 142. The classic judicial rationale for the per
se rules is stated by Justice Black in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
356 U.S, 1, 5 (1958).
256 Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 5. Kaysen and Turner continue:
The gains of the per se rules in terms of administrative simplicity are great since
they are relatively clear, they are self-enforcing to a much greater extent than pro-
hibitions which depend on the evaluation of effects in complex market conditions,
and they therefore lessen the volume of proceedings necessary to achieve a given
level of enforcement. Any actual proceeding is relatively simple, since it involves on-
ly the identification of the illegal conduct and the proof that it occurred. The in-
vestigations into market situations and market results characteristic of other anti-
trust proceedings are unnecessary.
KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 254, at 142.
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tivist strategy is necessarily improper; no doubt there are instances in which it
is fully justified on the ground of judicial economy, or perhaps on the ground of
producing more certainty in the law. Such a technique is a shorthand,
however, with the reduction in subtlety thereby implied. Moreover, by restrict-
ing the latitude of inquiry in each individual case, the use of the "per se" rules
probably inhibits the development of system-level "spontaneity." In other
words, for spontaneity to be developed within a system, thereby enabling such
system to solve interactive problems, the system must be capable of optimizing
diverse considerations. The system can do so only if it as a system has ex-
perimented with a wide variety of alternative solutions.
The alternative to the reductivist strategy is of course a full inquiry into
the interactions of the variables. Referred to as the "rule of reason," this
broader investigation tends to be used in cases involving exclusive re-
quirements contracts and vertical market divisions. 257 The rule of reason ap-
proach preserves the interactive nature of the problem. As such, the only possi-
ble solution is one that is spontaneous. In performing the essentially non-
deliberative, spontaneous rule of reason inquiry, a judge considers openly and
honestly the various relevant factors and then "cali[ s) forth his best and most
purposeful intuition. [He] must know and say what he can about each and
come to some sense about the weight of each and where the balance lies; one
can do no more. ,,2513
Because of the explicit statutory enumeration of factors that must be con-
sidered, no such choice about the breadth of approach is easily available to the
British Restrictive Trade Practices Court. Moreover, the original jurisdiction
of restrictive trade cases is foisted on the British Court — as a practical matter,
it cannot refuse to engage in the balancing. Hence, any dissonance that exists
between interactive problems and the procedures of traditional adjudication
can be resolved only by way of procedural adaptation. Examination of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Court procedures reveals that there has indeed
been such procedural adaptation, and that it has occurred along lines predict-
able under this article's posited theory.
25 ' See HIRSCH, supra note 22, at 255-58.
"a L. A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 188 (1977). Sullivan
states further:
The final question is whether, on balance, the restriction imposed substantially im-
pedes competition. Where, as here, there seem to be legitimate purposes and where
effects are both adverse and beneficial, the calculus of decision entails discrimina-
tion applied to rather finely shaded gradients. Let us state outright that if lawyers
and judges have scanty qualifications for performing this function, economists have
no better ones. With respect to any given practice applied in any given market situa-
tion, theory and empirical study may be able to suggest and perhaps validate
various effects as either helpful or harmful to competition or both. But neither
theoretical nor empirical material can devise a single yardstick against which to
measure them; the matter must be referred to the arts rather than the sciences of
judgment. Having identified purposes and effects one looks at length at each of
them.
Id.
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Recall that the dissonance between interactive problems and traditional
adjudication stems not from the legal system's lack of spontaneity, but with its
slowness in making the large number of adjustments that constitute spontanei-
ty ." 9
 Hence, the dissonance can be resolved at least partially by speeding up
the process of mutual adjustment. This can be accomplished either by increas-
ing the frequency of adjustments (e.g. by increasing the number of decisions
made, or the number of persons making each decision) or by increasing the
latitude of adjustment possible in each decision (e.g. by increasing the diversity
of information available to the judges, or by removing any constraints on the
frequency or magnitude of their deviations from one another). Because of
statutory inhibitions, not much has been done with respect to increasing the
frequency of adjustments. The Court cannot, for example, adopt substantive
rules that require highly decentralized assessments of certain disputes; nor can
the Court by itself increase its own numbers. 260 The procedures of the Court as
structured by the statute, however, allow for adaptations which result in much
greater latitude for the mutual adjustments that do occur. For example, diver-
sity of mentality among judges is assured by the requirement of section (4) of
the Act. This section requires that, in addition to the appointment of tradi-
tional professional judges, there also be appointed to the Court lay judges who
are "qualified by virtue of knowledge of an experience in industry, commerce,
or public affairs. "261 At the first sitting of the Court in 1958, the majority of the
judges were non-professionals: two were industrialists, one an accountant, and
one a trade union officia1. 262
 These non-lawyers are more likely to feel less
restricted by the norms of traditional legal discourse. Hence the likelihood is in-
creased that a wider variety of decisional rationales would be used, and a richer
storehouse of alternatives would be accumulated with which to make decisions.
This greater latitude and richer variety promotes the ability of - a system to
display spontaneity.
More startling innovations are found in the lack of restraint on the fre-
quency or magnitude of possible adjustments that can be made by the Court.
Judicial review of the Court's decisions, which would operate over time to
standardize holdings within a consistent doctrine, is almost nonexistent. Find-
ings of fact may not be reviewed 263
 and appeals on questions of law are ex-
tremely rare.'" Second, there can be detected a certain relaxation of the re-
quirement that the Court justify its decisions. In art early case, for example,
Mr. Justice Devlin, who was quite intent on maintaining for the Court the ap-
pearances of a traditional court of law, 265
 was forced to admit that, with respect
259 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
260
 Only the Lord Chancellor is empowered to appoint new judges or create diverse
panels of the Court. Restrictive Practices Court Act, 1976, (1976 c. 33) 4.
251 Id.
252
 STEVENS & YAMEY, supra note 277, at 3.
252 Restrictive Practices Court Act, 1976, (1976 c. 33) 5 10(3).
264 STEVENS & YAMEY, supra note 250, at 133, n.2.
262 Id. at 125-35.
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to assessing just one factor, the relevant extent 'of unemployment,
We can make no specific findings on any of these points, and can only
state in general terms the sort of consideration relating to them which
have influenced us in determining whether or not the words of the
subparagraph apply. 266
Where the judges are empowered to find facts, and where no appeal is possible
on such findings, in effect the judges may consider any sort of information or
evidence to which they are privy (which, especially for lay judges, may be con-
siderable), even where the source is extraneous to the submissions of the case.
This is an extremely important point, given that these controversies are inter-
preted to be very largely questions of fact rather than law. 267
Perhaps the most remarkable adaptation, however, is in the suspension of
the finality of judgments. Unique to all English law courts, 269 the Restrictive
Trade Practices Court has just such powers. Section 4 of the Act allows the
Court to reopen any of its previous decisions where there is "evidence of a
material change in the relevant circumstances. " 269 No judgment of the Court,
therefore, is truly final. 270 This of course increases vastly the potential latitude
of mutual adjustment."'
Anglo-American courts respond in several different manners to the
dissonance created when an interactive problem is submitted for decision by
the procedures of traditional adjudication; all of such responses can be
predicted. They may refuse outright to consider the matter, as in Nashville 1-40.
They may functionally refuse to consider the matter, by adopting broad powers
of discretion in non-judicial decision-makers, as in Overton Park, Stoyanoff, and
Reid. They may attempt to resolve the awkwardness by fictionally converting
the interactive problem into one with simple content variables, either by ex-
pressing every variable in terms of some common denominator, or by giving
conclusive weight to a single variable. Finally, they may attempt to resolve the
dissonance by leaving the structure of the problem intact, but then adapting
the procedure variable associated with the problem variable so as to make the
266 Re Yarn Spinner's Agreement, [1959] 1 All E. R. 299, cited in STEVENS & YAMEY,
id., at 129-30. Conclude Stevens and Yamey respecting the "legalism" of the Court, as reflected
in the admissions by Devlin:
This flexible attitude was in effect required in analyzing all the gateways ....
[Recently] the judges, rightly it is submitted, have not in any way sought to disguise
the novel activities they are required to perform, and they have willingly conceded
the absence of readily available analogies on which to base a traditional legal
analysis. In interpreting the Act the judges in later cases have not shied away from
interpretations which leave them an obvious discretion in their application.
Id. at 129-30.
267 Id. at 133.
268 Id. at 145.
269 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976 (1976, c. 34) § 4.
276 STEVENS & YAMEY, supra note at 144.
"' Re Standard Metal Window Group Agreement, [1962] 3 All E. R. 210, cited in
STEVENS & YAMEY, id at 145, n.3.
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procedures comport with the requirements of the problem, e.g., the British
Restrictive Trade Practices Court.
B. When Adjudication Faces Problems with Unknown or Disputed Decisional Criteria
Adjudication is much better suited to solving problems where decisional
criteria are well-established, rather than to solving problems where decisional
criteria are unknown or disputed. 272
 Often, however, judges attempt to hear
problems for which established decisional criteria are not available. Once again
the judge may adapt to this dissonance between the shape of the problem and
the structure of traditional adjudication by either modifying the problem, or by
adapting the procedure of adjudication.
Problem modification may take several forms. The first and probably
most common possible response is not so much a modification of the problem
as a constituting of the problem, a setting of its boundaries; that is, an attempt is
made to create decisional criteria by which the problem may be solved. A sec-
ond possible type of problem modification admits inability to state acceptable
criteria and then "disperses" the decision-making over large numbers of peo-
ple from a broad cross-section of the populace. Such dispersal means that even
if the decisions that emerge remain largely arbitrary, the decisions arguably are
at least more democratic.
Another set of possible responses to a lack of established decisional criteria
can be grouped under the heading "procedural adaptation." Just as the ap-
pearance of an interactive problem sometimes caused an adaptation in proce-
dure, that is, a shift towards faster spontaneity,'" so also a dissonance caused
by the appearance of a problem with unknown or disputed decisional criteria
can cause an adaptive shift in procedure along the variable respecting univer-
sality versus particularism. The adaptation that can occur is to decide the case
using procedures that have attributes opposite to traditional adjudication on the
three separate continua that constitute the universal-particular variable. 274
1. Establishing Criteria for Novel Problems
The most common and straight forward judicial response to a problem
that lacks criteria is to attempt to supply the criteria. This is a problem
"modification" only in a loose sense. More accurately, the supplying of deci-
sional criteria is a sort of encapsulation or segmentation of the problem so that
it can be intelligibly discussed. Supplying of decisional criteria occurs most fre-
quently where a problem is new to resolution by adjudication. Virtually no
problem comes to a decisional system with ready-made decisional criteria. The
distinctions that form the boundaries of the problem must be invented, discuss-
272
 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
279
	 supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
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ed, then perhaps refined or rejected. Gradually, the decisional criteria of the
problem reach greater consensus, even if such consensus consists only in the
agreement that there exist two or more opposing but legitimate considerations.
The typical judicial reaction to novelty, therefore, it to supply defining
criteria to the novel problem. As such criteria are supplied and accepted within
the legal system, the profile of the problem gradually moves toward the ideally
justiciable position of "well-established criteria," thus resolving the structural
dissonance between the problem and the procedure of traditional adjudication.
This process presents no long-term "justiciability" difficulty. Quite the con-
trary. It is just such process of trial and error and succeeding approximations in
problem-solving that is much of the genius of the common law.
This process of supplying definitional criteria to a novel problem is
perhaps illustrated by the growth of the tort cause of action referred to as
"negligent infliction of emotional distress." The English history of this tort
begins with Victorian Railway Commissioners a. Coultas . 225 There, the Privy Coun-
cil rejected the notion that plaintiff could recover for emotional distress (mani-
fested by physical illness) suffered after receiving a violent shock owing to the
negligence of the defendant. 2 " Significantly, it has been suggested that the
very lack of judicial criteria for delimiting such a notion as negligent infliction of
emotional distress inhibited recognition of the tort.'" Sir Richard Couch, in
delivering the judgment of the Board, cited this lack of criteria as a major
reason for refusing recovery. 278 Granting recovery in this case, he stated,
would encourage similar claims "in every case where an accident caused by
negligence had given a person a serious nervous shock. "279
The first recognition in England of the cause of action was in Dulieu a.
White. 2" There, defendant's negligently driven horses charged into a pub in
which plaintiff worked. Although the horses did not touch her, plaintiff was so
frightened that she suffered a miscarriage. Justice Kennedy rejected the Coultas
view, holding that the defendant could be made to pay where the damage
followed reasonably and naturally from the shock. Kennedy stated, however,
that one defining criterion or necessary condition of recovery was that the men-
tal shock arise "from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself "
rather than to a third party."' Kennedy's criterion lasted only until Hambrook
a. Stoke Bros. 282 The plaintiff there recovered wrongful death damages when his
275 [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222, discussed in Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16
MOD. L. REV. 14 (1953).
276 [1888] 13 App. Cas. at 225-26.
277 Id. See also Goodhart, supra note 276, at 14.
276 [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222, at 225-26.
279 Id. at 225. He concluded that "[t]he difficulty which now often exists in case of al-
leged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused by the negligent act would be
greatly increased, and a wide field opened for imaginary claims." Id. at 226.
280 [1901] 2 K.B. 669, discussed in Goodhart, supra note 276, at 16.
281 [1901] 2 K.B. 669, at 675 [emphasis added].
262 [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.), discussed in Goodhart, supra note 276, at 18-19.
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wife died from a shock received from watching an unattended lorry careen
down a hill where she knew her out-of-sight children were walking. It was held
not necessary to recovery that the plaintiff fear for his or her own safety.'"
Rather, the proper criterion was held to be that: "the shock resulted from what
the [plaintiff] either saw or realized by her own senses, and not from something
which someone told her. '284
Meanwhile across the Atlantic, an alternative criterion known as the
"zone of physical risk" was being proposed as the boundary of the tort. This
criterion is illustrated by the Wisconsin case of Waube v. Warrington. 285 Recov-
ery was denied in this case to a woman who received a fatal shock after witness-
ing, from a nearby window, a negligent automobile driver run over her son. 286
The court held that the harm to plaintiff was beyond the defendant's
reasonable foresight. 287
 This test was accepted (at least by Justice McNair) in
King v. Phillips,'" in which a mother was denied recovery for her emotional
distress caused by watching, from seventy to eighty yards away, defendant's
taxi negligently backing onto the tricycle of her son. 289
Other criteria of the tort, some that contradict the "zone of physical risk"
test, have now been suggested. 29° One such suggested criterion is that proximi-
ty does not matter so long as the plaintiff is closely related to the person in-
jured, rather than a mere bystander. 2" Another is that the psychic impact must
be fairly contemporaneous with the shock. 292 In New York, the criterion was
established that any alleged psychic harm must be evidenced by some residual
physical manifestation. 293 This condition was subsequently waived in cases in-
volving the mishandling of corpses and erroneous death announcements,
286
	 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.), at 152.
204 Id.
2" 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), discussed in Goodhart, supra note 276, at 22.
266
	 Wis. at 604, 258 N.W. at 497.
287 Id. at 514-15, 258 N.W. at 501,
288 [19521 2 T.L.R. 277, aff'd. [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, discussed in Goodhart, supra note 276,
at 21. On appeal, the judgment of McNair was affirmed. But Denning, L.J. did not embrace the
zone of physical risk test, arguing that the duty of care owed by defendant varied, depending on
which sort of injury, physical or emotional, was being contemplated. [19531 1 Q.B. at 440. And
Hodson, L.J. seemed to ground his decision on the criterion stated by Kennedy, J. in Dulieu v.
White. Id. at 443-44. Concludes one commentator: "It is obvious, then, that the authorities are
in a state of confusion...." W. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 124 (10th ed.
1975).
289 Although some question persists of the English acceptance of the "zone of physical
risk" test, the most recent case, McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1981] 1 All E.R. 809, seems to have
adopted the test as a limitation on liability. The case was grounded on policy considerations
rather than on the narrower factual ground of "foreseeability."
290 The criteria that follow in the text are distilled from discussions of cases in Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936) and in M.
FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTER-
NATIVES 233-46 (2d ed. 1979).
291 Id.
292 Id.
299 Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
570	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:505
whose facts demonstrate "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental
distress." 294
 A relatively recent New York opinion held that no recovery could
be had simply for the witnessing of destruction of property. 295 This criterion
was rejected, however, in Hawaii 296 and Washington 297 . The Washington
Supreme Court in Hunsley v. Giard 296 allowed recovery to a man who suffered a
heart attack when the defendant drove his automobile into the utility room of
plaintiff's house. 299
 Therefore, while the boundaries of this novel tort are
becoming more well defined, courts continue to seek criteria to cope with it.
Over time the criteria will become established and clear.
As stated above, problems like recovery from emotional shock that exhibit
disputed or unknown decisional criteria on account solely of their novelty do
not present long-term justiciability difficulties. Very gradually the decisional
criteria become established. Certain problems, however, present a dissonance
along this variable that arguably cannot be sorted out by the normal process. It
is on such problems that the radical problem modifications and procedural
adaptations will be found. Two sorts of such problems can be identified. First,
problems that cannot be solved without "judging the whole person" who
stands before the court. Second, problems that cannot be solved without mak-
ing unusual distinctions among people who cannot be brought before the court.
2. "Judging the Whole Person"
A judge must "judge the whole person" before him/her where in solving-
the problem the judge is expected to change the whole person before him/her. In
other words, the "problem" in such cases is seen as the status of the person be-
ing judged, and the "solution" to the problem is seen as changing that status.
Where the person being judged has been ascribed some label (such as
"criminal" or "unruly child") that attaches to every part of the defendant, the
judge can attempt to change the label only if he or she investigates every part of
the person. Criteria can never be stated uncontrovertibly for understanding
294 Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (1975), quoting W. PROS-
SER, PROSSER ON TORTS 330 (4th ed. 1971).
295 Van Patten v. Buyce, 37 A.D.2d 448, 450 326 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198-99 (1971).
296 Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 171.73, 472 P.2d 509, 518-21 (1970).
257 Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
298 Id.
299 Id. Hunsley suggests yet another boundary: There is no recovery unless the reaction
sustained is that of "a normally constituted person, absent defendant's knowledge of some peculiar
characteristic or condition of plaintiff. In other words, was plaintiff's reaction that of a reasonable
man?... This principle goes to the standard of liability, not the extent of recovery once liability is
established." Id. at 436, 553 P.2d at 1103 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The latest British case is McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [19811 1 All E.R. 809, discussed supra
at note 289, in which the zone of injury tests seem to have been adopted on grounds of policy,
rather than on grounds of foreseeability. Id. A mother was denied recovery for nervous shock suf-
fered upon being informed hours after an accident that her daughter had been killed, and upon
seeing the injuries to her husband while he lay in the hospital. Id. at 812.
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completely any given individual. Hence, cases that require such understanding
never will be subject to "well-established criteria." Unlike the "novel prob-
lem" example,30° the structural profile of the problem of "rehabilitating" a
criminal or "saving" an ungovernable child will remain disputed or unknown.
Moreover, unless the rehabilitative ideal is abandoned, there seems little in the
way of possible problem modification that would satisfactorily resolve the dis-
sonance. Hence, some procedural adaptation might be expected.
According to the theory of this article, such adaptation should occur along
the procedure variable associated with the problem variable that causes the
dissonance; in this instance, "universalism versus particularism." Indeed, the
judicial adaptations to cases requiring "judging of a whole person" can be
described by the terms of that variable. Traditional adjudication is universalist
in its appeal to general rules or doctrine, particularist in its use of decisional in-
formation and evidence, and universalist in its social assumptions about
disputants. 30 ' In contrast, the very personal inquiry required in dealing with
criminals and ungovernable children allows only limited appeal to rules or doc-
trine, accepts a wide, fluid standard for what constitutes relevant evidence in
the inquiry, and adopts certain inegalitarian assumptions. In short, the pro-
cedural adaptation is to reverse completely the traditional structure of ad-
judication along the universalist and particularist variable. The discussion that
follows demonstrates this shift for the problem of both criminal sentencing and
child ungovernability, and traces the cause of the shift to the unusual task re-
quired of the judge: to change the status of the person before him.
American judges have great discretion in imposing criminal sentences."'
To further rehabilitative goals, a judge
is expected to "individualize" the sentence he imposes to suit the
character, social history, and potential for recidivism of the offender
before him. Yet, because of the general absence in our system of
meaningful procedures for the appellate review of sentences, he is
denied standards by which to determine any particular sentence or by
which to learn what decisions his fellow judges have reached in
similar situations. 3 ° 3
The judge must personalize the proceedings where the "solution" to criminali-
ty is thought to be rehabilitation; but such required individualization precludes
the establishment of decisional criteria. The problem of what to do about "un-
governable" or "unruly" children who engage in noncriminal misbehavior is
equally difficult. Two leading commentators have concluded that the "legal
supervision of [this] parent-child relationship cannot be undertaken consistent
300 See supra notes 275-99 and accompanying text.
s" See supra notes 133-99 and accompanying text.
"2
 See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of
Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1975).
903 Id. at 1362-63 (footnotes omitted).
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with the rule of law. " 304 This is because the conceived solution to ungovern-
ability "extend's] official concern beyond discrete misbehavior to the condition
of the whole child. " 305 The judge's goal is to "save [the child] from a
downward career" 306 rather than to punish the child.'" The result is a lack of
standards similar to that in criminal sentencing.'" The aims of rehabilitation
and salvation require procedural adaptations that reverse the field of the
universalist and particularist variable. First, "judging the whole person" vir-
tually precludes an appeal to general rules or doctrine. Each case is considered on
its own, with extraordinary nonappealable discretion put in the judge, who need not articu-
late the reasons for his/her decision. 309 "Sentencing judges are thus left free to form-
ulate and apply their own personal theories of punishment. They are allowed to
impose their beliefs, biases, prejudices or reactions to particular defendants
within the very wide margins afforded by our present statutory range of
sentences."'" Although less formally institutionalized, this same wide discre-
tion characterizes the judge's role under the vague ungovernability statutes.
The very vagueness and lack of rules or doctrine in ungovernability statutes is
the means of granting broad discretion to the judge, 3 " for "[w]ho can deter-
334 Katz & Teitlebaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law in
BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS ,OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 202 (L. Teitlebaum & A.
Gough eds. 1977).
"5 Id. at 207 [emphasis added].
306 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
"7 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 50, 62 A. 198, 198-99 (1905).
"8 One researcher states: "[A] general survey of ungovernability processing reveals that
the court's assessments are frequently inaccurate. . .. The inaccuracies in assessment are evident
in the illogical patterns of decisions concerning which cases to adjust, whom to detain, which
cases are serious enough to merit formal adjudication, and what dispositions are appropriate."
Note, Ungooernability: the Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 1383, 1397 (1974).
"9 As stated in P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN, & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EF-
FECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977):
Judges who sentence criminals do so virtually without legal guidance or control . .
[This] is evident in Title 18 of the United States Code, which contains most of the
federal criminal statutes and penalties. Bereft of sentencing standards for judges,
this chaotic patchwork of penalties authorized by individual statutes, enacted at dif-
ferent times and having no relationship to each other, has established a bizarre
range of penalties for an enormous variety of criminal activities. Meaningful
legislative standards for trial judges exercising initial sentencing discretion are non-
existent. For example, a judge is advised in Section 3651 of Title 18 that he may sus-
pend the sentence and impose probation "when satisfied that the ends of justice and
. the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby." Not
even the most rudimentary requirements of due process of law apply at sentenc-
ing.... Reasons for sentences are not required, nor is the information on which the
judge may be relying necessarily disclosed to the accused or his counsel for correc-
tion or rebuttal. Putting it bluntly, there is no requirement that the sentence have
any rational basis whatsoever.... Nor is there any appeal from the discretion of the
sentencing judge or any procedure to correct sentencing abuses. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1-3.
31° Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
3" In a commentary on Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) statutes, Katz and
Teitlebaum find a causal link between the characteristic vagueness of the statutory concepts, and
the flexibility needed to vest wide discretion in the judge:
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mine with specificity which child is 'ungovernable, ' 	 . or which juvenile is
`habitually beyond the control of his or her parents? ' "312
In addition to the lack of an appeal to general rules or doctrine, the stand-
ards for what constitutes relevant evidence in the criminal sentencing and child
ungovernability inquiries is much less particularist than in traditional ad-
judications. In criminal sentencing, judges receive information about the of-
fender through the "presentencing report" usually prepared by a probation of-
ficer. The scope of such a report is virtually unlimited, encompassing "[title
subject's homelife, childhood, educational and employment history, political
and religious attitudes, and sexual experiences . . . . "313 Moreover, the pre-
sentencing report is of lasting significance, affecting subsequent decisions such
as parole. 314
Particularity of evidence and decisional information is similarly aban-
doned in adjudicating whether a child is ungovernable. Ungovernability
statutes provide no standards for what information the judge is to consider in
making decisions."' In the absence of such standards, the judge relies on "per-
PINS jurisdiction embodies a set of fundamental conceptual contradictions, which it
seeks to resolve through the mediating device of general standards. On the one
hand, PINS laws attempt to apply the rule of law to a relationship of status .. . On
the other, it reflects a desire to do substantive justice without abandoning the formal
requirements of legal justice. Broad, imprecise legislative standards were introduced
in an effort to mediate these contradictions [T]he "vagueness" of the PINS
statutes cannot be considered accidental .... [A] rule prohibiting a person from
behaving so as to injure or endanger the health or morals of himself or others" can
guide neither the conduct of citizens nor of officials.
Katz & Teitlebaum, supra note 304, at 209. This functional use of the vague labels of "ungovern-
ability" to grant wide discretion to the judge while maintaining the appearances of the rule of law
has been noted by other writers: "Most statutes authorizing jurisdiction over unruly children
and noncriminal misbehavior are exceedingly vague in wording and overbroad in scope."
Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should be Eliminatedfrom Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 645, 657 (1977).
312 Ketcham, supra note 311, at 657.
313 Coffee, supra note 302, at 1370.
While the degree of standardization varies, probation manuals typically recommend
at a minimum that the report contain a separate section dealing with each of the
following categories: prior record, family history, social adjustment, education,
marital status, personality traits, attitudes toward probation, and physical and men-
tal health.
Id. at 1370 n.27 (citations omitted). Coffee summarizes the criticism of this very broad inquiry:
"[T]he goal of individualization based on an understanding of the whole person is largely beyond
the realistic capabilities of the criminal justice system and often in direct conflict with the goal of
treating similar offenders similarly." Id. at 1368.
21+ Coffee states:
The key document both at [the sentencing] stage and at the later parole stage is
the pre-sentence report. Its recommendations are generally followed by the sentenc-
ing judge and the extent and scope of its investigation of the defendant overshadow
subsequent inquiries at the parole or custodial classification stages .... [M]isinfor-
mation that enters the pre-sentence report is likely to have a multiple impact on the
offender's future. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1369-70.
313 In ungovernability cases a judge is given problems far more delicate and corn-
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sonal feelings and predilections, " 316
 the often vindictive and vague statements
by parents (e.g. "He is such a liar, his mind is bad and he needs to be put
away")3 " and court personnel who supply information similar in nature to
that collected in criminal.pre-sentence reports. 31 ° The judge's reliance on such
evidence constitutes a much less particularist approach to evidence than that
used in traditional adjudication.
The final procedural adaptation that occurs in these "judging the whole
person" cases is that the universalist social assumptions of traditional adjudica-
tion break down in favor of more particular notions of what sort of person is
more, and less, valuable to society. Both the sentencing process and ungovern-
ability dispositions import some decidedly inegalitarian criteria. For example,
the information in the criminal presentencing report often is assessed by the
"case attribute" approach in which the pre-sentence investigator is asked to
describe the offender in "vivid, flesh-and-blood" terms. 319
 Such a process is
highly subjective, however, and cultural prejudice creeps in; "[i]f the offender
attends church, he is assumed to be a safe risk; if he lives with a woman to
whom he is not legally wed, he is assumed to be amoral and a higher risk. " 320 If
the pre-sentence report is assessed by the alternative "categoric risk" ap-
proach, 321
 however, the results heavily disfavor the poor and Black. This ap-
proach considers factors such as level of education and consistency of employ-
ment which are irrelevant to personal culpability and tend to distinguish the
poor and the Black from the rich and the white. 322
Similar discriminatory effects surface in child ungovernability cases.
Sometimes the particularity is a favoring of certain behaviors typified in the
middle class. 323 Or, the breakdown in universalist assumptions limy be on
grounds of intelligence: "Data in New York makes it apparent that those
[labelled "ungovernable"] are overwhelmingly those with lower I.Q. 's; judges
are willing to give a brighter youth a break on the theory that he 'might really
become something. ' /324 Or, the particularity may occur on . racial grounds or
plex and far less subject to judicial solution than those in most areas of law. He must
accurately assess a parent-child conflict and determine what kind of "help" the
child involved may need. To permit the judge to understand and cope with prob-
lems of such intricacy, the statute gives him vast . discretion with respect to what in-
formation he is to consider relevant and it sets no standards for decisionmaking in
order to avoid compromising this task. (footnotes omitted).
Note, 83 YALE L. J., supra note 308, at 1403.
313 Id. at 1404.
9'7 Id. at 1396.
"I' Id. at 1404-05.
919 Coffee, supra note 302, at 1399-1400.
u Id. at 1400 (footnote omitted).
92 ' Id. at 1405.
322 Id. at 1407-08.
323 Note, 83 YALE L. J., supra note 308, at 1404. Indeed, it has been suggested that the
founders of the American juvenile court system deliberately chose to penalize behavior that was
largely attributable to lower class and immigrant children. A. PLATT', THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 139 (1977).
924 83 YALE L. J., supra note 308, at 1404 note 131.
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along gender lines. In fact, it has been well-documented that "the weight of
non-criminal jurisdiction falls most heavily on poor and nonwhite children"
and on young girls. 323
Problems requiring the judgment of "the whole person" simply confound
a decisional system that requires well-established decisional criteria. In
response, the system adapts by reversing its normal assumptions about the
universality of people and society. The system does not appeal to general rules
or doctrine. Limitations on what evidence shall be heard are similarly aban-
doned. Finally, and most unfortunately, discriminatory decisions are often
made on the basis of assumptions about the value of an individual to society.
Each of these adaptations is made along the particularist-universalist pro-
cedure variable in response to the lack of clear decisional criteria found in
"judging the whole person" problems.
3. Making Distinctions Between and Among Persons
Along with "judging the whole person" problems, a second type of prob-
lem also defies establishment of decisional criteria: where proper solution re-
quires sharp distinctions and judgments to be made among people who are not
before the court. Personalized inquiries may be appropriate, yet such inquiries are
by definition impossible since the person to be inquired of is not to be found.
Since the procedural adaptations described above are therefore unavailable as
techniques for resolving the dissonance, judges can be expected to resort to a
strategy this article labels "dispersal." That is, making the decision-making
more democratic by spreading out decisional responsibility among the entire
population affected. Obscenity cases illustrate this sort of problem, and the
features of the dispersal strategy.
The "problem" of obscenity is how human sexuality should be portrayed
and viewed. 326
 The. proper solution to this problem rests on a recognition that
the appropriateness or offensiveness of such portrayals varies enormously
depending on the nature of the person viewing the portrayal, and the social con-
text of the portraya1. 3 " The criteria of obscenity consequently remain disputed
3" Sussman, Judicial Control Over Noncriminal Misbehavior, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051,
1054-55 (1977), states:
[A] disproportionately heavy—and perhaps unconstitutional—burden [falls] on
young girls. The inexact and vague definitions in PINS statutes vest an inordinate
amount of discretion in the hands of parents and the judiciary, who often follow a
double moral standard, punishing girls for behavior that would be overlooked in
boys. Although there is no evidence to suggest that young girls are more in need of
super-vision or treatment than young boys,.customary fears of sexual promiscuity,
pregnancy, and illegitimacy, as well as outmoded perceptions of women as the less
stable sex, result in their presence in juvenile courts ... pursuant to the PINS
jurisdiction, in numbers far greater than their male counterparts. (footnotes omit-
ted).
626 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 662. See generally F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
(1976); CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: ESSAYS ON OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (H.
Clor ed. 1971).
'” See infra notes 331 and 333 and accompanying text.
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and unknown. Attempt after attempt to establish decisional boundaries for this
concept have failed because proper judgment of a particular book or film as a
whole can be made only if the psychology of each viewer, and the context of
each instance in which the allegedly obscene material is viewed, can be judged.
Since that is impossible, judges often attempt to modify the problem by seeking
some uniform vision of the portrayal of sexuality in general;"" continual efforts
have been made to promulgate regulation employing some uniform criterion.
The efforts have failed because there always arose instances in which, given the
nature of the viewer and the context of viewing, the regulation was simply in-
appropriate."' This has led to the adoption of the dispersal strategy in which
the attempt to state uniform criteria is abandoned in favor of more local, more
representative regulation. This strategy differs from the procedural adaptation
of speeding up system spontaneity."° Spontaneous solutions are inhibited
under the dispersal strategy because consistency is demanded only at the local
level: the elegant, close mutual adjustments of stare decisis that cause spon-
taneous solutions to emerge are largely eliminated. In the place of established
principles for decision, the dispersal strategy substitutes policy, formulated
locally and usually by a more socially representative body, namely the jury.
The dispersal strategy is not a procedural adaptation, because the structure of
adjudication in such cases is not significantly altered. It is also not quite a prob-
lem modification, because the problem is not formally altered or simplified.
Rather, the dispersal strategy is a tacit admission that the problem is not a
"legal" one, but rather a "political" one, and that the legal system is insuffi-
ciently flexible to resolve this dissonance.
The problem of obscenity is one whose decisional criteria remain disputed
and unknown. This much has been admitted by numerous academics and
judges. As one Supreme Court justice has stated, "although we have assumed
that obscenity does exist and that we 'know it when [we] see it' . , we are
manifestly unable to describe it in advance .... ""' Given the lack of estab-
"8 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 661-62.
529 See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
"° See supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text.
3" Paris Adult Theatre I tr. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart
and Marshall, J. J., dissenting), cited in TRIBE, supra note 3, at 669. Describing the Court's ef-
forts, Brennan states:
No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substan-
tial a commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of views, and remained
so resistant to the formulation of stable and manageable standards .... [T]he
vagueness problem would be largely of our own creation if it stemmed primarily
from our failure to reach a consensus on any one standard. But after 16 years of ex-
perimentation and debate I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that none of the
available formulas ... can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level. . . . Any effort
to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such
indefinite concepts as "prurient interest," "patent offensiveness," "serious literary
value," and the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the ex-
perience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them .... Added
to [this] is the further complication that the obscenity of any particular item may de-
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lished standards for obscenity, even-handed enforcement of obscenity law is
virtually impossible."' This elusiveness of criteria stems, as ChiefJustice War-
ren suggested, from the fact that obscenity is a function of the circumstances of
its dissemination. 333 Ironically, the Court traditionally avoided in its standards
any distinction (except for minors 334) among people likely to be exposed to the
allegedly obscene material. The famous Roth 333 test overturned the use of the
English Hicklin336 standard of tendency to "corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences. " 33 ' The Roth test was as "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. " 333 This
standard, which attempted to state a uniform criterion of "obscenity" irrespec-
tive of type of person viewing or context of portrayal, was a step in the wrong
direction. 339 Eventually Roth fell to the currently-used dispersal strategy as
stated in Miller v. California, 3" under which obscenity was henceforth to be
judged according to local community standards. Under the Miller test "each
jury, in each town and city, may thus be a law unto itself, applying what might
represent not any widely-shared sense of value but merely an average of local
extremes. ""' The Miller standard has been described as "intolerably vague"
pend upon nuances of presentation and the context of its dissemination.
Id. at 73, 83-84.
3" As stated recently by Justice Stevens:
[T]he present constitutional standards, both substantive and procedural (How, for
example, can an appellate court intelligently determine whether a jury has properly
identified the relevant community standards?), which apply to these [obscenity]
prosecutions are so intolerably vague that evenhanded enforcement of the law is a
virtual impossibility.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 197 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), cited in TRIBE, supra note 3, at 669.
"' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C. J., concurring).
3" See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3" Regina v. Hicklin [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
3" Id. at 371. This test remains in use in England, although it is to be interpreted ac-
cording to current standards (R. v. Martin Seeker Warburg Ltd. [1954] 2 All E.R. 683). See
generally 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND. 1022 (4th ed. 1976).
"3 354 U.S. at 489.
339
 The pressures on the Roth "average person, general community standards" test are
well depicted by the case of Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), as reported by Tribe:
Mishkin may be seen as illustrating the lack of a principled foundation for the
Court's obscenity decisions. The defendant in that case had contended that publica-
tions depicting deviant sexual practices could not satisfy the "prurient appeal" test
of the then-governing Roth decision because they did not excite prurient thoughts in
Roth's "average person": "instead of stimulating the erotic," he argued, "they
disgust and sicken." 383 U.S. at 508. The Court rejected the argument, modifying'
the Roth definition to permit suppression of erotica exciting only to the deviant. The
Roth average person was replaced by the deviant person in cases where material ap-
pealing to the deviant was at stake.
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 663 n.50.
310 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
34'
	 supra note 3, at 664-65 [citations omitted]. He states further:
States remain free to adopt communitywide, statewide, or nationwide standards of
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and as leading to "grossly disparate treatment of similar offenders." 342 This
undoubtedly is true, and reflects that the standard is no longer a "legal" one,
but rather is a matter of local policy. Fragmenting the problem of obscenity
along geographical lines moves no closer to the real solution, which is to
distinguish particular persons and contexts for which the material is unaccept-
able. That is a job beyond the practicality of adjudication; the only remaining
alternative is that taken: to decide cases ad hoc but in a fashion that at least im-
ports a measure of representativeness. Hence the Miller standard allows "each
jury ... to be a law unto itself." The jury can make distinctions between peo-
ple that, if clearly articulated, would offend egalitarian ideals. The dispersal
strategy employs the jury as an aresponsible political agency"' to accomplish
sub silentio what for traditional adjudication would be the impossible job of ar-
ticulating obscenity criteria based on classifications of people and contexts not
before the court.
This section examined the response of judges to problems that are disso-
nant with adjudication by reason of the non-existence of clear decisional
criteria. Such dissonance most commonly appears where the problem is novel
to adjudication. In such cases adjudication slowly provides the needed criteria;
this is not strictly a problem modification. More difficult dissonances exist
where the problem requires "judging the whole person" appearing before the
judge, or where the problem requires the judge to make distinctions among
people who cannot be brought before the court. Such dissonances appear to
cause the judge to adapt the procedures of adjudication: in the former situa-
tion, by changing the nature of adjudicative information and changing the
social assumptions about disputants; in the latter situation by shifting effective
decision-making from the judge to a body that is representative of the popula-
tion.
prurience and patent offensiveness—subject to continuing supervision by the Court
to assure that juries do not go too far. Prurient appeal may be defined in terms of the
target audience, with more protective standards for children than for adults, and
with attention to whatever special groups a book or film might be designed to
stimulate. In close cases, it may be made decisive that "the purveyor's sole em-
phasis [is] on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications." Neither expert
testimony on community standards nor instructions on precisely what
"community" to consider are constitutionally required....
Id. at 663-65.
3" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
3" The term "aresponsible agency" is coined by Calabresi and Bobbitt:
What we shall call the aresponsible agency is a typically American mode of decen-
tralizing political decisions. The jury, is one of its aspects, is the prototype of this
variant .... The responsible agency generally has three features: It is represent-
ative, decentralized, and it gives no reasons for its decisions. Its representative
quality is supposed to give effect to what society views as relevant differences among
individuals. Because the agency is decentralized, it is able to make individuated
decisions. And giving no reason, it avoids, or at least mitigates, the conflict between
the wish to recognize differences and the desire to affirm egalitarianism in all its
forms.
CALABRESI AND BOBBITT, sup ra note 25, at 57.
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In the section that follows, dissonance arising by reason of a problem be-
ing based on the future rather than the past is resolved either by a problem
modification, or yet another form of procedural adaptation.
C. When Adjudication Faces Future-Based Problems
As a reactive rather than active procedure, traditional adjudication is well-
suited to problems that arise out of past events.'" Future-based problems pose
difficulties for adjudication, and judges hear such problems with reluctance.
Future-based problems can be classified into two types: (1) "predictive" prob-
lems, which are those requiring an immediate decision but where the wisdom
or efficacy of such decision is conditioned on uncontrollable future events; and
(2) "planning" problems, which require the commitment or supervision of
resources toward some task or goal. Such problems are future-based because
the solutions depend on predictions of the consequences of intervention."'
When judges hear "predictive" problems, they tend to resolve the dissonance
between the future-based problem and the procedure of traditional adjudica-
tion by modifying the problem so as to treat it as past-based. When judges hear
"planning" problems, they tend to resolve the dissonance by adapting their
procedures to become more active than reactive. Each of these adaptations will
be explained more fully below.
1. "Predictive" Problems
Predictive problems most commonly are presented to the judiciary in the
context of requests for "technology assessments," i.e. disputes about the envi-
ronmental or health impact of some proposed or ongoing activity. Such prob-
lems are future-based because a decision either to permit the activity, or to en-
join or regulate it, is necessarily grounded in determining not only current ef-
fects, but the risks of future effects. The ultimate wisdom of many such deci-
sions can be judged only by the hindsight of future generations. A reactive
system of decision-making such as traditional adjudication lacks the informa-
tional resources to deal properly with predictive problems. Moreover, the
incremental decision-making of adjudication inhibits a comprehensive and
coherent treatment of such problems. Judges normally have before them in a
given case only limited aspects of a given predictive problem and therefore, are
inherently limited in their ability to dispose of the problem. When heard by
judges, predictive problems tend to be converted into more familiar and less
demanding past-based problems. Such conversions are achieved procedurally
by the manipulation of burden of proof standards, and substantively by the dis-
counting of future costs.'"
544 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
845 HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 34-87 (1944).
346 Both the procedural and the substantive devices for converting a future-based prob-
lem into a past-based problem are rather subtle, and their operations are described in only a few
recent articles. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 244; Vig, Environmental Decision Making in the Lower
580	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:505.
In establishing procedural devices for adjudicating predictive problems,
three alternative models are said to be used by the United States Congress and
courts to address the problem of uncertain environmental and health effects of
certain proposed activities: the "free market" model, the "regulation-market
failure" model, and the "state of the art" model."' The models differ in which
party bears the burdens of persuasion, and production of evidence. In the "free
market" model, a presumption exists in favor of allowing unregulated market
forces to operate as a means of determining whether risks of harm are
outweighed by the benefits of engaging in the activity. Heavy burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion are placed on those who would regulate the activity. 348
A lack of information can defeat the regulator; even where information about
potential injuries can be produced, the regulator will lose if the risk of injury is
not proved by a "preponderance of the evidence. " 349 This requirement is
crucial because much information about potential injuries is inherently prob-
abilistic, speculative, or unavailable.'" By placing very high standards of pro-
duction or persuasion on the regulator, what in reality is a dispute about risks is
transformed to an issue of whether the regulator can conclusively prove some
future injury, almost necessarily by coming forward with proof about injuries
that have occurred in the past."'
Courts: The Reserve Mining Case, in ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: THE MAKING AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 75-98 (M. Steinman, ed. 1978); Yellin, Judicial Review and
Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental Catastrophe, 45 GEO WASH, L. REV. 969 (1977);
Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 54; L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 47-61
(1973).
"' Rogers, supra note 244, at 219-25. Rodgers points out that the Administrative Proce-
dures Act does not mandate in these circumstances which party to a dispute, proposed actor or
regulator, has the burden of proof. Concluding his discussion on this point, he states that "[t]he
Congress, then, and the courts in plumbing a subject often addressed only by implication, have a
free hand in addressing the burdens of uncertainty that influence the outcome of formal decision-
making." Id. at 219.
NM Id.
NM Id.
3" Gelpe and Tarlock described the difficulties, for example, of predicting environmen-
tal effects. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 54, at 407-12. The difficulties are "attributable to the
uniqueness of each [ecological] system, thresholds, and interactions that are synergistic." Id. at
408. To summarize these difficulties: (1) The "uniqueness" of each ecological system "means
that it is difficult to predict the characteristics of one system based solely on the characteristics of
another. To some extent each system requires individual study." Id. (2) "Threshold" problems
in prediction arise when one factor (x) in a system causes a qualitative or quantitative change in a
second factor (y), but only at certain threshold levels of X. "If such a system is examined when X
is at a sub-threshold level, it would not be possible to identify the relationship between X and Y.
They appear to be independent. Yet the action of X on Y may be an important part of a full
description of the system." Id. at 401.
(3) "Synergistic" interactions can be found at either the systems level, or at the component
level. At the systems level, "[t]he characteristics of a forest are different than the additive sum of
the characteristics of all the trees, shrubs, etc. Therefore, even if one knew all about trees and
shrubs, one could not fully predict what a forest would be like. Separate descriptive studies at
each level are necessary." Id. at 410. Similarly, at the component level, "the effect of two factors
acting together in an ecosystem may be greater or less than the sum of the effects of the factors
operating separately." Id. at 410.
"I See id. at 412.
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This transformation is well illustrated in the often cited case of Reserve Min-
ing Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency." 2 A Federal District Court had en-
joined the dumping of taconite tailings into Lake Superior, from which the
water supply of Duluth, Minnesota is drawn."' On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that a health risk from the asbestos fibres in taconite had been prov-
en, entailing possibly severe injuries to the public.'" Nonetheless the injunc-
tion was stayed. 555
 For an injunction to lie, said the court, a proven risk was in-
sufficient; there must be proof of an imminent injury. The court stated:
"Although we are sympathetic to the uncertainties ... , we are a court of law,
governed by rules of proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of a
demonstrable hazard to the public health."'" Such a conclusion is not man-
dated."' By shifting the burdens of production and persuasion from the regu-
lators to the actors, the opposite results obtain: no action with potentially
adverse environmental consequences could be taken except upon proof of its
safety. There is nothing inherent to a "court of law, governed by rules of
proof," that precludes taking action on the strength of proof of risks of future
injury. What is true, and what lies behind the court's conclusion, is that a court
has great difficulty dealing with predictive problems and probabilistic
evidence.
This is demonstrated by the fact that sometimes courts in fact do behave in
precisely opposite fashion to that which the Reserve Mining court claimed is the
inherent nature of the court. This occurs where a court adopts the "regulation-
market failure" model of dealing with predictive problems. 358
 Under this
model the burdens of proof are simply reversed.'" The regulator's prima facie
552 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
353 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974).
"4 514 F.2d 492, 520, 536 (1975).
355
 498 F.2d at 1086.
556 Id. at 1084. The Court explained this conclusion as follows:
[A]lthough Reserve's discharges represent a possible medical danger, they have not
in this case been proven to amount to a health hazard. The discharges may or may
not result in detrimental health effects, but, for the present, that is simply unknown.
The relevant legal question is thus, what manner of judicial cognizance may be
taken of the unknown,
We do not think that a bare risk of the unknown can amount to proof in this case.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove that a demonstrable health hazard exists. This failure,
we hasten to add, is not reflective of any weakness which it is within their power to
cure, but rather, given the current state of medical and scientific knowledge, plain-
tiffs' case is based only on medical hypothesis and is simply bgond proof. . . . If we are
correct in our conclusion that evidence does not exist in the record on which to find
Reserve's discharges to be unsafe, the district court's determination to resolve all
doubts in favor of health safety represents a legislative policy judgment, not a
judicial one ... .
Id. at 1083-84 (emphasis added).
357 See supra note 347. See aLro Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 346, at 415-16.
338 Rodgers, supra note 244, at 224, 225.
359 The model and its application is described as follows by Rodgers:
This model is the converse of the free market model in that it also takes seriously the
data needs of formal decisionmaking, except that the burden of overcoming uncer-
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showing of a risk to human health is determinative unless the proposing actor
can rebut - the presumption with conclusive evidence of either the falsity of the
risk, or of the gaining of overwhelming future benefits by allowing the
activity. 36° Once again, given the inherent uncertainty of information in this
sort of predictive problem, the operation of the burdens of production and per-
suasion serve to foreclose a balanced inquiry about future risks and benefits.
Once again the case is made to turn on evidence of existing effects drawn from
past experience, not on purely predictive evidence of future effects. In the free
market model, virtually conclusive weight is given to the present benefits of the
activity, and the costs of regulating it. In the regulation-market failure model,
virtually conclusive weight is accorded the present costs of the activity (in the
form of provable risks). The two models taken together demonstrate the alter-
native problem modifications used by judges when faced with the inherent
awkwardness of a predictive problem.
It is only on those rare occasions that courts use the "state of the art"
model that a balanced investigation of future costs and benefits is undertaken.
This model embraces "a standard of proof [i.e. burden of persuasion] that
tolerates uncertainty, and thus seeks pragmatically the best decision for the
moment. It anticipates a decision with data already known, requiring only that
agencies use the best available evidence in reaching judgments." 36 ' Under this
model the burden of production of evidence is also assigned pragmatically,
"with the party possessing information being the one expected to produce
it. ''362
Even under a model free of debate-confining presumptions, pressure ex-
ists to discount future consequences in favor of consequences that might be
proved by referring to past experience. Sometimes, as illustrated by the court's
opinion in Reserve Mining, 363
 this takes the form of reluctance to accord the
status of "evidence" to proofs that are admittedly probabilistic. At other times,
the discounting of the future is the indirect result of an oversimplified analysis
of the notion of a future "risk." This tends to occur where the court faces a
predictive problem, like the permitting or enjoining of a nuclear power plant,
involving a very low probability of harm, but where such harm would be
tainties rests upon the proponent of the proposed activity. The standard is set high
because the possible severe health consequences of approval, presumptively at least,
are not offset by disruption of current economic interests. The party who proposes to
introduce a new technology into the market must establish the safety of the initiative
under a high standard of proof. The paradigms of the model are provisions of the
drug and pesticide laws, which require proponents to develop extensive data to
establish the safety of a product before it will be allowed on the market. The model
was proposed, but eventually abandoned, during the vigorous debate that attended
enactment of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.
Id. at 224, 225.
3" Id,
361 Id. at 222, 223.
3" Id. at 223.	 •
363 See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
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catastrophic.'" For such problems, courts tend to equate the notion of future
"costs" or "risks" with the probability of harm occurring. For example,
"nuclear risk analyses have adopted the . . . rule that probabilities are deter-
minative of risk." ' 365 A more accurate appraisal, however, would be to apply the
traditional negligence standard for determining risk, namely that risk is the
product of probability times consequences. 366 It is not even unknown in the law
to determine risk solely on the basis of consequences, with virtually no legal
weight accorded to "the degree of precautionary care [or] the remoteness of the
possibility of catastrophe." 367 Such a rule is applied in determining liability for
"abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" activities.' 68 Where a problem
with a low probability of occurance but with potentially drastic consequences is
judged by risk standards that fail to consider consequences, the effect is to dis-
count future costs unjustifiably in favor of present benefits. The risk rule that
has been applied in such cases can be explained as a problem modification to
relieve the dissonance of considering future-based problems. Probabilities of
harm from the operation of nuclear power plants can be based largely on past
safety records, and on descriptions of reactor safeguards; hence, it is according
to such criteria that analysis proceeds, regardless of how unrepresentative that
may be of the full extent of the problem.
In summary, the judicial reluctance to base adjudicative decisions on
future-based evidence causes distortion in the articulation, and often the
resolution, of a predictive problem. Courts avoid the necessity of actually mak-
ing the prediction by casting the burdens of production and persuasion in such
a manner that one party is precluded from establishing its version of the likely
future. Where this is not possible, and courts actually undertake to make a
decision based on a prediction of the future, courts are likely to avoid making a
complete analysis by considering only the likelihood of a given event occurring
in the future, and not its possible consequences. Each of these adaptations, by
virtue of diminishing the predictive element, serves to make the dispute resolu-
tion procedure more "reactive" than "active."
2. "Planning" Problems
"Planning" problems are entirely distinct from predictive problems, and
they evoke a different judicial response. Whereas decisions on predictive prob-
lems are conditioned on uncontrollable future events, decisions on planning
problems assume the future can be manipulated to comport with the decision.
364 Yellin, supra note 346, passim.
365 Id. at 986 [emphasis added].
366 This is known as the "Learned Hand Formula" and is articulated in United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947). Yellin, ,upra note 346, at 982. Tradi-
tional tort cases are not predictive problems. The events appertaining to the judicial decision in
normal tort cases are historical, not future-based in the sense here used.
367 Yellin, supra note 346, at 984.
368 Id. at 983.
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Planning decisions are interventionist and are instrumental in performing
some task, or achieving some goal. Planning is "laying down how the
resources of society should be 'consciously directed' to serve particular ends in
a definite way. "369 Such decisions, to be effective, cannot leave the future to
chance. If the decision is indeed to be instrumental in reaching some goal or
state of affairs, then necessarily the decisionmaker must "foresee the incidence
of its actions. " 370 Hence, planning decisions are inescapably future-based.
Not all decisions that are instrumental toward meeting a goal, however,
are truly future-based "planning" decisions in the sense here meant."' A true
"planning" decision is one that is instrumental in achieving some goal that
does not contemplate the optimally efficient allocation of resources. 372 A "plan-
ning" decision contemplates committing resources in a manner different from
the allocation that would obtain " ... if decisions were made about the use of
resources on the basis of whether the marginal loss of preserving them exceeds
the marginal amount people are willing to pay for their preservation. "373 Sup-
pose, for example, an agency is entrusted with supervision of airline flights 374
between London and New York. Suppose also there exists sufficient demand
and airline capacity to support twenty flights daily. The agency faces both a
first-order, and a second-order, determination: 373 The first-order decision is
how many flights to allow, the second-order decision is how to allocate the fly-
ing rights among contending airlines. Suppose that in order to advance some
goal like currency protection, or income redistribution, or simply pater-
nalism, 376 the agency decides to allow only ten flights per day. This is a true
"planning" decision, a commitment of social resources on grounds that do not
seek optimally efficient use of resources. Suppose in making the second order
allocation among the airlines the agency lets out the rights for competitive bid-
ding, except that it prohibits two airlines from bidding because of chronic past
unreliability and flight cancellations. This agency decision is not a true "plan-
369 HAYEK, supra note 345, at 35.
37°
 Id. at 76.
371 TRIBE, supra note 346, at 53-56.
372
 Many legal decisions are "instrumental" toward the goal of efficient allocation of
resources, and therefore are not "planning" decisions. The form of a legal decision is not
diapositive of whether or not it is a response to a planning problem. Tribe suggests three distinct
forms in which an efficient, and therefore "non-planning," result might be achieved in the
prevention, say, of pollution: (1) the issuing of a specific directive abating the pollution, id. at 53;
(2) "modifying market incentives," for example by correcting market imperfections so as to
establish prior "rights" to clean air, or to pollute, which can then be exchanged privately to op-
timize resources, td. at 54-56; and (3) "changing the decision-making structures," for example
by requiring "the merger of an upstream polluter ... with a downstream user, thereby inter-
nalizing automatically a number of formerly external costs." Id. at 56.
373
 Id. at 57.
3" The example is broadly taken from Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.
J. 1227, 1232-34 (1966).
375
 The terms "first order determination" and "second order determination" and their
meanings were coined by Calabresi and Bobbitt. See CALABRESI & Boni-Fr, supra note 25, at 19.
"6 TRIBE, supra note 346, at 57-58.
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ning" decision; rather, the agency is attempting to correct an imperfection in
the market method of seeking optimal allocation of resources. If instead the
method of making the second-order determination is to grant an exclusive
license to the national airline so as to protect its market, that is a true planning
decision.
Legal decisions correcting market failures, as in the initial second-order
determination considered above, are commons" and present no great disso-
nance with the procedure of traditional adjudication. 'Where judges are faced,
however, with the need to make true planning decisions exemplified by the
above first-order decision, they tend to adapt their procedures in various ways,
especially towards making adjudication more "active" than "reactive."
The traditional judiciary very rarely face planning problems, and hence
this argument must be from analogy to administrative agencies. Planning
problems commonly are assigned to such agencies, which often are required to
deal with such problems in a more or less "adjudicatory" fashion. The
awkwardness of solving planning problems with reactive procedures creates
some procedural adaptations. 378 The deciding agency uses numerous criteria in
making a decision.3 79 The parties therefore present evidence on every con-
ceivable issue, since they have no idea which issue may be dispositive of the
decision. 38° For the same reason, the agency likely will admit any evidence of-
fered, and the record of the proceedings therefore could be enorimous. 3 " "It is
the limitless and unfenced range of the agency's probable basis of decision that
lies at the root of the procedure problem. "382 The problem, in other words, is
that once efficiency is abandoned as the criterion for allocating resources to
some regulatory task, the decision-makers are left with a value choice in finding
an alternative distributional criterion. Commonly, nothing in the pertinent
'" See supra note 372; See also infra note 386 and accompanying text.
3" [W]hat works [procedurally] for regulation does not and cannot work for
allocation and planning. Adjudication procedure is made ridiculous when it is
enlisted in an attempt to "prove" planning by evidence.... The parties have no
way of knowing in advance which criteria will be stressed in a given case and for all
that the parties know, new criteria may be introduced. Accordingly, the prudent
lawyer must seek to introduce evidence bearing on every imaginable issue that the
agency might consider. The lawyer would be rash indeed if he omitted some point,
no matter how farfetched, for the agency might later fix upon this as the pivot of its
choice. For the same reason, the hearing examiner is reluctant to exclude any
evidence. It is unlikely that he can be criticized or reversed for admitting evidence,
but if he leaves a gap in the record over the objections of a party he invites trouble.
Everything conspires to expand the size of the record and virtually no counter-force
is at work to limit evidence. This condition seems inevitable if the decision cannot
really be placed upon a basis of objective choice. Since it is tacitly recognized that
the agency will be making policy as it goes along there can be no limit to the
relevance of evidence.
Reich, supra note 374, at 1241.
"9 Id.
' 8° Id.
39i Id.
382
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statute informs such a choice other than that it be in the "public interest. " 983
This vagueness results in the formless "trials" described above, and in an in-
stitutionalized arbitrariness of decisions utterly inconsistent with the Rule of
Law, since "the use of the government's coercive powers will no longer be
limited and determined by preestablished rules. "384
Furthermore, a decisional system assigned to achieve a certain goal cannot
remain procedurally reactive, waiting for fortuitous cases to come its way. Not
so much can be left to chance. Bureaucratic pressures to implement particular
results will result in either the convening of hearings regardless of whether a
normal "case or controversy" presents itself for determination, or perhaps in a
careful screening of cases for selective hearing. Preservation of traditional reac-
tive methods of obtaining cases will be seen as inefficient, or stifling of change,
or even dangerous. 385
As suggested, planning problems very rarely arise in the common law.
This is perhaps because the solutions to such problems entail declarations of
prior "rights" of an unusual sort. The "rights" normally declared by the com-
mon law create entitlements in things under circumstances where the market
has for some reason failed. 385 Once legal entitlements are created, they may be
exchanged freely so as to achieve efficient allocation of resources. But in "plan-
ning decisions" as defined in this article, efficient allocation is not the goal.
Such decisions are consciously an instrument toward some other distributive
goal grounded in the value choices of the decision-maker. Any "rights"
declared as part of a planning decision must, therefore, necessarily be both
"noneconomic" and "inalienable. "387 Examples of precedents of such deci-
sions are "the constitutional prohibition against slavery, the distribution of
non-negotiable food - stamps, the statutory prohibition against the use of heroin,
[and] the criminal proscription of killing or mutilating a person even with his
consent." 388 Notably, it is probably only the latter decision that emerged from
the procedural setting of traditional adjudication.
Nonetheless, there have been instances of judges hearing planning prob-
lems, most often in declaring rights pursuant to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 388 Even here, of course, the value
"3 Id. at 1238-40; accord, HAYEK, supra note 345 at 57.
3" HAYEK, supra note 345, at 82.
385 Cf. Black, The Mobilization of Lau, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973).
'Be See, e.g., the discussion analyzing all of tort law in this manner, in Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 122, passim.
"7 TRIBE, supra note 346, at 58. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122.
888 TRIBE, supra note 346 at 58.
389 See, e.g., the fairly recent recognition that handicapped children have a right to
publicly supported education suited to their needs. To the defense by one local Board of Educa-
tion of insufficient. funds for such purposes, the court in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F.
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) stated: .
Constitutional rights must be afforded citizens despite the greater expense in-
volved.... If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and pro-
grams that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be
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choices underlying the "noneconomic" commitment of social resources toward
some goal (e.g. "equality") are not pulled out of thin air — the Constitution
does provide the general directions for society. A purer "planning" decision,
arguably, would occur if, for example, a court were to declare that citizens
possess inalienable rights to proper nutrition or adequate housing. In one very
recent and interesting case in Ohio, the common law was put to the test
whether it would decide a planning problem by ordering an uneconomic fac-
tory to remain open. 33° Both the Federal District Court judge and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals"' agonized over their decisions, yet ultimately de-
clined to recognize inalienable rights in workers, and in a town, to the con-
tinued operation of the factories that gave jobs and life to the community. 392
The case involved the contemplated closure of two steel mills in Youngstown,
Ohio. Because of the devastating economic effects of such a departure on the
people of Youngstown, 393
 the worker's trade union, the local Congressman,
and the Attorney General of Ohio brought suit to enjoin the closure of the fac-
tories. They alleged, among other things, a "community property" claim in-
hering in the town and the workers collectively (and thereby inalienably), in
the continued operation of the plants. 394
 In a pretrial hearing the District Judge
stated that "[l]t seems to me that a property right has arisen from this lengthy,
long-established relationship between United States Steel, ... the community
in Youngstown, [and] the people ... in having given and devoted their lives to
this industry." 395
 In his formal opinion, however, the Judge balked: "Unfor-
tunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement, to recognize this new
property right, is not now in existence in the code of laws of our nation." 396
The Sixth Circuit agreed both that there ought to be some form of right, but
that the common law is simply not able to recognize it in the face of economic
reality."' While sympathizing with the people of Youngstown, the Court
stressed the lack of any case or statute authorizing the court to enjoin the
closure of unprofitable factories. 395
 This article submits that the key here is not,
as the court claims, lack of authority. The common law often recognizes new
rights. The particular right suggested by the problem facing the court was,
however, qualitatively different. The problem did not call merely for declara-
expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a
publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit
therefrom.
Id. at 876. (citation omitted).
39° Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corporation,
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
391 492 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D. Ohio 1980); 631 F.2d at 1280.
392
 492 F, Supp. at 12; 631 F.2d at 1280.
393 631 F.2d at 1265.
394 Id, at 1280.
395 Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
396 492 F. Supp. at 10.
3" 631 F.2d at 1280-81.
398 Id.
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tion of an exchangeable entitlement. Rather, it called for creation of a right
toward achievement of a particular distributive goal. Stating baldly such a
value choice, and facing the fearsomely complex and frequent resource alloca-
tion decisions required to implement such choice was more than the court,
equipped with reactive rather than active techniques, was willing to shoulder.
Planning problems therefore require courts to abandon traditional reac-
tive procedures in favor of active procedures. Such a shift is so fundamental,
however, that decisions on such matters usually are made by administrative
agencies possessing loose standards of evidence and participation. As with
predictive problems, planning problems starkly present value choices. For
reasons of structure and therefore perhaps also of legitimacy, the judicial
system avoids or closely manipulates such issues.
This section has suggested that when judges face problems that are disso-
nant because they are future-based rather than past-based, the judge either
subtly modifies the problem so as to base his or her decision on historical infor-
mation, or else the proceedings become formless and policy-centered, lacking
that narrowness of purpose that normally characterizes adjudication.
D. When Adjudication Faces Multiplex Problems
Procedural control of traditional adjudication is divided about equally be-
tween the disputants themselves, and the stranger-judge. 399 Such a procedural
attribute may lead to the prediction that judges deal equally well with multiplex
problems (the problem feature closely related to disputant-controlled pro-
cedures) and simplex problems (the problem feature closely related to stranger-
controlled proceedings), and that no dissonance between problem and pro-
cedure could arise out of this variable. Earlier in this article, however, it was
concluded that adjudication is indeed better suited to simplex, rather than
multiplex problerns. 4" Multiplex problems, in fact, sometimes create
dissonance of a profound sort. Perhaps more than any other problem feature,
multiplex dissonance will cause courts straightforwardly to refuse to hear the
case on grounds of nonjusticiability. Where multiplex problems are heard,
often the decision amounts to no more than a functional refusal to consider the
issues in the case. A variety of devices can be employed to achieve this func-
tional refusal, including denial of the existence of a cause of action, invocation
of an immunity doctrine, or the embracing of an absolute affirmative defense.
These functional refusals to consider the case will be collectively labelled the
"exclusionary response." A third possible type of decision in response to a
multiplex problem is the "supervisory response" in which the judges hear the
case on its merits, but ultimately allow the disputants to determine the outcome
of the problem according to their own procedures, employing their own
339 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
4.°° See SUPTa notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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substantive criteria. This judicial response is a procedural adaptation in which
the dissonance is attempted to be resolved by shifting the procedures of tradi-
tional adjudication well over to "disputant control." This adaptation serves to
harmonize the procedures with the multiplex structure of the problem. A
fourth possible response is to convert the multiplex problem into a simplex
problem. This is accomplished where the judge standardizes the relationships
underlying the problem. This response will be termed the "role-assumption"
response. A final possible response is again procedurally adaptive. The judge
attempts to move away from the "stranger-control" pole, not by giving greater
control to the disputants, as in the third response, but rather by the judge at-
tempting to end his "stranger" role by becoming "intimate" with the parties
and their relationship.
Multiplex problems typically are in two situations: family relationships,
such as between spouses or between parent and child, and voluntary associa-
tion relationships, for instance those between church and parishioner or club
and member. Examples of the five above-described judicial responses are
drawn from both sorts of multiplex settings.
1. The First Response: Outright Refusal to Hear the Case
Explicit refusals to decide cases on grounds of nonjusticiability are more
than occasionally found in disputes arising from religion-based relationships,
particularly where making a decision would require judges to inform
themselves about, and interpret, theology. Ecclesiastical decision-making and
the Rule of Law sometimes are stated in such cases to be utterly incompatible,
and therefore religious disputes are held inappropriate for judicial resolution.
One recent Supreme Court case, Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,"' was
concerned with which of two religious factions was entitled to control the prop-
erty and assets of an Eastern Orthodox Diocese. 402 The answer lay in that
church's teachings about hierarchy within the church. The matter was thought
to be essentially theological; hence, a majority of the Supreme Court refused to
get involved. Stated Justice Brennan for the majority:
[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not ra-
tional or measurable by objective criteria . . . [Civil judges obviously
do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the
"law" that governs ecclesiastical disputes.] . Constitutional con-
cepts of due process, involving secular notions of "fundamental
fairness" or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to
such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance."'
40 ' 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
402 Id. at 698.
409 426 U.S. at 714, 715 and note 8 (emphasis added).
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The same attitude is reflected in many state court opinions. For example,
in United Kosher Butchers Association v. Associated Synagogues of Greater Boston,
Inc. ;404 plaintiffs claimed that defendants had acted in restraint of trade, and
with intentional interference to plaintiff's contractual relations, by arbitrarily
refusing to grant "kosher" certification to plaintiff's meats and poultry. In
refusing to hear the merits of the case, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that "[Tihis court is not qualified to decide and therefore
must refuse to consider an issue which is so exclusively one of religious practice
and conscience ... " 4°3 Whether courts are in any sense absolutely incapable of
hearing such disputes is not clear. Rather, courts realize the difficulty of deal-
ing with the many and varied relationships involved, and consequently decline
to hear the case.
2. The "Exclusionary Response"
Where judges are not so candid in their reluctance to decide a multiplex
problem, they may resort to the "exclusionary response" in which the judge
declines to hear the case by invoking some unreflective yet dispositive legal
device. Examples are the various intrafamily immunities in tort law, and the
refusal to enforce intraspousal agreements that attempt to regulate the in-
cidents of an ongoing marriage.
The intrafamily immunity doctrine in tort, although slowly breaking
down, remains in place with respect to alleged duties arising from within the
family relationship. The parental immunity rule best illuminates this trend. 4 °8
In America the rule was first specifically recognized in Hewlett v. George, 407 a
case that precluded a minor daughter's suit against her mother for wrongful
commitment to an insane asylum. The court based its decision on family peace
and public policy concerns, and on the parent-child relationship: the parent's
duty to care for and control the child and the child's "reciprocal obligation to
aid and comfort and obey. " 408 However primitive the model of the parent-
child relationship, it was sufficiently appealing to judges (arguably as an exclu-
sionary device) that the immunity rule came to be accepted for actions in
4 °4 349 Mass. 595, 211 N.E.2d 332 (1965).
Id. at 599, 211 N.E.2d at 334, 335 (emphasis added). The Court continued:
[T]he preparation of kosher foods has traditionally been under the exclusive control
of the rabbis.... Thus, such foods are by their very nature subjected to some
restraints. Indeed, as was stated by a New York court: "In the very nature of
things, Kasruth must be a monopoly in the hands of those best qualified to ad-
minister it. By definition and tradition those persons are the rabbis, and their decree
is final." (citations omitted).
Id. at 509, 211 N.E.2d at 334-35. Judges exhibit great flexibility in coping with dissonance.
Outright refusals to consider multiplex problems occur, as above, where the issue arises in a
dense, highly valued, and perhaps unorthodox social setting. See also Moustakis v. Hellenic Or-
thodox Soc., 261 Mass. 462, 159 N.E. 453 (1928).
406 See generally McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation," 43 MARV. L. REV.
1030, 1059-60 (1930); Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971).
40 ' 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4°8 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 591
negligence as well as for actions alleging intentional torts by the parent. 404 With
the spread of liability insurance, the immunity rule has tended to break down,
but only as respects "suits between parents and children which would
previously have been actionable between the parties absent the family relation-
ship. " 41° As to duties said to exist because of the family relationship such as the
parental duty to provide the child with food, housing, medical services and
other care, the immunity rule still applies. 411 The simple application of this im-
munity rule is a functional refusal to hear a case that would require the court to
interpose itself awkwardly between family members.
Judges use analogous devices to deny enforcement to intraspousal con-
tracts governing the marital relationship. One leading case here is Balfour v.
Balfour 412 in the English Court of Appeal. Before departing his wife and
England to resume a government post in Ceylon, the defendant husband orally
undertook to give thirty pounds per month to his wife "in consideration of her
agreeing to support herself without calling upon him for further
maintenance. " 415 Duke, L.J. and Warrington, L.J. held the agreement unen-
forceable because it was the husband's preexisting duty to support his wife, and
therefore the alleged contract lacked consideration. 414 Atkin, L.J. concurred;
but, recognizing that often there is indeed consideration present in these sorts
of agreements, he refused enforcement on a much broader ground. He stated
that agreements such as that in Balfour were outside the realm of contract law
since the consideration involved was "that natural love and affection which
counts for so little in these cold Courts. "415 The courts thus had no dominion
over such promises. Unlike the Balfour case, the American case of Miller v.
409 Ste Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971).
4 " Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 44, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866, 324 N.E.2d 338,
342 (1974).
4" For example, in a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case generally overturning
parental immunity, two areas remained protected from judicial intrusion: "(1) Where the al-
leged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the al-
leged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provi-
sion of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." Goller v. White, 20
Wis.2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963). The doctrine of parental authority, which gives
immunity to a parent from what would otherwise be assault or battery charges, remains in force
in England. W. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 654 (11th ed. 1979). It is, accord-
ing to Rogers, assumed to exist by the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (17 Statutes 435), S
1(7). I found no English case articulating any such distinction as in Holodook or Colter.
412 [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (C.A.).
413 Id.
414 Id. at 574-78.
413 Id. at 579. Balfour is still recognized in England. If the spouses are living together at
the time the contract is made, a presumption exists that they do not intend to be legally bound.
Gould v. Gould, [1969] 3 All E.R. 728, [1970] 1 Q.B. 275. On the other hand, the presumption
does not hold where the spouses have separated at the time the contract is made; according to P.
BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 146 (1976), in such circumstances the intention of the parties to make a
legal relationship is a question of fact to be inferred from all the circumstances. Merritt v. Mer-
ritt, [1970] 2 All E.R. 760. Indeed, Lord Denning, M.R., here felt that in such circumstances a
presumption should exist that the parties did intend to be bound. Id. at 762.
592	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:505
Miller 4" involved a written agreement between husband and wife. Each party
promised the other to "behave respectfully and fairly treat the other."'" In ad-
dition, in exchange for Mrs. Miller keeping her home in a comfortable and
reasonably good condition, Mr. Miller was to provide her with necessary ex-
penses, and, "[to] pay Mrs. Miller, for her individual use, two hundred dollars
per year."'" When Mr. Miller failed to pay, his wife sued in breach of con-
tract. The Iowa Supreme Court invoked the preexisting duty rule to deny
recovery, then added that public policy precluded inquiry into husband-wife
disputes "pertaining so directly and exclusively to the home, and its value as
such ... [S]uch inquiries in pubic would strike at the very foundations of
domestic life and happiness."" Here again by applying this substantive doc-
trine the court effectively refused to intervene in an intra-family dispute.
The exclusionary response is virtually an outright refusal to hear a case.
By basing the refusal in substantive doctrine, however, the court creates a less
strong precedent to be overcome in the event that future courts do wish to hear
similar cases.
3. The "Supervisory Response"
The third possible judicial response to multiplex problems is the "super-
visory response." Here, the problem is not unrestrictively thrown back to the
disputants to resolve as they might; rather, the problem is thrown back with a
specific judicial direction that the disputants shall resolve the matter according
to the disputants' established procedures. This procedurally adaptive response
is a method by which the problem is virtually guaranteed to be resolved
without violence, but also with the disputants in complete control of both the
procedures and the substance of the ultimate decisions. It is not an uncommon
response, but more often is used when the dispute is between members of a
voluntary association, rather than a family. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens
dissented in the Serbian Orthodox Diocese case, for example, in favor of an ap-
proach that would have decided the controversy by examining the procedures
mandated under the church's own constitution and penal code. 4" Such an ap-
proach, asserted Rehnquist, is the normal response a court might take "to
decide a similar dispute among the members of any other voluntary associa-
tion." 42 ' Indeed, in Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in America, Inc., et al. 422
on facts similar to those in Serbian Orthodox Diocese, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted just such a supervisory response. The trial judge had
examined the Diocesan by-laws, and the facts surrounding the appointment of
•16
 78 Iowa 177, 35 N.W. 464 (1887) aff'd on reh'g. , 78 Iowa 177, 42 N.W. 641 (1889).
4." 78 Iowa at 180, 42 N.W. at 641.
4 " Id.
4 ' Id. at 182-83, 42 N.W. at 642.
420
	 U.S. at 726-27.
431 Id. at 726.
422 355 Mass. 278, 244 N.E.2d 276 (1969).
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a particular bishop."" The trial judge then issued a decree that both determ-
ined who were qualified members of the Diocese and also ordered the church
council to hold a meeting so that a new bishop could be elected according to the
church rules. 424 The decree was affirmed on appeal, with the high court
holding that the dispute was not "one of church law, . . . but one of contract
law ... We only interpret the by-laws of a Massachusetts corporation which
constitute a contract between the members and the Diocese."'" The key to this
supervisory response is that the multiplex nature of the problem remains in-
tact, to be resolved by disputants' procedures, using such substantive criteria
as they choose. The judicial role is confined to insuring procedural regularity
within the relationship.
The supervisory response is not readily available in family multiplex
cases, however, because families do not have formally constituted decisional
structures. Moreover, under certain circumstances (especially where the
disputants are grossly disparate in knowledge or power, as in the parent-child
relationship), 426 it would be unfair, or even dangerous, to relegate the ultimate
solution to the disputants. In such circumstances stranger control, rather than
disputant control, is more appropriate: the problem should thus be taken out of
the hands of the disputants. In such cases the multiplex dissonance must be
directly confronted. Judges may respond by attempting to "simplify" or objec-
tify the multiplex relationship through role assumptions, 427 or they may re-
spond by attempting to become intimately knowledgeable about the multiplex
relationship.'" As will be seen, neither response is fully satisfactory.
4. The "Role-Assumptions" Response
Any family multiplex relationship can be simplified through-role assump-
tions.'" For example, the father is often assumed to be more capable of, and
therefore entitled to discretionary powers over, the disbursement of family in-
423 Id. at 280-88, 244 N.E.2d at 277-78.
424 Id. at 279, 244 N.E.2d at 277.
425 Id. at 282, 244 N.E.2d at 279. (citations omitted).
426 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
427 See infra notes 429-40 and accompanying text.
426 See infra notes 441-55 and accompanying text.
"9 The following is a summary of what is meant by "role-assumption" as it pertains to
law:
Role is a basic concept of sociology. We understand role as the sum of all rules of
conduct imposed by society on the holder of a certain social position. Rules of con-
duct attach to a social position, and role becomes the point of intersection between
individual and society. A role represents a normative generalization. The human
being is seen not as a unique entity, but as one among many holders of the same
position. He is seen not as the individual person, but as the employer, the salesman,
or the habitual criminal who confronts us as an object of law. From society's point of
view, however, the role represents a subset of the individual's personality, since the
role does not comprise the total human being but only a partial aspect.
Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REv. 941, 951 (1971).
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come (beyond the minimal levels of support required by law). 43° Importing
such an assumption into the judicial mentality works well as a device to deter-
mine the outcome of, or exclude from court entirely, all sorts of intrafamily
financial disputes. The device, however, is obviously simplistic and perhaps
often works unfairness. The assumption may have been valid in an era when
women were generally less well educated than men. This assumption would
now seem extremely doubtful. Nevertheless, the courts ding to it tenaciously.
Child custody cases provide a perhaps more striking example of role
assumptions guiding court decisions. Here the historical variability of the
assumptions and the weight accorded them demonstrates the lack of any em-
pirical foundation for those assumptions. For example, in the early nineteenth
century the father was conclusively presumed to deserve custody of his child. 491
The English case of The King v. De Manneville 434  the operation of a nearly
"owner-object" role assumed to exist between a father and his children. The
affidavits showed that the wife had separated herself shortly after marriage
because of ill treatment by her husband. 433 Nevertheless a child was born of the
marriage, and was only eight months old when the defendant father forcibly
took the child from the mother and "carried it away almost naked in an open
carriage in inclement weather. "494 The father, nonetheless, was awarded
custody since he was "the person entitled by law to the custody of his child. "4 3 5
In America, by contrast, although some early state statutes expressed a
preference for the father, no such absolute paternity preference took hold in
America. 4" In the twentieth century, in fact, most courts came to adopt the op-
posite role assumption, strongly preferring the mother in custody suits. By
1912 a New York court stated: "[T]he child at tender age is entitled to have
such care, love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can usually
give. " 437 This maternal preference rule was advanced both by amended state
+3° See, e.g. , Austin v. Austin, 282 A.D. 493, 124 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953) and McGuire v.
McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953). In both cases wives unsuccessfully attempted to
secure regular household monies from their tight-fisted husbands. Both attempt failed, the courts
relying on a role model of husbands' fiscal discretion. The Austin court lectured: "Instead of
litigating the issues between them in court at the cost of time, expense, and harassment to both,
the parties, still living together as man and wife, should recall the solemn vows and promises
mutually made and amicably compose relatively trivial differences." 282 A.D. at 494, 124
N.Y.S. 2d at 902. Said the McGuire court: The living standards of a family are a matter of con-
cern to the household, and not for the courts to determine ..." 157 Neb. at 238, 59 N.W.2d at
342.
s" Mnookin, Child-custody Adjudication: Judicial Fzinctions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975).
4 ' 2 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
4" Id.
434
4" Id. at 1055. The paternity preference rule in England was overturned by statute in
1925. Section 1 of the Guardian of Infants Act, 1925 stated that neither the father nor the mother
should be regarded as having a custody claim superior to the other. This Act has now been
superseded by the Guardianship of Minors Act, 1971 (41 Statutes 761), with no substantive
change to this provision. P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW (1976) at 307. See also infra note 428.
Mnookin, supra note 431, at 234.
"' Ullman v. Ullman, 151 A.D. 419; 424-425, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1912).
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statutes and by judicially-constructed exceptions. 438 Perhaps the growing
awareness of the arbitrary nature of such assumptions has led to the ongoing
abandonment of the maternity preference rule in favor of the "best interests of
the child" standard. 439 Particularly in custody proceedings incident to divorce,
this standard is now overwhelmingly dominant among the states and in
England. 44° Its application illustrates the final judicial response to multiplex
problems, i.e. the "intimacy response."
5. The "Intimacy Response"
In this response, the dissonance between multiplex problems and
stranger-controlled proceedings is attempted to be resolved by the judge aban-
doning his "stranger" posture. To accomplish this, the judge seeks to become
intimately familiar with as many as possible of the subtle links of the relation-
ship: psychological, economic, medical, and educational. The approach is sub-
ject, however, to the same criticisms made above"' to the radical "individua-
tion" approach taken in criminal sentencing and child ungovernability cases.
Rather than attempting, as in the individuation approach, to judge "the whole
person," in the "intimacy" response the judge attempts to ignore role
stereotypes and assess "the whole relationship."
Leading family law commentators have questioned the efficacy, fairness,
and wisdom of the intimacy response. One commentator, for example, writes
that an attempt to understand the "best interests of the child" often reduces in
practice to "the court . . . surrendering its jurisdiction" to the social welfare
agencies, 442
 which at times operate to protect their own authority, rather than
protect the child or the parent. 443
 Under this view, the true arbiters are the
"experts," that is, the social worker or child psychiatrist. 444 For example, in
one seemingly bizarre case a father's visitation rights were terminated because
a psychiatrist testified that the father showered on the child "too much atten-
tion, love, and affection, and in that way he set up an invidious comparison
which made the mother look bad." 445
 The major reason for this result, states
one commentator, "is that the process was not truly an adversarial one .
The impartiality of most experts also is in doubt. " 946
 Though the judge's
"8 Mnookin, supra note 431, at 235.
"8 Id.
44° id. at 236. In England the Guardianship of Minors Act, 1971 (41 Statutes 761) states
that the welfare of the child is to be regarded as the first and paramount consideration in a
custody determination. In J. v. C., [1969] 1 All E.R. 788 (H.L.); [1970] A.C. 668 this principle
was said to apply regardless of whether the dispute is between the parents, or between one or both
parents and a stranger. BROMLEY, supra note 435, at 311.
4" See supra notes 301-25 and accompanying text.
442
 Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application of The Best In-
terests of the Child' Doctrine, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 244, 244 (A. E. Wilkerson, ed. 1973).
4" See, e.g. , In re Jewish Child Care Association, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S. 65, 156
N,E.2d 700 (1959), described in Katz, supra note 430, at 252-53.
444 Foster, "Trial of Custody Issues and Alternatives to the Adversary Process," in THE
CHILD AND THE COURTS 55 (I. Baxter and M. Eberis. eds. 1978).
4" Id. at 56.
448 Id. at 57.
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reliance on experts diminishes the adversarial nature of the proceedings, this
reliance is a way for the judge to gain intimate knowledge of the relationship. It
has been suggested that the adversarial nature of the proceeding could be
restored by appointing a lawyer to "speak for the child. "447 The lawyer would
examine the child's educational, personal and health needs and then reach a
decision as to the child's best interests. 448 Under the suggested model,
however, " [t]he advocate should have free rein to introduce into evidence any
medical, psychological, psychiatric, or juvenile-probation-department reports
about the child or his parents . . . "449 Thus, the suggested model leads back to
an attempt at intimacy, and back also to the experts. This approach is not like-
ly to fare any better than the judicial intimacy response. The difficulties are in-
herent in the nature of the problem, and the nature of adjudication. Adopting a
true adversarial form of adjudication may make the dissonance worse. Where
either the levels of hostility or the power differential between the parties in a
multiplex problem reach a certain threshold, the stranger-judge must in-
tervene. The structural demands posed by such problems, however, simply
may be beyond the adaptative capabilities of adjudication. The judge either
must simplify the problem to manageable levels, thus risking accuracy and
fairness; or he must attempt to become an intimate, at the risk of abandoning
the rule of law, thereby compromising acceptability. When a judge decides a
custody case under the best-interests principle, he is "[n]ot applying law or
legal rules at all, but is exercising administrative discretion. . " 4"
Similar perils attend an attempt to apply the intimacy response to volun-
tary association multiplex problems. Judges normally steer clear, but there has
been an occasional judicial incursion into the affairs of private clubs, and
churches."' The results can be disastrous, as shown by the judicial floundering
in Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, 452 a case with issues similar to those
presented in the Serbian Orthodox Diocese,+" and Mitchell 454 cases. The Free
Church of Scotland dispute stemmed from the Act of Union of 1900 between the
Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church. Rather than merely super-
447 Coyne, Who Will Speak for the Child? in A. E. Wilkerson, supra note 430, 193, at 210.
449 Id.
449 Id.
45° Fuller, Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context 11 (unbound class material for
Sociology of Law, Summer 1971, Univ. of California, Berkeley) (unpublished), quoted in
Mnookin, supra note 431, at 255. Fuller continues:
The statutory admonitions to decide the question of custody so as to advance the
welfare of the child is as remote from being a rule of law as an instruction to the
manager of a state-owned factory that he should follow the principle of maximizing
output at the least cost to the state.
Id. Or, as stated succinctly by Mnookin: The [custody dispute] trial judge has broad discretion,
but the question asked often has no meaningful answer." Mnookin, supra note 431, at 262.
491 See, e.g., Young v. Ladies' Imperial Club Ltd., [1920] 2 K.B. 523, reversing [1920] 1
K.B. 81; Baird v. Wells, [1890] 44 Ch. D. 661; and Dawkins v. Antrobus, [1881] 17 Ch. D. 615,
all cited in Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930).
492
 [1904] A.C. 515.
4" See supra notes 401-02 and accompanying text.
494 See supra notes 422-25 and accompanying text.
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vise the churches' own procedures, the House of Lords "spent 112 pages, with
arguments by counsel of 97 pages and appendices of documents occupying 41
pages, to reach a decision which was so unsatisfactory that it had to be overrid-
den by an Act of Parliament (5 Edw. VII, c.12 (1905))." 455 The intimacy
response is probably a sincere effort by judges to overcome the "stranger"
aspects of their role. Given the methods by which courts receive decisional in-
formation, however, the response will most often fail.
The interaction of multiplex and simplex problems with disputant and
stranger control of procedures is complex, but rewardingly examined. Tradi-
tional adjudication contains much disputant control, perhaps in response to the
many multiplex problems that, for want of a better alternative, are resolved in
the courts. Yet for all their familiarity with multiplex problems, judges have yet
to find a consistent method by which to accommodate such problems within the
structure of adjudication. Perhaps the most satisfactory response is the third
one, the "supervisory response" in which violence is averted but the dispute
turned back for resolution within the relationship. The response is not feasible,
however, in most family settings. Moreover, it can sometimes lead to final out-
comes that, although procedurally regular, are oppressive. In resolving such
cases, what sadly is lacking for the judges is a middle ground between simplistic
role assumptions, and the unfathomable intimacy of the underlying relation-
ship.
E. When Adjudication Faces Public Disputes
Experience informs us that some distinction exists between "private"
disputes and "public" disputes. In civil law systems the distinction is sharply
drawn, "public law" being identifiable by a body of rules wholly autonomous
from private law, and normally entailing a separate administrative jurisdic-
tion. 456 In the common law system, the distinction between public and private
is imprecise and tentative, 457 and different definitions of public versus private
disputes have been proposed by commentators. 458 Earlier discussion of this
"5 Chafee, supra note 451, at 1024. Chafee further criticizes:
In the course of the argument Haldane charged one of the law lords with anthropo-
morphism in his interpretation of predestination, and the Lord Chancellor in his
opinion felt obliged to quote two passages of original Greek from the Councils of
Constantinople and the Synod of Jerusalem in order to show the attitude of the Ar-
minians.
Id.
"6
 Vedel, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 57, 58 (5th ed., 1973), cited in Harlow, "Public" and
"Private" Law: Definition without Distinction, 43 MOD. L. REV. 241, 241 (1980).
4" Harlow, supra note 456, at 241. As Harlow stated:
When in England we talk about "public law," we all know roughly what we are
talking about .... We do not need to define the term more precisely because,
although we may sense in the common law a latent distinction between the "public"
and the "private," we do not use these terms as classificatory terms of art in the
same way, for example, as we use the terms "contract," "tort," and "crime." Nor
do legal consequences usually flow from the distinction.
466
 Friedman constructed a rather formalistic definition of public and private disputes. A
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concept concluded 459
 that private disputes are more accurately, efficiently, and
acceptably resolved through strict; assured procedures; public disputes are bet-
ter resolved through loose, diffuse procedures. 46° Predictably, when a public
dispute is adjudicated, judges will either somehow convert the problem to a
"private" one, or modify adjudicative procedures to become more loose and
diffuse. There is only limited latitude in this area for problem modification, for
reasons that will become clear. Hence, the adjudication of public disputes
results in procedural adaptations that are more loose and/or diffuse.
A less formalistic approach to the distinction between public and private
disputes is required for full understanding of the difficulty of adjudicating
public disputes. Certainly the notion is linked to the relationship between the
State and private persons. This article proposes a definition of public versus
private disputes which is based on three possible levels at which two parties can
relate, and the differing types of norm used to govern each level of relationship.
Parties can relate to one another: (a) "universally," invoking act-based
norms; (b) "categorically," invoking group-based norms, or (c) "particu-
larly," using person-based norms. The distinction between act-based norms
and person-based norms has been discussed above."' Briefly, an act-based
norm is a standard for legal judgment based on "the consequences of specific
private dispute is one where there is no initial participation by public authorities; public disputes
are those in which the State is a disputant, either plaintiff or defendant. See supra discussion at text
accompanying notes 17-20. Although there are certain difficulties with Friedman's definitions,
the definitions sufficed (1) to identify the opposing poles of the public-private problem variable;
and (2) to establish the following relationships with the loose, diffuse-strict, assured procedure
variable: generally, private disputes are more accurately, efficiently, and acceptably resolved
through strict, assured procedures; public disputes are better resolved through loose, diffuse pro-
cedures.
Professor Chayes posits an alternative set of boundaries for public, and private,
disputes. Private disputes are those arising out of the social and economic arrangements con-
structed by autonomous, private actions, It is toward the resolution of such disputes that tradi-
tional adjudication is designed. Chayes' new model of litigation, "public law litigation," reflects
and relates to a regulatory system where these [social and economic] arrangements are the prod-
uct of positive enactment [E]nforcement and application of law is necessarily implementa-
tion of regulatory policy. Litigation inevitably becomes an explicitly political forum and the court
a visible arm of the political process. Chayes, supra note 20, at 1304.
Chayes then describes in an excellent and comprehensive fashion the procedural adapta-
tions that occur when such regulatory public disputes are adjudicated. Chayes' definition of a
public dispute, however, is both a bit too broad and a bit too narrow. Much of commercial con-
tract law and tort law, for example, now is "positively enacted." No doubt economic and social
arrangements are heavily influenced by the existence of such statutes. Yet clearly not all of such
cases are "public law litigation." Professor Chayes undoubtedly does not intend such breadth.
Yet in another sense, Chayes is too narrow: judges will react in an even more extreme fashion
than that described by Chayes where they attempt to hear another variety of public dispute (see
infra discussion of cases based on "particular interactions" at notes 464-69 and accompanying
text) that has nothing to do with positive regulation.
"9 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
46° See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
461 See supra notes 65-66, 135, 145, 160-62 and accompanying text. See generally Fuller,
"Two Principles of Human Association," 11 NOMOS (VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS) 3, 17-19
(1969); Fuller, supra note 16, at 34-36.
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acts or failures to act. "462 A person-based norm, on the other hand, is a stand-
ard for legal judgment requiring a "general appraisal of the qualities or
dispositions of the person" involved."' A "group-based" norm, finally, is a
standard for legal judgment that requires classifications of persons. As stated,
parties relate in each of these three ways.
1. "Universal" Interactions
Where the parties are private persons, the law will enforce only their
universal dealings based on act-norms. Private interactions of a categorical
nature remain either non-legal, or they may indeed be illegal, as where people
discriminate against one another along categories defined by race, or gender.
Private interactions of a "particular" nature also remain non-legal: One
private person's assessments of another's competence or character or stability
or piety will not be made the basis of legally-enforceable rights and duties.
Categorical and particular interactions of private persons are beyond the pale
of law, although the group-based or person-based norms by which the interac-
tions proceed may well be enforceable by such non-legal methods of social con-
trol as religion, custom, fashion, and taste. Since, however, the State can inter-
act only through the medium of law, the categorical and particular interactions
between State and private person, if any occur, must be enforceable at law.
"Public disputes" are those legal disputes that arise out of the categorical, or particular in-
teractions of the State and private persons.
Hence, "private" disputes are those legal disputes that arise out of
universal, act-based norm, interactions. It does not matter whether the interac-
tion is between private persons exclusively, or between private persons and the
State. Where the interaction is universal, any legally recognized dispute arising
therefrom is "private." Examples of universal interactions between private
persons are commonplace. Any private contract, for example, is a universal in-
teraction: any legal judgment arising out of the breach of such contract will
treat the contracting parties universally (or, as is sometimes said, "objectively")
examining only their respective behaviors. 164 That is all that is considered rele-
vant. One party's greater wealth or knowledge, or good or bad intentions, does
not matter, at least up to the threshold of fraud or duress. And even those af-
firmative defenses are based on the conduct of the parties, not on their statuses
or the structure of their market positions. Similarly, judgments about tortious
liability between private parties are based on the respective conducts of the par-
462 Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 329 (1971).
463 Id.
464 Presumption of universality among private persons are, of course, quickly breaking
down in contract law and tort law. The universal act-based norm is being replaced gradually by
group-norms (e.g. "consumer," "merchant," "manufacturer," "employee," etc.) where legal
consequences follow not solely from one's behavior, but also from the group of which one is a
member. See generally Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract in British Labor Law, in 0. KAHN-
FREUND, SELECTED WRITINGS 78-87 (1978); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964);
Rehbinder, supra note 429; GILMORE, supra note 185.
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ties, assuming both parties to be standardized, "reasonable" people. Special
clumsiness gives rise to no special excuse, nor does superior agility or intelli-
gence entail special obligations towards others."' Such contract and tort dis-
putes are "private disputes," even though obviously the State can breach con-
tracts, and commit torts, and be held liable just as though the State were
another standardized, objectively-considered, private person. Where the State
so interacts, any ensuing dispute remains "private." The criminal law is also a
universal interaction between the State and private persons. All persons are
deemed equivalent under the criminal law, save for the insane and children.
Criminal law is definitely based on act-norms. Even "premeditation" and
"special intent" crimes are act-based: acting through especial malice is just an
especial form of conduct, it is not a quality or attribute of the criminal. Hence
criminal law trials are "private disputes," even though the State is a party.
The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that most constitutional litigation is
"private." Interaction between private persons and the State under the con-
stitution is universal, even though the particular facts may be idiosyncratic.'"
"Private disputes" are better solved by strict, assured procedures, such as
exist in traditional adjudication. Universal interactions are crisply defined by
behaviors. Expanding the inquiry to permit loose, diffuse participation would
serve no purpose. Private disputes therefore are easily compatible with tradi-
tional adjudication. "Public disputes," on the other hand, arise out of
categorical, or particular, interactions between the State and private persons.
Both of these two types of public disputes are dissonant with traditional ad-
judication. Each of the two sorts of problem, however, is grounded in a dif-
ferent sort of norm, and judicial response in hearing such problems varies ac-
cordingly. Because the dissonance is embedded deeply in the structure of the
norms of the interaction, judicial conversion of a public dispute into a private
one is difficult. Rather, the dissonance is resolved through a variety or pro-
cedural adaptations.
2. "Categorical" Interactions
Categorical interactions that give rise to the first sort of "public dispute"
are exemplified by the regulation of economic activity, and by affirmative
465 The general statement about the standardization of people in tort law should be
qualified (1) by the changes described supra in note 464; and (2) by the fact that if people hold
themselves out as having special abilities or knowledge, tort law will often judge them by those
higher standards. E.g. physicians are judged by the standard of the "reasonable physician," and
not by the standard of the "reasonable man." David Fleming, personal communication, 1981.
466
. Disputes defining the boundaries of citizen-State interaction are normally better
solved through loose, diffuse procedures. (See supra text accompanying notes 79-91). This would
suggest that most Constitutional litigation, although a "private dispute" by the definition here
posited, should be loose and diffuse. Arguably, litigation at the Supreme Court level in the
United States is indeed fairly loose and diffuse, given the frequency with which amicus curiae briefs
are filed, and given the extensive academic and journalistic commentary on the decisions of the
Court.
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measures by the State to improve the social position of particular groups. Such
interactions are grounded in group norms. In the case of regulation, particular
sectors of the economy (e.g. common carriers, radio and television broad-
casters, and utilities) are identified as belonging to a relevant category. Regula-
tions are then promulgated that apply universally within the target group. The
conduct of a particular company is irrelevant to whether state action will be
brought to bear on it. Mere structural or productive similarity to others war-
rants inclusion in the regulated group. The same sort of group norm governs
state efforts at affirmative action. The identifying criterion for membership in
the group benefitted by the regulation is not conduct, or the actual experienc-
ing of discrimination. Rather, it is skin color or gender. Similarly, the identify-
ing criterion for membership in the group burdened by the regulation is not
conduct, i.e. past acts of discrimination, but rather position in the economy
like "employer" or "educational institution."
The State clearly does interact with private persons in this categorical
fashion. For the interaction to be effective, it must be enforceable in the courts.
Problems based on such group norms are dissonant, however, with traditional
adjudication."' Judges and the legal system generally have learned to adapt to
this form of public dispute by making extensive changes in the procedures of
adjudication."' For example, the most predictable procedural adaptation to
the dissonance created by a "public dispute" problem occurs along the
associated procedure variable of "strict, assured" versus "diffuse, loose" par-
ticipation. This adaptation results in the liberalization of the joinder rules, the
pleading rules, and the standing rules, 469 all of which operate under the tradi-
tional adjudication model to confine the inquiry strictly to the parties. In the
adjudication of a public dispute, however, "[t]he party structure is not rigidly
bilateral but sprawling and amorphous. " 470 The emergence of the "class action
is a further adaptation to the fact that the underlying norms speak for, and to,
groups. 4 " Class action provisions diffuse the litigation by allowing all persons
within the group to influence the decision. Concerns frequently expressed by
judges and commentators that the group actually before the court be truly
representative of the various interests in the controversy are concerns for the
diminished assuredness of participation that occurs whenever the strictness of
the proceeding is relaxed. 472 "The emergence of the group as the real subject or
object of the litigation not only transforms the party problem, but raises far-
reaching new questions" 473 about how loosely the adjudication ought to be
467 See supra text and accompanying notes 464-65.
468 See infra notes 469-74 and accompanying text.
469 Chayes, supra note 20, at 1289-91.
42°
 Id. at 1302.
' 71 Id. at 1291-92.
"2 Id. at 1291, 1310-13.
"3 Id. at 1291.
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organized, and about how, within the relevant group, strictness and assuredness
can be maintained. The procedural adaptation, in other words, should go only
so far towards diffuseness and looseness as is required to cope with the group-
based norms of the lawsuit. An adaptation that goes beyond the structural
demands posed by the problem would be equally unsuitable in terms of ac-
curacy and acceptability."
The law will thus enforce categorical interactions between the State and
private persons, even though such interactions solely between private persons
would not be enforced. Such enforceable categorical interactions are ex-
emplified by economic regulations and affirmative action programs. Problems
arising from such interactions pose dissonance for traditional adjudication
primarily because they are based on unfamiliar group norms." The legal
system has responded to this dissonance with extensive procedural adaptations.
The success of this effort is disputed, but the procedural changes are consonant
with the demands posed by the structure of this type of public dispute."
3. "Particular" Interactions
The second sort of "public dispute" occurs where the law must enforce an
interaction between the State and a private person that is particular, based on
personal norms. A particular interaction is the opposite of a universal interac-
tion. It is concerned with what a person is, rather than what act he/she has
done. Whereas the act-based norm of a universal interaction is objective,
perhaps even quantifiable, excluding all variables beyond observable conduct,
the person-based norms seek informed subjectivity based on considering as
many variables or attributes as possible. 4" Particular interactions occur con-
stantly in everyday living: private persons continually judge one another in
terms of overall moral, social, or spiritual worth. Observable behavior only
partially informs such judgments. The law will never enforce these sorts of par-
474 Id. at 1296. Chayes describes other features of the new procedures adopted by the
public law litigation model. Such other procedural adaptations operate indirectly to reduce the
strictness and assuredness of the proceedings. Primarily, however, the other devices are respond-
ing to other problem variables that correlate with being a group-norm based public dispute. For
example, Chayes mentions that the typical public law problem is future-based. Id. at 1296. This
problem feature, he notes, causes judges to take a much more active, rather than reactive, role in
fact-finding. Id. at 1297-98. He states that "Nhe fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative
but predictive and legislative .... The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the af-
fair: its administration requires the continuing participation of the court." Id. at 1302. Just such
procedural adaptations are predictable under the theory of this article where a judge attempts to
hear a future-based problem. See supra notes 344-97 and accompanying text.
475 Problems arising from such interactions also pose dissonance for traditional adjudi-
cation because they tend to possess other dissonance-producing features, such as being future-
based. See supra note 474.
475 Chayes is optimistic that the adaptations are suitable to the problems. Chayes, supra
note 20, at 1313.
"' Cf. supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Galanter, supra note 135 at 155, and
Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 640-46 suggest that person-based norms actually prevail in non-
Western tribal systems.
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ticular judgments where made by or between private persons. Occasionally,
however, the State also finds itself compelled to engage in such particular in-
teractions. Here again, if such actions are to be effective they must be en-
forceable in court. This article already has discussed three examples of such in-
teractions, and how judges respond to them. The examples are the criminal
sentencing process where rehabilitation is a goa1, 428
 child ungovernability
determinations, 179
 and child custody determinations based on the "best in-
terests of the child" standard."° Civil commitment proceedings are perhaps
another example."'
This article has shown that enforcing such particular interactions is so
foreign to our courts that they take refuge behind extremely vague standards
that afford often unreviewable discretion to the judge , 482 Additionally, there
may be unjustified abdication of fact-finding in favor of experts."' The effect of
court-appointed masters and experts, and of judicial notice of social welfare
and probation reports, is to loosen the proceedings. They are loosened not by
expanding the number of parties, as occurs in the "categorical" type of public
dispute, but rather are loosened by opening for examination every facet of the
parties' lives. One function of pleadings in Anglo-American adjudication is to
protect the privacy of the parties and safeguard against judicial bias arising
from some past behavior or trait of a party that is unrelated to the matter at
hand. There can be no such protection where the courts are attempting to ad-
judicate person-norm interactions. Indeed, particular instances of this sort of
abuse have been cited in the examples discussed above, particularly respecting
probation department and social welfare agency reports. 484 A subtler danger
may be that particular interactions between the State and private persons are
unconsciously enforced in ways that disfavor the poor, the uneducated, the
unorthodox, and those comprising minority groups. 485
These difficulties with the completely unconfined inquiries of particular
interactions are made worse by the fact that the various judicial responses
operate to reduce assuredness of participation. To be sure, the parties before
the court retain their rights to present proofs and cross-examine witnesses. For-
478 See supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
473 See supra notes 311-25 and accompanying text.
4BG See supra notes 440-50 and accompanying text. The State involvement in such cases is
sometimes strong, as in custody proceedings based on parental neglect or abuse, but also is
sometimes weak, as where the custody proceeding is pursuant to a divorce. Mnookin, supra note
431, passim. The latter case may be an exception to the rule that the law will not enforce private
party particular interactions.
481
 See generally Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 157
(1979); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Note, Developments in the Law•—Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
482
 See supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
483
 See supra notes 442-49 and accompanying text.
484 See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
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mally, assuredness is unaffected in person-norm based inquiries. Substantive-
ly, however, assuredness is severly impaired by the vague standards and the
over-reliance on experts. It is the essence of such inquiries that they are unprin-
cipled. They neither appeal to precedent nor make precedent. Where the final
determination is a matter of judicial discretion, the parties can never fully
know what is and is not relevant or persuasive. In that sense their participation
is not "assured," i.e. protected by the institution. Participation cannot pro-
ceed in a vacuum; 486 the participants must share stable expectations about how
the decision maker will act, 487 and what notions inform his/her judgment.
This is not, however, to criticize judges. They here face a type of dispute
highly dissonant with their accustomed procedures. They respond with adapta-
tions that, according to the theory of this article, are in the correct direction. If
the process is unsatisfactory it is not for want of sincere efforts by judges. It is
perhaps more to be regretted that there remain instances where particular in-
teractions between the State, and private persons, must somehow be enforced.
Dissonances created by the attempt to adjudicate public disputes result in
a variety of procedural adaptations. Where the public dispute involves categor-
ical norms, the adaptations serve to make the proceedings more diffuse and
loose. In the relatively rare circumstances in which the State interacts with a
citizen on a "particular" basis, the adaptations become more extreme—dispu-
tant privacy becomes threatened, and the decisions lack principled consistency.
F. When Adjudication Faces Problems Where Private Resolution is Infeasible or
Undesirable
Dissonances created where the judiciary faces problems that - cannot
feasibly or desirably be resolved privately are best analyzed together. Because
this section is very detailed, first a summary is provided of the relevant
variables and their associations. Thereafter, a number of predictions of judicial
reactions to the various dissonances are presented. Finally, a more detailed ex-
amination is made of the adjudication of infeasible and undesirable problems.
The problem variable "feasible-infeasible private resolution" is associ-
ated with the procedure variable "strong-weak responsiveness." Adjudication
as noted is basically strongly responsive to the proofs and arguments presented
by the parties, 488 and copes more easily with problems for which private resolu-
tion is feasible. 489 Hence dissonance exists where there is presented for ad-
judication a problem for which private resolution is infeasible.
The problem variable "desirable-undesirable private resolution" is asso-
ciated with the procedure variable "corrective-facilitative." Adjudication is
basically a corrective procedure, although most decisions are incidentally facili-
486 Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, supra note 10, at 5.
*97 Freeman, supra note 72, at 179.
488 Set supra notes 153-55, 178-83 and accompanying text.
489 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
May 1983]	 JUSTICIABILITY	 605
tative of human interaction, 490 and it copes more easily with problems for
which private resolution is desirable. 49 t Hence dissonance exists where there is
presented for adjudication a problem for which private resolution is un-
desirable.
Logically, there are four possible types of problems that form the conjunc-
tion of the two problem variables here considered. The four possible types are
feasible-desirable, infeasible-desirable, feasible-undesirable, and infeasible-
undesirable. The theory developed in this article can be used to make predic-
tions of the judicial response to each of the four sorts of problems.
First, feasible-desirable problems present no dissonance with traditional
adjudicative procedures. Such problems can be decided without recourse to
problem modifications. Similarly, no procedural adaptations are required: ad-
judication can remain strongly responsive, and retain its usual mixture of cor-
rective and facilitative functions.
Second, infeasible-desirable problems present a dissonance with the pro-
cedures of traditional adjudication. The expected judicial modifications to the
problem somehow should convert the problem from "infeasible" to
"feasible;" alternatively, the expected procedural adaptation would shift the
adjudication away from the "strongly responsive" pole to the "weakly respon-
sive" pole. That is, the procedural adaptation should seek to allow for greater
flexibility and less emphasis upon the proofs and arguments of the parties.
The third set of problems, feasible-undesirable problems, present a
dissonance different from that created in infeasible-desirable problems. Feasi-
ble-undesirable problems are dissonant along the "desirability of private
resolution" continuum. The expected judicial modifications to the problem
somehow should convert the problem from "undesirable" to "desirable."
Normally an alternative judicial response would be a procedural adaptation
along the associated procedure variable. Here, such a procedural shift would
be toward the "facilitative" pole, away from the "corrective" pole. But if the
problem cannot be modified to one for which private resolution is desirable, it
would be counter-productive for the judge to facilitate such private interaction.
Hence if the problem modification to "desirable" is impossible, it is more like-
ly that the decision would follow the only remaining path and somehow convert
the problem from one that is feasible to one that is infrasible. Such a conversion
prevents the problem from being privately resolved, which by definition is
undesirable. This rather ironic result is the reason why these problem variables
are considered together.
Finally, infeasible-undesirable problems present dissonance along the
"feasibility of private resolution" and "desirability of private resolution"
variables. Consistent with the analysis immediately above, it makes sense for
judges either to modify both problem variables (so as to convert the problem in-
4" See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
491 See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
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to one that is feasible and desirable) or to decide in such a manner as to preserve
or strengthen the "infeasibility" aspect of the problem. Nothing good is
achieved by a successful modification of only one .aspect of the problem.
Achieving only a feasible-undesirable outcome is worse than doing nothing at
all, because (as in feasible-undesirable problems) it increases the chances that
undesirable private negotiations will occur. Similarly, there is little purpose in
achieving only an infeasible-desirable result.
The actual results when adjudication faces these four categories of infeasi-
ble or undesirable problems are strikingly similar to the above predictions.
There follows a closer examination of each of the above four problem types,
and the various judicial modifications and adaptations to such problems.
1. Feasible-desirable Problems
As suggested, feasible-desirable problems present no structural dissonance
to traditional adjudication. Such problems are typified by disputes over owner-
ship of property, or over enforceability of contracts. Where such disputes arise,
the parties could feasibly resolve the matter amongst themselves, and society
normally has no reason to prevent such private resolution (the conditions giv-
ing rise to "infeasibility" and "undesirability" are considered below). 492
Where the parties have not so accommodated this sort of dispute, it is either
because one or both parties is ignorant of his or her respective rights or duties
(hereafter referred to as "entitlements"), or it is because one or both parties is
seeking the expressive imprimatur of a court decision. In either case, the deci-
sion of the court can be strongly responsive — can proceed from and be con-
gruent with the arguments of the parties. The social interest is basically in solv-
ing the matter peaceably, not in solving it with a particular outcome. There is
no need to make any special reference to some social, or utilitarian, criterion.
The decisional criteria may safely be formulated by the parties themselves.
Similarly, adjudication can play its traditional role of "correcting" the parties
by clearly announcing specific entitlements, which announcement not only
resolves the immediate problem, but also facilitates the future private interac-
tions of these parties and all others similarly situated. For example, once
ownership of a chattel is established by court decision, the parties may private-
ly negotiate a purchase and sale of the object between themselves. Prior to the
court decision, such a transfer obviously would have been more difficult.
Similarly in the contract example, any definitive judicial interpretation of a
disputed clause will facilitate adjustments or modifications in future dealings.
2. Infeasible-desirable Problems
Feasibility of private resolution first begins to shade into infeasible private
resolution where a loss occurs, as through negligence, fraud or crime, such that
"2 See infra text accompanying notes 495-97, 522-23.
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the liable party has nothing to gain by negotiation. 493 It was suggested 494 that in
dealing with such cases, judges become more weakly responsive out of a desire
to ensure the protection of society against the higher likelihood of aggression.
This section suggests other situations in which private resolution is infeasible
and describes an alternative judicial response to infeasibility. This response is
to attempt to modify the problem so as to make private resolution more feasi-
ble.
There are two distinct conditions that lead to the infeasibility of private
resolutions. The first is where one or more parties is under a legal incapacity
that bars the party from making a binding private agreement. Examples of
such legal incapacities include being a minor, or being insane. The second con-
dition leading to infeasibility of private resolution is where for some reason the
transaction costs of making an agreement are very high. Examples of high
transaction costs include high information costs, as where one or both parties
are ignorant of their respective entitlements, but discovering such entitlements
would entail prohibitively large attorney fees or litigation expenses. Another
sort of high transaction cost arises where there are "free rider" or "holdout"
problems that bar private resolution. 495 Cases where a loss has occurred also fit
in this category, especially losses due to accidents. Where accidents have oc-
curred, it is obviously infeasible for all prospective victims to negotiate ex ante
with all prospective injurers a compensatory price for all potential injuries. 496
And after the loss has occurred, not only does the injurer have no incentive to
negotiate, but also the victim is not likely to accept in settlement such sums as
the injurer might have been willing to accept, prior to the actual occurrence of
the accident. 497
In coping with infeasibility caused by a legal incapacity, courts tend to
make the procedural adaptation of appointing someone to participate in court
on behalf of the incapacitated person. If need be, a permanent guardian can be
selected to carry out legal transactions for such a person. Such an appointment
clearly facilitates future interactions by legal incompetents, preventing the oc-
currence of additonal problems that are "infeasible." In coping with in-
feasibility caused by high transaction costs, courts tend to convert the problem
into one that is feasible, by any or all of three methods: first, by supplying in-
formation about entitlements; second, by defining objectively the worth of such
entitlements; third, by granting to one party the right to assume the entitle-
ment of another upon payment of an objectively determined value. Such
493 Aubert, supra note 31, at 33.
494 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
495 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
496 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1108-09. Generally, the reasoning
throughout this chapter is heavily indebted to this excellent article.
497 Id. at 1109.
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methods can thus resolve infeasibilities based on, respectively, high informa-
tion costs; lack of incentives to negotiate after a loss; and structural obstacles to
private resolution such as the free-rider and holdout problems.
a. Legal Incompetency
The procedural device of appointing a guardian to represent the interests
of a legal incompetent is familiar. To resolve the immediate difficulty of ad-
judicating where such a person is brought before the court, the judge will re-
spond weakly to such person's arguments by appointing what in England is
called the official solititor, 195
 and what in America is called a guardian-ad-
litem. 499
 It is one of the simplest and most effective procedural adaptations to
dissonance. After the appointment, the judge can resume the strong respon-
siveness of traditional adjudication. 50° As suggested, the appointment by the
court of a permanent guardian is a variant on the above procedural adaptation.
A permanent appointment is merely more prospective or preventative in cop-
ing with infeasibility caused by legal incapacity.
b. High Transaction Costs
Coping with infeasibility caused by high transaction costs requires greater
sublety and is usually less successful. It involves the gradually increasing inter-
vention by the court into the framework of private interactions. Ideally, the in-
tervention should be only so intrusive as is needed to solve the particular cause
of the infeasibility. Since private resolutions of this type of problem are desirable,
the court should not preempt such resolutions; rather, it should intervene so as
to facilitate them. The first such intervention is the announcement of respective
entitlements, enforced only by what Calabresi and Melamed call a "property
rule. " 50 ' The court does not declare a particular value to the entitlement. Once
an entitlement is announced to exist in favor of some party, such party may
freely transfer the entitlement at a mutually agreed price. Conversely, no one
has the right to deprive the holder of his or her entitlement on payment of any
price except that which is mutually agreed upon. As described with respect to
feasible-desirable problems, 502 the announcement of entitlements suffices to
443 See generally, 10 HALsBuRv's LAW OF ENGLAND 950 (4th ed, 1975).
4" See generally, E. K. Solender, Guardian-ad-litem: a Valuable Representative or an Illusory
Safeguard? 7 TEX. TECH L. REV. 619 (1976).
'°° An alternative theoretical possibility would be for no representative to be appointed,
and the judge to play a weakly responsive role in favor of the incapacitated person. Such compen-
sation could be "active," with the judge supplying information and arguments on behalf of the
weaker party, or it could be "passive," with the judge silently easing the burdens of proof in
favor of such party. In comparison with the adaptation actually made, these possibilities are
decidedly less acceptable because they in effect require the judge to compromise his or her objec-
tive role. The theoretical possibilities are also likely to be less efficient and less accurate, because
the judge is not trained to be an adversary.
3°1 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1092.
504 See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
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modify a problem whose private resolution is infeasible by reason of ignorance
of one's entitlements, their transferability, and their worth, into a problem that
is feasible for private resolution. 5 °3
The court intervenes one step further where, in order to solve an infeasibility
problem, the court must declare some specific value for the announced entitle-
ment. Since price is probably the most important feature of any bargain, this
sort of intervention in which the court sets prices on entitlements is inevitably
restrictive to private resolutions. The intervention is justified, however, in any
case where absent the intervention the parties would be even more incapable of
negotiating. Such is the case whenever a "loss," broadly defined, has oc-
curred. The judicial implication of "reasonable" terms into a contract is per-
haps the best example of this type of intervention. Suppose the parties have
entered into an agreement with the intention of making a binding contract, but
have inadvertently omitted the price. Under two distinct circumstances, one
party will lose completely the incentive to negotiate a price. The first is if the
5" Regretfully, obtaining even such minimal intervention as the declaration of entitle-
ments can be very expensive, and it may well be just such costs that makes such a problem "in-
feasible." From this standpoint it is difficult to understand the traditional judicial doctrine of
"advisory opinion" under which the courts often refuse to hear cases until an actual injury has
occurred. No doubt the doctrine grew up as a response to fears both for judicial legitimacy and
administration. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Brilmayer, Judicial Review,
Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method, 57 B.U.L. REV. 807, 822 (1977). Brilmayer
notes that were it not for "ripeness" doctrines, the notion of res judicata would break down. Id.
at 823. However, the importance for private resolutions of having available some relatively cheap
mechanism for obtaining authoritative declarations of entitlements has led to the fast-spreading
use of statutorily-created declaratory relief provisions. See, e.g. , Declaratory Judgments Act, 28
U.S.C. i$ 2201-02 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). As stated as early as 1949:
With few exceptions, judicial intervention has traditionally been limited to existing
or highly imminent ruptures in social and economic relationships. Modern
declaratory relief, however, extends the scope of court protection in advance of
harm, seeking to forestall rather than merely repair damage. The need for such
added protection stems from the fact that in a complex society doubt of the law or
uncertainty concerning facts may in itself produce significant economic, ad-
ministrative, or social detriment. The declaratory judgment is usually the exclusive
remedy where an individual is uncertain of his right to alter existing relationships
over another's objection; in this way, the risk of a "leap into the dark" is obviated.
Similarly, if one is threatened by prejudicial action or adverse claim, he may obtain
a declaration that the defendant has no right to alter existing relationships, thus
eliminating the risk of harassment or damage.
Developments in the Law—Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HAIN. L. REV. 787, 789 (1949). In
England the common law has been fairly liberal toward declaratory relief since the Court of
Chancery in 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86 (1852), sec. 50) was empowered to make binding declara-
tions of right without granting consequential relief. According to 1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND (4th ed. 1973):
It is ... sometimes convenient to obtain a judicial decision upon a state of facts
which has not yet arisen, or a declaration of the rights of a party without any
reference to their enforcement. Such merely declaratory judgments may be given,
and the court is authorized to make binding declarations of right whether any conse-
quential relief is or could be claimed or not .... There is a general power to make a
declaration whether there be a cause of action or not... .
Id. at 171,¶185.
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market suddenly shifts, making the transaction highly unprofitable for one par-
ty at the previously prevailing price. The second circumstance is if one party
has substantially performed. There has in a sense been a "loss" in both cases,
making one or the other party have nothing to gain by negotiating the omitted
price term. In such circumstances, the courts sometimes have declared an ob-
jective "reasonable" price to be inserted into the contract. Cases illustrating
the latter "substantial performance" circumstance are fairly common; 504
 cases
illustrating the former "market shift" circumstance more rare."' Moreover, it
is this sort of intervention by courts that typifies tort law. A loss has occurred,
and, because no incentives to negotiation exist, the courts intervene by de-
claring an objective value for the infringed entitlement . 506
This sort of post hoc declaration of entitlements facilitates interaction in
contract because parties know the courts will prevent injustices from befalling
them due to their negotiating carelessness. Tort law facilitates interaction
because if parties were required to negotiate ex ante with all prospective victims
before undertaking any dangerous activity, prohibitive transaction costs would
force the curtailment of "many activities that might, in fact, be worth
having." 507 Moreover, the knowledge that courts in fact will intervene with ob-
jectively determined values is an incentive to negotiate and thus makes feasible
the private resolution of disputes.'"
The final step a court may take toward modifying infeasibility caused by
transaction costs is designed to overcome such structural obstacles to private
resolution as the "free-rider" and "holdout" problems. In this intervention,
the court grants to one party the right to appropriate the entitlement of another,
upon payment of an objectively determined price. This intervention differs
5" A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 93 (1963). Cases invoking the "frustration
doctrine" are by analogy illustrations of judicial interventions in the price term of contracts due
to market shifts.
505 Corbin states:
The court will be more ready to find that the apparently incomplete agreement was
in fact complete and required the payment and acceptance of a "reasonable" price
or a performance on "reasonable" terms, in case the parties have already rendered
some substantial performance or have taken other material action in reliance upon
their existing expressions of agreement ....
Id. , at 93, 94.
5" Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1108-10. Calabresi and Melamed describe
such interventions as "liability rules" which they define as follows: "Whenever someone may
destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an en-
titlement is protected by a liability rule." Id. at 1092. This connotes, however, that the tortfeasor
has a right to injure, so long as he is willing to pay compensation. A better Hohfeldian category to
describe the tortfeasor is that he has a "power." As discussed infra at text accompanying note
509, a potential victim surely could enjoin an imminent injury; hence the tortfeasor does not have
a "right." Use of the term "liability rule" is for that reason avoided in this article.
507 Id. at 1109.
5" As stated by Calabresi and Melamed: "[W]here negotiations after an accident do oc-
cur—for instance pretrial settlements— it is largely because the alternative is the collective valua-
tion of the damages." Id. (emphasis added).
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qualitatively from the one described immediately above in that there, the pay-
ing party was being held "liable." The paying party might be said to have a
power to commit the tort, for example, but would never be said to have an en-
forceable "right" to injure another upon payment of compensation. The pro-
spective victim of a tort could normally seek an injunction against imminent in-
jury by the prospective tortfeasor. 509 Not so, however, where the court inter-
venes in this third way. Such interventions are illustrated by nuisance cases
where the court refuses to grant an injunction against the nuisance, and by the
doctrine of eminent domain."'
The well known and often-cited case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Inc. , 5 "
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, is one illustration of this third type
of intervention. Defendant operated a large cement plant that emitted dirt,
smoke, and vibration."' The surrounding land owners brought an action to
enjoin its operation."' The trial court specifically found that the cement plant
constituted a nuisance, 514 but the court ordered no injunction. 515 Rather, in the
face of much precedent to the contrary, the plant was allowed to escape an in-
junction upon condition of its payment of judicially determined damages to the
neighboring landowners. 516 In the face of substantial New York precedent to
the contrary"' the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision denying the injunc-
tion."" The facts show an instance of structural obstacles to private resolution.
Notwithstanding that plaintiffs were substantially damaged, such damage was
"relatively small in comparison with the value of defendant's operation and
with the consequences of the injunction which the plaintiffs seek. " 519 To shut
down the plant would therefore be an inefficient use of resources: it would be
"cheaper" for the cement plant simply to pay off the injured neighboring land-
owners. Such a private resolution would not occur, however, because presum-
ably there existed a "holdout" obstacle to the resolution. That is, one or more
of the neighboring landowners would calculate that they could receive more
compensation if they held out against settlement until all their neighbors' en-
titlements had been purchased, thus inflating the compensation beyond what
the cement plant was willing to pay. Hence the court intervened by in effect
granting to the cement company the right to purchase the plaintffs' entitlements
to be free of nuisance, even where such landowners were not willing to sell such
entitlements . 520
5 °9 See supra note 506.
31° Both examples are suggested by Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 122, 1105-08.
3" 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), discussed id.
3" Id. at 222, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
315
3l+
	Misc.2d 1023, 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (1967).
515 Id. at 1024, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
' 1 ° Id. at 1025-26, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 114-16.
317 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 224, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315, 316, 257 N.E.2d at 872.
519
	
at 228, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319, 257 N.E.2d at 875.
5" 257 N.E.2d at 872.
'7° 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315. The second half of the Boomer opinion con-
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The doctrine of eminent domain exists to resolve the same sort of obstacles
to private resolution. 52 ' If society is not given the right to purchase, at an objec-
tively set price, the entitlement of even an unwilling private person, holdout
problems would prevent the building of most public works projects. If, on the
other hand, "society can remove from the market the valuation of each tract of
land, decide the value collectively, and impose it, then the holdout problem is
gone." 522
 The court thus will have succeeded, although in a rather more intru-
sive way, of converting a problem where resolution was infeasible to a problem
with a feasible solution.
3. Feasible-Undesirable Problems
Adjudication may be made difficult where private resolution of a problem
is undesirable, and it would be expected that the court make efforts to convert
the "undesirable" feature to "desirable." Failing that, however, the court
should not adopt the normal procedural alternative of a shift on the associated
procedure variable. That is because here, such a shift would be from "correct-
ive" to "facilitative" procedures. Since private resolution of the problem is ir-
redeemably undesirable, however, facilitating private interaction would be
counter-productive. Hence the alternative course is to sabotage private resolu-
tion by making the problem "infeasible" rather than "feasible."
There are four possible reasons why a private resolution of a dispute may
be undesirable. First, the private resolution might predictably be violent; sec-
ond, one of the parties to the resolution may not be in a position to choose the
resolution which is best for him/her; third, the private resolution may entail
burdens or costs for unrelated third parties; and fourth, the private resolution
may come to some solution that society deems morally offensive. Under all four
circumstances a private resolution between the disputing parties is feasible. In
the third and fourth circumstances, however, there are third parties who are
directly affected by the private resolutions. Since the affected third parties fre-
quently cannot be part of the direct negotiations between the disputing parties,
such private resolutions are considered to be "infeasible," and discussion of
such problems is deferred until the next section.'" Hence this section will con-
cerned calculation of damages, i.e. the reasonable price for the purchase of plaintiffs' en-
titlements. Contrast Boomer with the recent English case of Laws v. Florinplace, Ltd., [1981] 1 All
E.R. 659, in which Vinelott, J. granted an interlocutory injunction in favor of neighboring
dwellers against the continued operation of a shop selling pornographic magazines and books.
Notwithstanding defendant's arguments that no nuisance was as yet proved, and that loss of
profits subsequently difficult to measure would result from an interlocutory injunction, the shop
was shut down. It is impossible to say that Boomer is wrong and Florinplace is right. The two cases
represent widely divergent views on the relative importance of economics, and, for want of a bet-
ter phrase, social concerns.
'21 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1106-07.
522 Id. at 1107.
523 See infra notes 539-53 and accompanying text.
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sider two sorts of feasible, yet undesirable problems: those where private reso-
lution is likely to cause violence, and those where one party to the private reso-
lution is unlikely to negotiate a solution to his or her best advantage.
a. Violent Resolutions
Little discussion is required of the first problem. It is relatively easy for the
courts to resolve this dissonance by modifying the problem from one that is
"undesirable" to one that is "desirable." Violence is likely to occur where the
court refuses to hear a dispute for which there exists no other viable method of
resolution. In such circumstances the parties turn by default to self-help. Often
some custom, or reciprocal family obligation, or even the need to preserve
future dealings softens the method by which self-help proceeds. In the absence
of these mitigating circumstances, self-help ranges from the disruption of mid-
night automobile repossessions to physical intimidation. In general, self-help is
unpredictable and a remedy highly disfavored by the legal system. 524 Its
avoidance is accomplished by the court agreeing to hear the case on its merits.
Once the court announces the respective entitlements, private resolution by
peaceable means is enhanced, indeed becomes desirable, in the ways discussed
above.
b. Unfair Resolutions
The second sort of feasible-undesirable problem is more difficult. It il-
lustrates "true paternalism," 525
 and arises where society has some reason to
believe that the resolution that would emerge from private negotiation of a
dispute would be unfairly disadvantageous to one party. It may be, for exam-
ple, that one party is in a grossly inferior bargaining position, or it may be that
one party lacks understanding of what is desirable for him or her. The ideal
solution would be to modify the problem into one for which private resolution
is desirable by correcting the inbalance of bargaining strength, or by educating
the ignorant party about what is best for him or her. Such solutions are not
unknown to the common law, but they seem to emerge more readily from ac-
tive decision systems like the legislature. One could argue, for example, that
consumer protection legislation like the English Unfair Contract Terms Act,
1977 and Fair Trading Act, 1973 526
 and certain provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and other statutes, 527
 attempt both to redress the bargain-
524 See F. H. LAWSON, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 25 (2nd ed. 1980) ("one of the most
significant themes in history has been a persistent and continuous attempt by political societies to
suppress self-help and substitute for it judicial processes").
523 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1113-14.
526 See generally G. H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 179-96 (5th ed. 1979).
527 See generally R. STARR & R. DONIN, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES-AN
EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE ch. 9 (1979).
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ing positions of merchant-lenders and consumers-borrowers, and to educate
the latter group or provide the mechanisms whereby they might educate
themselves. What is notable about all such regulations is that they attach
unavoidably to the relevant transactions. These regulations are entitlements
that are granted to the consumer, borrower, or farmer, and are protected by
"inalienability." Inalienability rules are virtually the opposite of property
rules; to a partial or full extent their "transfer is not permitted between a will-
ing buyer and a willing seller." 528
In this sort of regulation, the solution of modifying the problem to make it
desirable for private resolution tends to merge with a modification of the prob-
lem that, perhaps ironically, makes the problem at least partially infeasible of
private resolution. The total effect is to permit, and even make desirable,
private interaction; but only within a rigid negotiating Framework, the terms of
which have been unalterably removed from private negotiation. For most of
the above regulation, the terms that are specified for the parties are quite
detailed and specific. Such regulation can also be extremely general, in an at-
tempt to limit in ill-defined ways the possibility that one party to a resolution
might be unacceptably disadvantaged. The "unconscionability" provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 529 for example, create an unavoidable frame-
work designed to prevent the enforcement of private resolutions that reflect
undesirable bargaining conditions."°
In contrast to these legislative efforts, the more reactive procedure of com-
mon law deals in an ad hoc, uncategorical fashion with private resolutions made
undesirable by a severe imbalance in bargaining conditions. It has always been
possible in Anglo-American adjudication to strike down or modify private
agreements, but this normally occurs by the court invoking its "equitable
powers," which creates far weaker precedent. For example, in the 1948 case of
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wante et al. , 531 the defendants were Pennsylvania farmers
who signed a form contract to grow carrots for Campbell Soup Company, at
twenty-three to thirty dollars per ton."' After the harvest, the market shot up
to ninety dollars per ton, and the defendant refused to deliver."' Plaintiff
sought specific performance, which was denied at the i:rial level on grounds of
adequacy of legal remedy. 534 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but not
on that ground. The appellate court reviewed the entire agreement, and con-
cluded that the agreement, while not illegal, was too one-sided and inequitable
to the defendants to be enforced in the courts."'
528 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1092.
528 U.C.C. 5 2-302 (1962).
538 For a discussion of U.C.C. 5 2-302 as introducing a notion of "procedural uncon-
scionability," see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967).
"' 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
532 Id. at 81.
533 Id.
534 75 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
333 172 F.2d at 83.
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In addition to occasional refusals to enforce contracts that show an
"overall imbalance," common law courts also sometimes regulate particular
features of private interactions, such as disclaimers from tort liability. 536 In
some cases such disclaimers have been said to be totally unenforceable;" 7 in
other cases the clauses have been allowed to operate only where the court could
be sure that sufficient attention had been called to it.'" There has not
developed in the courts, however, the sort of categorical, systematic problem
modifications undertaken by the legislatures to resolve this type of feasible, yet
undesirable problem.
4. Infeasible-Undesirable Problems
The analysis of infeasible-undesirable problems is similar to that stated for
feasible-undesirable problems."' Here, private resolution is both infeasible
and undesirable. A successful modification would convert both problem
features so as to achieve feasibility and desirability of private resolution. Fail-
ing that, the likely judicial reaction is to reinforce the "infeasibility" feature
through the setting of entitlements protected by inalienability rules. Any in-
termediate solutions are counterproductive. If the "undesirability" feature
cannot be converted, a court would be unwise to adopt a solution that moves
across the associated procedures variable from "corrective" to "facilitative."
Similarly it would be unwise in such a case to make a problem modification
from "infeasible" to "feasible." If private resolution is irresolvably
undesirable, it is better to deal with the problem in such a fashion as to inhibit
536 The common law has not settled on a consistent rule regarding disclaimers from
negligence. As recently as 1961 the New York Court of Appeals held unanimously in Ciofalo v.
Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961) that
negligence disclaimers can be upheld like any other freely bargained contract term. Discussing
this case, Franklin in When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases,
18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966) states:
Yet, the state of the law is by no means clear. There are cases in which courts have
ruled that disclaimers against negligence liability were "against public policy" and
would not be enforced—an antipathy to disclaimers that belies the placid, almost in-
evitable, tone of the New York approach.
Id. at 1005, (citing Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1955) and Norway v.
Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361 P.2d 162 (1961 (dictum)). Accord W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 656 (4th ed. 1971). The law is similarly fluid in England. Rutter v. Palmer,
[1922] 2 K.B. 87, announced clear support for the operation of such clauses. Since then, the
clauses have been continually more narrowly confined and closely scrutinized. A. G. GUEST,
ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 160.63 (25th ed. 1979). Accord TRE1TEL, supra note 526, at 152-96.
57 See supra note 536 and cases cited therein.
"B See, e.g., Hollier v. Rambler Motors (A.M.C.) Ltd., (1972] 2 Q.B. 71, in which the
plaintiff had twice signed defendant car repairer's work form on which a disclaimer had ap-
peared. Id. at 75. On the third occasion, plaintiff merely telephoned defendant to arrange repair
of plaintiff's car. Id. at 74. The car was damaged on defendant's premises by a fire caused by de-
fendant's negligence. Id. at 74-75. The Court of Appeal refused to apply the exemption clause,
on two grounds: first, that there was insufficient course of dealing to import the clause into the
oral contract; id. at 75-78; second, that the language of the exemption clause did not specifically
and unequivocally cover negligence. Id. at 78-82. See also GUEST, supra note 536, at 162-63.
539 See supra notes 524-38 and accompanying text.
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such private resolution. There is also little point in converting the undesirable
feature if the infeasible feature cannot also be converted or dealt with by some
procedural adaptation.
Two sorts of problems were suggested abovem° as illustrating those for
which private resolutions were infeasible or undesirable. They were, first,
problems whereby the resolution adopted would create costs or burdens for
some third party who cannot join the negotiations; and second, problems
whereby the resolution adopted is offensive to generally held moral values. In
both cases the infeasibility does not refer to the disputants themselves, but
rather to the infeasibility of their being joined by, or taking account of, the
third parties who are more than usually affected by the disputants' private
resolution. In both cases the "undesirable" feature derives from this inability
of the third parties to affect the negotiations. Hence if the infeasibility cannot
be overcome the problem will remain "undesirable." The infeasibility de-
scribed by these two sorts of problem is extremely difficult to overcome by any
of the methods discussed above in the context of problems where private resolu-
tion is desirable but infeasible."' Hence the infeasibility, and therefore also the
undesirability also cannot be resolved. In dealing with these infeasible-undesir-
able problems, courts tend to respond by reinforcing infeasibility by stating en-
titlements that are protected by inalienability rules.
a. Private Resolutions that Create External Costs
The sort of private resolutions that create costs or burdens on parties who
cannot join the negotiations are typified by contracts that restrain trade. The
basic American antitrust statutes and British Restrictive Trade Practices
statutes"' in substance amount to little more than instructions to courts to
engage in the process of optimizing the various goals underlying the regulation
of competition. This the courts do by a variety of simplifying techniques and
problem modifications. The decisions of both British and American courts
have in common, however, that the entitlements they announce are protected
by rules of inalienability. That is, the decisions are regulatory, giving to non-
disputant competitors and the consuming public certain entitlements that can-
not be waived, modified, or transferred. This is the common form of such deci-
sions because it is utterly impractical, for example, to give to competitors or the
public a right to be free from fixed prices, yet protect such a right only by a
property rule. If the right is "stolen" by two companies agreeing to fix prices,
the conversion cannot practicably be remedied by private actions."' It is con-
' 4° See supra note 523 and accompanying text.
S41
 See supra notes 493-522 and accompanying text. Such methods are unsatisfactory in
resolving problems that are both infeasible and undesirable of private solution, because they were
directed at permitting a private transaction to proceed. In infeasible-undesirable problems the dif-
ficulty is that the solutions impose externalities of one sort or another on third parties.
342 See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
343 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1112 and note 42.
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ceivable a court could enforce such a right by an intervention similar to emi-
nent domain in which conspiring companies could elect to buy off the right by
paying any objectively determined value. In a sense this is what happens in the
private enforcement cases brought under the antitrust laws,'" The fact that
plaintiffs in private enforcement cases are entitled to treble damages,
however, 545
 demonstrates that the legislators do not consider antitrust cases to
be ones that can be made "desirable" for private resolution simply by pro-
viding entitlement-takers a mechanism for paying their way. Prohibitions
against price-fixing, attempts to create monopolies, etc. are announced by
courts in such a fashion as to leave no room for private negotiations. Because it
is impossible to overcome the infeasiblity of having all affected parties included
in the negotiations, private resolution remains undesirable, leading to court
decisions that make such resolutions impossible as a matter of law.
A more difficult case than the antitrust example occurs where one person
is allowed to sell his land to another, a polluter, thus injuring his neighbor by
lowering the value of his neighbor's land.'" Some commentators547 dismiss
dealing with this example by means other than an inalienability rule largely
because there are many possible affected neighbors, thus leading to the dif-
ficulties described in the antitrust example.'" If there is indeed only one
neighbor it would seem an easy modification to both the infeasibility and the
undesirable problem features simply to give the neighbor a property entitle-
ment to intervene in the transaction as a "third-party sufferer" analogous to a
"third-party beneficiary." It is curious that such a concept has not been ar-
ticulated. If the polluter's actions rise to the level of nuisance, the neighbor has
that remedy. There are many cases, however, in which a third party suffers
distinct injury that is not recognizable as nuisance. Perhaps such -third parties
have been protected in such cases by seeking an injunction and showing the
likelihood of imminent irreparable injury. Yet, as noted,'" dealing with mat-
ters in equity rather than law creates weaker precedent. A generally recognized
544 See infra note 545 and accompanying text.
54s See 5 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1976). Note also that S 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 26 (1976), authorizes private suits seeking injunctive relief. About private en-
forcement of antitrust violations, Sullivan states:
Most private actions are treble damage cases, though the number of suits for injunc-
tive relief is increasing. Private actions may be brought for virtually any antitrust of-
fense. There are cases challenging vertical restraints. There are also many impor-
tant cases brought by competitors and by customers challenging horizontal
restraints. Suits by major firms are becoming increasingly common, as are class ac-
tions. Damage awards and settlement sums have often been substantial. (footnotes
omitted).
SULLIVAN, supra note 258, at 769-70.
545 As stated by Calabresi & Melamed: "if Taney were allowed to sell his land to Chase,
a polluter, he would injure his neighbor Marshall by lowering the value of Marshall's land."
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1111.
'47 Id.
546 See supra notes 543-44 and accompanying text.
549 See supra notes 529-35 and accompanying text.
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right protecting third-party sufferers perhaps would facilitate private interac-
tions toward greater fairness and more efficient distribution of resources.
Where, then, problems are of a sort that their private resolution creates exter-
nal costs of a monetary nature, courts resort to State regulation of the problem,
thereby foreclosing the ability of the parties to effect a private solution. The
problem that follows, whereby private resolution is morally offensive to
unrelated third parties, is a specialized case illustrating the same principles,
and the same solutions.
b. Private Resolutions that are Morally Offensive
The second type of infeasible-undesirable problem arises where the terms
reached by private resolution are offensive to widely-held moral values as
where, for example, one wishes to sell one's self into slavery. 550 The in-
feasibility again arises from the large numbers of affected persons (those who
find slavery repugnant) who cannot intervene practically in the negotiations.
Yet because of free rider problems and high information costs,"' private
resolution is and will remain infeasible. The only remaining alternative 552 is for .
the State to prohibit such transactions altogether by resorting to rules of in-
alienability: people will be granted inalienable rights in their freedom and con-
tinued existence. 553
5. Summary
The predictions of how courts react to problems that are either infeasible
or undesirable, or both, cannot be made without considering both the feasibili-
ty and desirability of private resolution variables in tandem. If the variables
were considered separately, the framework would yield some false predictions.
For example, it would predict that where an undesirable problem feature could
not be modified, the courts should attempt a procedural adaptation toward
greater facilitation, and less correction. In fact, the court in such a case should
seek to minimize facilitation. This contradiction was anticipated earlier in this
article, where it was concluded that no firm associations could be drawn be-
tween the problem and procedure variables. 554 The difficulty is that corrective
procedures and facilitative procedures are not opposites in the same sense as
the other paired procedural qualities. Increasing the clarity of entitlements
through a strongly corrective procedure may very well further facilitate private
interaction with respect to such entitlements. 555 On the other hand it may not.
The confounding variable is whether the entitlement is accompanied by a prop-
'5° Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 122, at 1111.
"' Id. at 1112.
"7 Id.
"3 Id.
554 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
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erty rule, whether it is objectively valued, whether any party is given the right
to buy it, and whether its transfer or modification is prohibited. 556 This
variable provides the bridge between the variables of desirability and feasibility
of private resolutions that permits predictions to be made of judicial reactions
that are both more narrowly accurate and, one hopes, more generally il-
luminating about justiciability.
G. When Adjudication Faces Problems About Which Social Disagreement Exists
Disagreement in the community regarding the proper outcome of a prob-
lem is the one type of dissonance that has been widely debated by legal com-
mentators. Since Professor Bickel's extrolling of the "passive virtues,'' 557
much attention has been paid to such issues as the "political question
doctrine," "standing," "mootness," and "ripeness. " 556 Most analyses,
however, are set in the context of American Constitutional Law. Although this
section discusses in part these various prudential doctrines, and refers to cer-
tain Supreme Court decisions, the perspective is to view such doctrines as only
a small part of the many strategies of problem modification and procedural
adaptation that collectively comprise "justiciability."
The options available to judges in facing problems that involve social
disagreement are by now familiar. They may refuse outright to hear the case,
as occurs when the "political question doctrine" is invoked. They may func-
tionally refuse to hear an issue, either through the delay-producing procedural
devices of "standing," "mootness," or "ripeness," or by deciding the case on
narrow procedural grounds and thus not facing the issue squarely. They may
hear the case on its merits but attempt to convert the problem somehow into
one for which there exists a social consensus. Or, finally, they may hear the
case on its merits but adapt the procedures of adjudication, particularly toward
making a more "graduated, accommodative" decision rather than the tradi-
tional "binary" decision. 559 These responses will be generally discussed in the
contexts of three problems about which social disagreement exists: the death
"6 See generally Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 122.
"' Bickel, supra note 143 at 111-98; Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
538 See, e.g., J. RADCLIFFE, THE CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY PROVISION (1978); Albert,
Justiciability and the Theories of Judicial Review: A. Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139
(1977); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 'Case or Controversy' Requirement,
93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Brilmayer, supra note 482; Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues'—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Henkin, Is There a
'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV.
633 (1971); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363 (1973);
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. J. 517 (1966);
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
559 See supra notes 106.14 and accompanying text describing the associations between the
"consensus-dissensus" problem variable and the "binary-graduated, accommodative" proce-
dure variable.
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penalty, race relations, and abortion. As might be expected, judges resort to
several of the responses in dealing with these problems. But unexpectedly, we
shall see that judges also attempt, with varying success, to rule in the face of
dissensus, hoping thereby to force social movement toward a position that they
define.
1. The Death Penalty
In England, debate concerning the death penalty has largely been con-
fined to Parliament. Capital punishment was abolished in 1965 for the crime of
murder,'" and is retained only for treason's' and certain forms of piracy.'" In
the United States, however, the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution against "cruel and unusual punishment" has provided the
federal courts with jurisdiction over the permissibility of the death penalty.
Judicial treatment of the issue has included reluctance, delay, evasive
modifications, and inconsistency, the cumulative effect of which has been to
avoid announcing an absolute, binary decision on the matter. This, of course,
is predictable where courts face problems on issues where social disagreement
exists.
The Supreme Court at least three times refused to grant certiorari in cases
claiming that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."' It
first heard arguments on the issue in 1969, in Boykin v. Alabama.'" There,
Boykin, a black, faced execution for committing robbery. Although the
substantive issue of the constitutionality of the penalty was extensively briefed
and argued, 56' the Court reversed the conviction on the procedural ground that
the defendant did not fully understand the implications of making his guilty
plea, even though defendant never alleged the plea had been made involuntari-
ly or under duress.'" The Court held that the trial judge must "canvass . .
the matter with the defendant."'" This case illustrates a common response in
dealing with Eighth Amendment problems: to avoid a direct substantive
holding by focusing on procedure. This accomplishes three things: first, it
prevents the punishment from being imposed on the individual defendant; sec-
ond, the tighter the procedural requirements the fewer persons will be sub-
jected to the questionable punishment; third, it allows time for public opinion
565 See generally, 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 493 (4th ed. 1976).
56' Treason Act 1814, 54 Geo. 3, ch. 146, 1.
562 Piracy Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 88, 5 2.
363 Alvarez v. Nebraska, 393 U.S. 823 (1968); Craig v. Florida, 383 U.S. 959 (1966);
Swain v. Alabama, 382 U.S. 944 (1965). Refusal to grant certiorari is, of course, commonplace
and discretionary with the Court. Refusal in no way constitutes an opinion the case is "non-
justiciable."
564 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
565
 Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1773, 1798 (1970).
566 395 U.S. at 246, 249.
567 Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 182 (1969).
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to come to a consensus on the offensiveness or legitimacy of the punishment.
This "procedural response" to the death penalty issue is noted by former
Justice Goldberg, joining in an article with Professor Dershowitz:
The Supreme Court's failure to decide the constitutionality of the
death penalty is not accidental .. . . Some tension has arisen between
the Court's preference for procedural reform and its apparently
growing aversion to the death penalty itself.. . . The result has been
extraordinarily stringent requirements of procedural fairness in
capital prosecutions. 568
This avoidance technique frustrates many judges: some who would do more,
some who dislike the subterfuge. In Witherspoon a. Illinois, 569 for example, a
state law that would have allowed prosecutors to exclude persons from acting as
sentencing jurors if they admitted to conscientious scruples against imposing
the death penalty was declared unconstitutional. The dissenting opinions illus-
trate the judicial frustration, but also the hard decisions to be made by a court
where it faces dissensus problems. Said Justice White:
If the Court can offer no better constitutional grounds for today's
decision than those provided in the opinion, it should restrain its dis-
like for the death penalty and leave the decision about appropriate
penalties to branches of government whose members, selected by
popular vote, have an authority not extended to this Court. 57 °
And, with similar candor but suggesting the opposite solution, Justice Black
stated:
With all due deference it seems to me that one might much more ap-
propriately charge that this Court has today written the law in such a
way that the States are being forced to try their murder cases with
biased juries. If this Court is to hold capital punishment unconstitu-
tional, I think it should do so forthrightly. . . 57 '
During the 1970's, the Court did become somewhat more forthright, with
more of the Justices reaching the issue of capital punishment on its merits. The
opinions equivocate, however, and within the space of six years seem to make a
theoretical full circle. The landmark decision came in 1972, in Furman a.
Georgia." 2 This case has been described by one commentator as a
"jurisprudential debacle," 573 consisting of nine separate opinions resting on at
least three distinct rationales. Justices Brennan and Marshall considered the
death penalty per se cruel and unusual; Douglas, Stewart, and White concurred
568 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 565, at 1798, 1799.
'fig 391 U.S. 510 (1968), discussed in Goldberg and Dershowitz, supra note 565, at 1799,
note 117.
570 391 U.S. at 542, quoted in part in Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 565, at 1800.
5"
 391 U.S. 532, quoted in part in Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 565, at 1800.
572
 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
373 Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 998 (1978).
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in the result overturning the instant death sentence but on the more "limited
grounds that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was applied in a
sporadic, capricious, arbitrary, or unfairly discriminating way. " 574 In dissent,
Justices Burger, Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist would in principle have
allowed petitioners to be executed, but all "by and large . . . skirted the
substantive issue" 5 " by deferring on federalism grounds to the judgments of
the state legislatures. 576 Chief Justice Burger took direct issue with the prevail-
ing plurality opinions of Douglas, Stewart and White, arguing that jury sen-
tencing is not unconstitutionally capricious: the death penalty is rare, stated
the Chief Justice, not because juries are arbitrary or discriminatory, but
because they show mercy to all but the most reprehensible criminal."' Furman
in retrospect turned on a somewhat wider issue, namely who is to decide to exe-
cute criminals. Should it be the jury, with their unappealable discretion and
unpatterned results, or should it be the state legislatures, through their
deliberations of which crimes deserve such punishment. Even Furman, then,
was essentially a procedural case. It did not say squarely that executions are
cruel and unusual. Rather, it overturned the instant death sentence because
too much discretion had been left to juries, and the criteria of death was uncon-
stitutionally hidden. 578 This would to the uninitiated seem an unlikely rationale
by which to decide the cruelty of punishment. At least one commentator ex-
plained the Furman holding explicitly in terms of the Court reaching a decision
that accommodated the perceived split in public opinion. 579 Indeed, Justices
Brennan and Marshall referred directly in their holdings to what they saw as an
emerging consensus against the death penalty. Evidence was for them
manifested in three sources: "the fun]willingness of legislatures to authorize
capital punishment, of juries to impose it, and of the general public to support
it. " 580
 According to Sarat and Vidmar, the overt references in Furman to public
Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245,
1245 (1974),
"5
 Radin, supra note 573, at 998.
"6 Id.
577
 408 U.S. at 387-89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5 " The Furman majority, despite their disparate rationales for invalidating the
death penalty, shared at least one major premise: the unfettered discretion of
sentencing juries produced anomalous results. In their view, the few cases in which
the death penalty was imposed could not be distinguished on any acceptable basis
from the many in which the defendant's life was spared.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Death Penalty, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 105 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
579
 Arbitrariness was a compelling argument in Furman because the Court
perceived that the infrequency and capriciousness of executions demonstrated socie-
ty's rejection of the death penalty. Under those circumstances, the Court could not
countenance what appeared to be the pointless execution of a few. Moreover, the
Court's analysis permitted it to endorse the emergent consensus againt capital
punishment without outlawing the death penalty directly.
Id. at 107 (ftiotnote omitted).
'0 Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the
Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171, 174 (footnote omitted).
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opinion polls on the underlying issue are part of a wider "normative" ap-
proach to the standards by which Eighth Amendment cases should be judged.
According to the normative approach, judges look to such polls as ultimate
justifying criteria."' We need not defend or even demonstrate the general exis-
tence of such a "judgment by plebescite" method of Constitutional adjudica-
tion. It is enough for our purposes to note that most of the Furman opinions
made some sort of effort to justify their holding with prevailing public senti-
ment, even though evaluations of such sentiment varied widely. Such refer-
ences show the Justices to be at least aware of the widespread disagreement in
public opinion. The contention here is that such awareness compels an ap-
proach that is more graduated and accommodative ;
 that is, more cautious
about the articulation of a clear judicial position. 552
This hesitancy is best proved in the latest major case, Lockett v. Ohio."'
The effect of Lockett is to go full circle from the pre-Furman division of responsi-
bility between jury and state legislature. Furman struck down a death sentence
because the then-prevailing practice of allowing sentencing juries unfettered
discretion to consider any mitigating circumstances resulted in the imposition
of capital punishment in a way that defied rational explanation or consistent
pattern. Unrestrained jury discretion was equated with caprice, and dis-
allowed. This led many states to enact statutes that either called for a manda-
tory death sentence for certain crimes, or else confined the factors that could be
considered by the jury in passing sentence. In 1976, Woodson v. North Carolina 584
and Roberts v. Louisiana's' invalidated the mandatory provisions: Gregg v.
Georgia, 586 jurek v. Texas, 587 and Profitt v. Florida 588
 upheld the guided discretion
statutes. But even this seeming compromise between the role of the legislature
and sentencing jury could not hold. In Lockett, 589
 a guided discretion statute
stated that those convicted of felony-murders must receive a death sentence ex-
cept where the trial judge found the existence of one of three mitigating circum-
stances:
(1) that the victim induced or facilitated the murder;
381 Id. 173-75.
582
 As Radin has stated:
JI]n the cases challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty a surprising
observation can be made. Not only have certain Justices adopted different adjudica-
tory attitudes from one case to the next without appearing to notice it, but the at-
titudes expressed or implied in the various opinions have often been so disparate as
to range from one end of the spectrum to the other, from the rhetoric of extreme ac-
tivism to that of extreme deference.
Radin, supra note 573, at 1002.
5" 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
5" 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
585
 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
586
	 U.S. 153 (1976).
"7 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
588 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
589
 As analyzed in Note, 92 HARV. L. REV. 99, supra note 578, at 100-01.
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(2) that the offender acted under duress, coercion, or strong provo-
cation; or
(3) that the offense was primarily the product of psychosis or mental
deficiency insufficient to constitute legal insanity. 59°
Since the judge did not find any such mitigation to be present in the case, he
sentenced the defendant to die. 59 ' The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding the statute violative of the Eighth Amendment because it "impermis-
sibly prevented the trial sentencer from giving weight to mitigating factors
other than those specified in the law.'" 92 In other words, the quality of mercy
must not be strained; the sentencer must be allowed full discretion to consider
any factor.
Clearly, then, we have arrived back at the pre-Furman position. In his dis-
sent to Lockett, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the case may either be "seminal"
or "the third false start in . . the past six years." 593 If the predictions of judi-
cial response to problems involving widespread and intense social disagree-
ment are correct, it is the latter.
2. Race Relations and Abortion
It is an unworthy subject of investigation that never produces surprise.
The American judicial treatment of the final two examples, race relations and
abortion, are nothing if not surprising. Perhaps for that reason they make fit-
ting final examples of the richness and complexity of "justiciability."
Given the intense and widespread social disagreement about proper out-
come, one would expect to find in the judicial opinions dealing with these prob-
lems all manner of evasive, modifying, and adaptive responses. Instead the
courts have dealt with the matters relatively forthrightly. To be sure, the pru-
dential doctrines are occasionally invoked to prevent argument on certain
aspects of the problems, or to prevent argument by certain persons. 594 On the
5" Onto REV. CODE ANN., §§ 2929.03-2929.04 (B) (1975),
591 438 U.S. at 594.
592 Note, 92 HARV. L. REV. 99, supra note 578, at 101, citing 438 U.S. at 604-05.
393 438 U.S. at 632.
59'
	 Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 479 (1972) who described the pre-Roe v. Wade "standing" issue as follows:
The lawyer handling a suit challenging an abortion statute will argue that his plain-
tiffs have standing under conventional notions, in an attempt to disguise the public
nature of the suit. The courts have responded in a similar vein by finding standing
when any personal interest can be shown. The "standard plan" in these suits is to
include as plaintiffs a physician, a pregnant woman desiring an abortion, a woman
seeking to avoid pregnancy, and other concerned professionals. In most cases stand-
ing has not been a problem, at least for the treating physician and his patient.
Id. at 498 (footnote omitted),
Seller does note, however, Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz.
1971), in which a complaint by a physician, married couples, and the Planned Parenthood .
Association was dismissed for lack of a case or controversy, failure to show "irreparable injury,"
and failure to exhaust state remedies. Sedler also notes Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32 (D.
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whole, however, the courts have neither refused to hear the cases nor tampered
with the problems. Nor can it be said that the opinions have avoided clearly
stated, binary results: both Brown v. Board of Education"' and Roe v. Wade, 596 the
landmark abortion case, leave little doubt about their implications. As sug-
gested above, 59' an institution will sometimes announce decisions on problems
about which such disagreement exists in an exaggerated binary fashion in
hopes of forging consensus through their decision, or in hopes at least of dis-
couraging the opposition. Both race relations and abortion may well be illustra-
tive of this "leadership" response to these problems ..
If one accepts this suggestion, one is immediately struck by a seeming
anomaly. Brown and its progeny are widely hailed as great judicial decisions; 59 a
Roe v. Wade, on the other hand, is severely criticised by even those who support
Minn. 1970), aff'd sub. nom. Hodgson v. Randall, 402 U.S. 967 (1971), which was held not to be
justiciable because the physician who had performed an abortion had not been prosecuted, and
the mere threat of prosecution did not constitute an "actual controversy." Sedler, supra note 594,
at 498 note 119.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), itself is interesting from the perspective of the
Prudential doctrines. The Court overlooked the fact that a pregnant plaintiff's case was technical-
ly mooted because at the time of argument she was not pregnant. As Monaghan complains:
But the Court then held that a married couple regularly having intercourse lacked
any "standing." The attempted distinction between the two situations on Article III
grounds seems without rationality. Perhaps the Court might have properly dis-
missed the married couple petition for want of ripeness, but certainly not for lack of
standing. The confusion between ripeness and standing becomes even more pro-
nounced once the Court's discussion of the "standing" of clergy, nurses and social
workers to challenge abortion statutes is examined.
Monaghan, supra note 558, at 1381.
As for race relations, Sedler summarizes that "[t]he courts have liberally interpreted
standing requirements in cases involving claims of racial discrimination." Sedler, supra note 594
at 499. However, in Brown v. Lutz, 316 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. La. 1970), and Hadnott v. City of
Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), "blacks who were not personally affected by the
alleged discrimination were held to lack standing." Sedler, supra note 594 at 500. Moreover,
standing has been important to exclusionary zoning cases in which the link to racial discrimina-
tion is indirect. See, e.g., W arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
'" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
596
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
$97 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
598 The discussion of Brown is so voluminous as to defy citation. For some recent com-
mentary on the past and future of this issue, see, e.g. , Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice
Situations, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1978); Bindman, The Law and Racial Discrimination: Third
Thoughts, 3 BRIT. J. L. Soc. 110 (1976); Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REv.
427 (1979); Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classification, Desegregation, and Reverse
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494 (1977); Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time has Come:
Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI, L. REV. 742
(1974); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion—a Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979); Lustgarten, The New Meaning of Discrimination,
1978 PUB. L. 178; Neuborne, Observation on Weber [United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 Sup. Ct. 2721J,
54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 546 (1979); Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of 'Affirmative Action', 67
CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1979); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Struc-
tural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979); Wasserstrom, Rascism, Sexism, and Preferential
Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977).
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liberalized abortion. 599
 By contrasting in each of these cases the nature of the
disagreement, the timing of judicial involvement, and the sort of arguments
made in the respective opinions, perhaps something can be learned about when
judiciary leadership is appropriate, and when, on the other hand, the judiciary
should respond in a more evasive or accommodative manner.
In the case of pre-Brown race relations it is fair to say that the social
disagreement had led to a political stalemate. First, opinions on the question
were obviously split along regional lines. 600 In a federal system this means that
relegating the matter to local control will simply maintain the status quo. At
the national level, the legislature was similarly split into warring camps of suffi-
cient strength that there could be little hoped for resolution. 60 ' The executive
(President Eisenhower) kept a stony silence on the issue. As a result, there was
nowhere for this problem to go but the judiciary. In contrast, the political
debate in the year just prior to Roe v. Wade would give rise to the belief that a
consensus was emerging in favor of relaxing the restrictions upon abortion."'
599 See, e.g. , Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV.
159; Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roc Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1979);
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stand-
ards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 221 (1973).
600 As reported in Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 377 (1954), just prior to Brown eighteen jurisdictions (virtually all of the Southern and
"border" states) made segregated schools mandatory by statute or judicial opinion. Id. at 378,
n.3.
691
 One commentator describes the reaction to Brown as follows:
To white southerners the decision on Black Monday [the day of the Supreme Court
decisions was received by most with deep resentment or bitter anger, by some with
quiet resignation, and by very few with rejoicing. Most southern editorial writers
vowed an eternal fight to preserve the southern way of life and prevent the
mongrelization of the races. Segregationist organizations flourished: moribund Ku
Klux Klan Klaverns gained new life and White Citizens' Councils mushroomed.
Opposition leaders were encouraged by strong statements of southern Congressmen
vowing to fight to the finish for segregation, and by the deafening silence from the
White House, where President Eisenhower refused to make any public comment on
the Supreme Court decision, and was rumored to be personally opposed to school
integration .... [D]espite the growth and viability of the civil rights movement, if
implementation of school integration was to occur, it was clear that it would have to be
accomplished through the federal judiciary, the weakest of the three governmental
branches, since Congress was controlled by southern committee chairmen and
paralyzed by threats of southern filibusters, while the President remained silently
aloof.
Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1975) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
602 In 1973 political forces were still vigorously debating abortion. Most states had
prohibited •abortions, except to save a woman's life, since the nineteenth century,
but a movement was afoot to relax that restriction. In the five years immediately
preceding Roe, thirteen states had revised their statutes to resemble the Model Penal
Code's provisions, which allowed abortions not only if the pregnancy threatened the
woman's life, but also if it would gravely impair her physical or mental health, if it
resulted from rape or incest, or if the child would be born with grave physical or-
mental defects. Four states had removed all restrictions on the permissible reasons
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The effect of Roe, of course, was to preempt most such debate. Those frustrated
by the decision mounted a campaign for the only remaining political remedy,
namely a Constitutional Amendment that would overrule the Court. Abortion
also played a controversial role in the 1976 Presidential Elections. 6"
Richard Morgan makes another point about the judicial intervention in
Roe that can be sharply contrasted with Brown. He states that the Roe Court
disregarded the axiom of judicial review that:
even after a dispute reaches the judicial system, the Supreme Court
should still hesitate to hear a specific case until lower courts have
"aged" the dispute by articulating the best arguments on both sides
and discarding the unpersuasive or irrelevant. 6"
In other words, by reaching early for the issue, the Court did not then have
available that series of approximations that the slow spontaneity of adjudica-
tion provides. As Morgan describes the lower court experience with the abor-
tion issue:
Between 1970 and 1972, a flurry of constitutional challenges hit the
courts, but of the seventeen courts that decided right-of-privacy
claims, twelve were three-judge district courts whose judgments
allowed direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, when the Court
had Roe before it and looked, as the axiom has it, to the lower-court
deliberations, it found not one federal decision that had received
intermediate appellate consideration, and only four decisions of state
supreme courts, none of which offered particularly illuminating
analysis.
In general, three years is hardly time enough for the judicial
system to evolve sound analysis for most constitutional issues, and
for so emotionally charged an issue as abortion, three years was very
little time indeed. The Court could justifiably have let the dispute
simmer longer in the lower courts. 605
Racial desegregation, on the other hand, had simmered in the federal
courts since the 1896 dictum in Plessy v. Ferguson"6 had approved of "separate
but equal" schools. 607 Judicial supervision of this requirement of equal facili-
for seeking an abortion before a pregnancy passed specified lengths.
Morgan, supra note 599, at 1726 (footnotes omitted).
6" See Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate Analysis of
Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1750 (1979).
6°4
	 supra note 599, at 1725 (footnote omitted).
6°5 Id. at 1728-29.
6° 6 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
607 Plessy itself concerned segregated railcar accommodations. In validating a Louisiana
statute requiring such segregated facilities, the Court stated:
The most common instance of this [segregation] is connected with the establishment
of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid
exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of
the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enfDrced.
163 U.S. at 544.
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ties began slowly, but a watershed was reached in 1938 in Missouri ex rel Gaines
v. Canada. 608 There, the Court ordered Missouri to provide, within its bounda-
ries, "facilities for [the legal education of Negroes] substantially equal to those
which the State there afforded for perions of the white race. "609 On the eve of
the Brown decision, it required an Appendix of six pages of small print for
Leflar and Davis to categorize the lower Federal court and State court cases
that had considered the issue of segregated educational facilities. 610
Finally, one might contrast the quality of the arguments used in the opin-
ions. Roe is widely viewed as resorting to "substantive due process," which has
become a euphemism for unprincipled judicial second-guessing of the legisla-
tures. 6 " Roe v. Wade holds612 that during the first trimester of pregnancy the
State may interfere with abortions in no way except to require that they be per-
formed by a physician; 613 during the second trimester, the State may regulate,
but not prohibit, abortions toward the goal of protecting maternal health; 614
during the final trimester the State may prohibit abortions except when an abor-
tion would be necessary to protect maternal health. 6 " The reasoning is that as
the fetus matures, the State's interest in protecting the fetus grows, as does the
State interest in protecting maternal health, which becomes increasingly en-
dangered the later in pregnancy an abortion is allowed. 616 Weighed against
such interests is the right of the woman's privacy, 6 " which is not a right specif-
ically mentioned in the Constitution. About this as a justification for the
Court's tripartite holding, Ely states:
What is unusual about Roe is that the liberty involved is accorded a
far more stringent protection, so stringent that a desire to preserve
the fetus's existence is unable to overcome it—a protection more
stringent, I think it is fair to say, than the present Court accords the
freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment.
What is frightening about Roe is that this superprotected right is not
inferable from the language of the Constitution . . . Nor is it ex-
plainable in terms of the unusual political impotence of the
group. . . .M 8
Harry Wellington is equally offended by the unmeasured nature of the Court's
argument:
60 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
669 305 U.S. at 351.
616 Leflar and Davis, supra note 600, at 430-35.
6" Epstein, supra note 599, passim; Tribe, supra note 599, at 7.
6" As summarized in Ely, supra note 599, at 921.
6 " 410 U.S. at 163, 165.
6" Id. at 163.
611 Id. at 163-64.
616 Id. at 162-63.
617 Id. at 152-53.
618 Ely, supra note 599 at 935-36 (footnotes omitted).
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Eisenstadt v. Baird [405 U.S. 438 (1972)] set the stage for Roe v.
Wade. . . A sense of concern with appropriate limits is lacking
in Eisenstadt; the analytical struggle with the problem, abandoned or
begged; the momentum for an overbroad, because it is under-
analyzed, due process, set in motion. Roe soon followed. 619
Wellington continues:
I am bound to say ... that even if I am wrong as to the appropriate
scope of judicial review, even if review of health matters should be
searching, the Court has failed to make its case. Search as one may,
he will not discover why a woman's liberty is constitutionally im-
paired if her safety is improved or her consent assured. She may be
inconvenienced somewhat, but surely that is not the issue. Liberty
cannot mean instantaneous gratification. Even the First Amend-
ment grants no such right. 62°
Tribe is no more charitable: "One of the most curious things about Roe is that,
behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which it rests
is nowhere to be found. 1 /621
In Brown, much has been made of footnote eleven of the opinion that re-
ferred generally to the research of Gunnar Myrdal and others regarding the
psychological effects of segregation. Judge John Minor Wisdom, however, dis-
putes that such appeal to sociology was in any way crucial to the opinion, and
disputes the idea that the Court was merely "legislating social goals into the
law. )'622 Similarly, even while guardedly criticizing the specific rationale cho-
sen by the Court, Professor Wechsler wrote in 1959:
I find it hard to think the judgment really turned upon the facts.
Rather, it seems to me, it must have rested on the view that racial
6"
 Wellington, supra note 599, at 297-98.
620 Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
621 Tribe, supra note 599, at 7, quoted in Morgan, supra note 599, at 1724, n.5.
622 Wisdom states:
Whatever effect the Court gave to the social science testimony, unarticulated in the
opinion, Brown was the product of irresistible social and political forces "an idea
whose time had come." But the opinion broke no new ground in judicial
methodology. The Court rested its decision on the content of the fourteenth amend-
ment in the context of the time, confident that it was interpreting the Constitution as
a living document for all times. Had there been no social data in the record, no foot-
note eleven, Chief Justice Warren, backed by all the Court, would still have been
able, (1) to start with the premise, as he did, that "we cannot turn the clock back,"
but "must consider public education in the light of its full development and its pres-
ent place in American life;" (2) to argue in a traditional judicial manner, as he did,
by analogy from Sweatt and McLaurin, that "intangible considerations" apply with
"added force to children in grade and high school;" and (3) to conclude that
"separate but equal" is "inherently unequal."
Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial Decision-Making Process in School
Desegregation Cases, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 134, 141-42 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
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segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority
against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved. 523
In sum, Brown seems to have attracted a greater consensus of approval than
Roe.
Certainly there are contrasts between Roe and Brown regarding the exist-
ence of decisional alternatives, judicial experience with the arguments, and the
depth of the underlying cultural principles. It would be tempting, therefore, to
conclude that Roe was a mistake, that the court should have adopted an ap-
proach more predictable under this paper's framework of justiciability. But in
fairness much more time has elapsed since Brown, and much progress has been
made in healing the social disagreement. The role played by Brown in such
process is yet debated, and so it may be too early to judge the Court's response
in Roe. Problems involving strong social disagreement present to the courts
perhaps the most difficult dissonance with traditional adjudications. In addi-
tion to questions of whether and how a court might intervene, there are painful
questions of when. In large part the prudential doctrines allow flexibility on
this issue, as do certain of the evasive problem modifications. By the ensuing
delay the problem may well be made less dissonant, or the courts may devise
an acceptable accommodation. If not, the courts must like all of us make their
leap into the dark.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to do justice to this topic. The article has tried to examine ad-
judication using a method and perspective that could as well be used to exam-
ine the legislature, or the marketplace, or the family. This urge was born of a
notion that all those social institutions have in common that they confront
problems, and cope as best they can. Few problems are resolved exclusively
within a single institution. This suggests that at least some choice exists as to
the means by which society defines and attempts to resolve problems. For such
a choice to be informed, much less implemented, there must be a common vo-
cabulary by which problems and procedures are discussed and evaluated. The
eight problem variables and procedure variables attempt one step toward that
end. The variables and their interactions create a complex but hopefully re-
fined and manageable vocabulary for discussing problems and procedures of
every sort.
In devising the framework of problem and procedure variables, some
compromises were made. Additional variables could be described, and addi-
tional associations exist among those variables that are discussed. The strong
correlations found between ideal justiciability and the problems most often
heard in adjudication are heartening, for they show that the framework is not
623 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 33
(1959).
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grossly inaccurate. The exceptions to the correlation, namely criminal sentenc-
ing and the setting of bail, serve further to prove the theory: they are in fact
problems with which both judges and commentators (not to mention prisoners)
chronically feel discomfort.
The second half of this article demonstrates both the vast structural range
of problems that are submitted for adjudication, and the ingenuity with which
judges resolve the various dissonances presented by such problems. The degree
to which specific judicial responses can be predicted and explained within the
analytical framework of the problem and procedure variables provides valida-
tion to many of the details of the theory.
A dialogue could now begin comparing and contrasting adjudication with
non-legal methods of problem-solving, or with dispute resolution techniques
such as mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and the emerging mini-trial. The
result could be recommendations on the sorts of problems best suited to be
resolved by each technique. Such recommendations cannot be made solely
from the discussion in this article. However unsuitable a problem is for ad-
judication, it does not necessarily follow that the problem should be refused by
judges as non-justiciable. To make such a conclusion one must know the conse-
quences of such a refusal: the prospects that some alternative decisional institu-
tion will deal with the problem more accurately, efficiently, and acceptably, or,
less happily, that the problem will be resolved by violence or with lasting un-
necessary injury to one of the parties. Such questions are of immense impor-
tance; hopefully their resolution can be assisted through the analysis here pro-
vided.
Before sending our problems to alternative decision systems, however, a
final word about the procedure with which we are most familiar. Adjudication
is indeed our court of last resort. It acquires its immense prestige in large part
from its general availability when other decision systems fail. Whatever may be
the shortcomings of judges and their procedures as a residual decision system,
adjudication remains for the most part rational, consistent, principled, and
fair. That it does not perfectly solve all problems is to be expected. Rather what
is astonishing is that it adapts so well to problems to which it is ill-suited.
APPENDIX A
Eight Structural Variables
By Which Problems Can Be Described
A. The "Difficulty" of the Problem
1. The problem is composed
of "simple" variables 	
2. Decisional criteria for
the problem are well
established 	
3. Decisional information
or evidence about the
problem is based solely
on past events 	
The problem is composed
of "interactive" variables
Decisional criteria for
the problem are unknown
or disputed
Decisional information
or evidence about the
problem is based on pre-
dictions of future events.
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B. The "Setting" of the Problem
1. The relationship of
	 The relationship of
the parties is	 the parties is
"simplex"  	 "multiplex"
2. The dispute is
	
The dispute is
"private"  
	
"public"
3. Private resolution	 Private resolution
of the problem is
	
of the problem is
infeasible  	 feasible
C. 'The "Social Concerns" Associated with the Problem
1. High social consensus	 Social dissensus exists
exists on the proper 	 on the proper outcome
outcome of the problem 	 of the problem
2. Private resolution of	 Private resolution of
the matter is highly
	 the matter is highly
undesirable 	 desirable
APPENDIX B
Eight Variables Useful in
Differentiating Among Procedures
A.
 The Decisional Process
1. The decision is made	 The decision is made
spontaneously  	 deliberatively
2. The process is
	 The process is
universalist  	 particularist
3. The process is	 The process is
reactive  	 active
B. The Relationship between the Procedures and the Parties
1. The proceedings are	 The proceedings are
controlled by	 controlled by
strangers 	 the disputants
2. Participation in the 	 Participation in the
proceedings is	 proceedings is
strict and assured  	 loose and diffuse
3. The decisionmaking is
	 The decisionmaking is
strongly responsive
	 weakly responsive
to the parties' proofs	 to the parties' proofs
and arguments
	  and arguments
C. The Nature of the Decision Reached
1. The decision is 	 The decision is gradu-
binary  	 ated or accommodative
2. The decision is 	 The decision is
corrective  	 facilitative
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APPENDIX C
A Summary of the Major Associations of
Procedures and Problem Variables
Al: "Deliberative" procedures are suitable for "simple" problems. "Spontaneous" procedures
are capable of resolving either "simple" or "interactive" problems.
A2: Procedures employing "universalist" rules, but "particularist" evidence are best suited to
problems whose decisional criteria are "well-established." Procedures employing "par-
ticularist" rules but "universalist" evidence are best suited to problems whose decisional
criteria are "disputed" or "unknown." The associations between problem criteria and the
treatment of disputants are not strong. There may be a tendency, however, for "universalist
treatment" of disputants to be associated with "well-established" . problem criteria, and
"particularist treatment" of disputants to be associated with "disputed" or "unknown"
problem criteria.
A3: "Active" procedures are better suited to solving problems that require analysis of "future"
events. "Reactive" procedures are better suited to problems based on "past" events.
Bl: "Stranger-controlled" proceedings are suitable to problems arising in the context of
"simplex" party relationships. "Disputant controlled" proceedings are better suited to
"multiplex" party problems, except where the parties are very unequal in power or
knowledge.
82: "Strict, assured" procedures are associated with "private" disputes; "diffuse, loose" pro-
cedures are associated with "public" disputes.
B3: "Weakly responsive" procedures are more suitable to problems for which private resolution
is "infeasible," but also to certain problems for which private resolution is "feasible."
"Strongly responsive" procedures are more suitable to resolving certain problems for which
private resolution is "feasible."
Cl: "Binary" decisions are associated with "social concensus" problems; Procedures employ-
ing "graduated" or "accommodative" decisions are more suited to "social dissensus"
problems.
C2: No generalization can be made between procedures that are "facilitative" or "corrective"
and whether or not private resolution of a problem is "desirable" or "undesirable."
APPENDIX D
A Graphical Representation of the Structural Profile
of Traditional Anglo-American Adjudication
Al:
Spontaneous 
	 Deliberative
A2: (a) Appeal to General Rules or Doctrine
Universalist	 " 	 Particularist
(b) Decisional Information or Evidence
Universalist 	 Particularist
(c) Social Assumptions about Disputants
Universalist 	 * 	 Particularist
A3:
Reactive	 • 	 Active
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B I :
Stranger	 Disputant
control 	 •
	  control
B2:
Strict, Assured
	 Diffuse, Loose
participation	 * 	
 participation
B3:
Strongly	 Weakly
responsive 	 •
	  responsive
Cl:
Binary	 Graduated, Accommodative
decision     decision
C2:
Corrective     Facilitative
APPENDIX E
A Profile of the Structural Characteristics
of the "Ideally Justiciable" Problem
Al:
Simple content	 Interactive content
variables  
	 variables
A2:
Well-established
	 Disputed or Unknown
decisional criteria	 * 	
 decisional criteria
A3:
Past-oriented '
	 Future-oriented
BI:
Simplex	 Multiplex
	
relationships    relationships
B2:
Private	 Public
disputes
 	
•
	  disputes
B3:
Private resol-	 Private resolution
ution feasible 	 infeasible
Cl:
Social consensus
	 Social dissensus
on proper outcome     on proper outcome
C2:
Private resol-	 Private resolution
ution desirable
	
•
	  undesirable
